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Abstract 
This research has investigated how anonymity has been achieved 
in text-based online conversations. It has found that anonymity 
could be attained without any special provision from a 
conversation system. The absence of face-to-face contact and use 
of typed remarks are sufficient to create anonymity.  
Nevertheless, the lack of special provisions can make it difficult 
for some to use the anonymity they have attained. Preserving 
such naturally attained anonymity can be equally difficult for 
users. System administrators will also have trouble controlling 
anonymity without special provisions. Will deliberate provisions 
for anonymity remove these problems? 
The goal of this research is to determine how anonymity in 
online conversations could and should be supported. An existing 
conversation system lacking in special support for anonymity 
has been selected. Every possible change for the benefit of 
anonymity has been made to this system. The changes that have 
been made and why they were made are described in this thesis. 
The impact of those changes is also discussed. 
The final outcome of this research is a set of guidelines and 
standards for supporting anonymity in text-based online 
conversations. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
1 Introduction 
Text-based online conversations and Anonymity 
A text-based online conversation is a style of communication where two or 
more parties exchange typed remarks over a computer network in real-time.
1
 
Since there is no direct contact between the conversing parties, very little may 
be known or certain about the identity of one another. 
A username (ie login name) may be all that one party knows about another—a 
point illustrated in the hypothetical (text-based) online conversation below: 
bob: hey terminator 
terminator: yes? 
bob: what's your real name? 
terminator: just call me terminator like everyone else 
bob: but who are you? 
terminator: i am terminator 
Even if a person were to provide a ‘real name’, how would one know it was not 
simply something fabricated? In fact, everything the person said might have 
been fabricated. As the following hypothetical shows, someone using the 
name Bill Gates does not necessarily mean that the founder of Microsoft 
Corporation is online: 
bob: who are you gates? 
gates: Bill Gates 
bob: i mean who are you in real-life? 
gates: I am BILL GATES. I am Microsoft! 
 
1
 The phrase text-based online conversation was an expression coined by the author 
because he believed it was more concise and accurate than terms such as: 
synchronous computer-mediated communication (Reid 1991), real-time computer 
conferencing (Ellis et el 1991), text-based synchronous remote electronic meetings 
(Rees et el 1993), chat (Shafer 1997) or chatting (Crumlish 1997), or online 
synchronous conversations (Suler 1997b). 
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bob: are you serious? 
gates: Yes 
Who are the people behind the names Terminator and Bill Gates? 
An Anonymous user 
The Oxford
2
 dictionary explains that the adjective anonymous originates from 
the Greek word anõnumos, which literally means nameless. Understandably, 
the Oxford dictionary regards an ‘anonymous’ person as someone whose 
‘name is unknown.’ Is the user ‘terminator’ anonymous? The word name needs 
to be clarified to answer this question. 
Virtually all dictionaries (including the Oxford) define a name as a word by 
which a person is addressed (ie spoken of or to). In other words, terminator is 
a name. As such, the user ‘terminator’ is not anonymous by definition. 
However, the author argues that such an understanding of anonymity is not 
appropriate in an environment where everyone essentially has a ‘name’—his or 
her username. He prefers to think of an anonymous person as someone 
mysterious and not merely nameless. 
The name terminator does not make the user ‘terminator’ any less mysterious. 
Is ‘terminator’ a male or female? What does ‘terminator’ look like? How old is 
‘terminator’? Where does ‘terminator’ live? The author believes that the real 
name of ‘terminator’ (ie the name recorded in his or her birth certificate, 
passport, or identity card) is at least needed for these questions to be 
answered. The qualifier ‘at least’ is used since a person’s real name may not 
even be sufficiently unique. In a world where there are billions of people, it is 
not unimaginable that there could be (several) people having the same full 
name. To simplify matters however, the author defines an anonymous person 
as someone whose (full) real name is not known. In other words, one’s 
‘acquaintance’ of ten years is still technically anonymous until one knows his 
or her full real name. 
Some support for the author’s ‘definition’ can be found in the Webster’s
3
 
dictionary. It regards an anonymous person as someone ‘with no name known 
or acknowledged.’ In other words, someone who refuses to provide a name or 
has provided an unacknowledged (ie unrecognised) name is anonymous. That 
should be equivalent to saying that a person is anonymous unless his or her 
acknowledged name is known. Since a person’s real name is perhaps the only 
name that is universally acknowledged, one should be able to assert that a 
person is anonymous unless his or her real name is known. 
Is ‘terminator’ anonymous? A person’s username can be (and is often) different 
from his or her real name. A full real name such as Sarah Jane Parker consists 
 
2
 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (Seventh Edition). 
3
 Webster’s New World College Dictionary (Third Edition). 
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of three separate names: a first (given) name, followed by a middle (given) 
name, and a last name (ie family name).
4
 In comparison, a username is usually 
a single word. It can be anything from the person’s real name (eg 
sarah_jane_parker or sarahjane_parker) to a truncated version (eg parker_s, 
sarah_j_parker, sarahjane, sarah, or even rah), to something concocted (eg 
sunrise or terminator). It is clear that terminator is not someone’s full real 
name. Since all that is known about ‘terminator’ is the name terminator, he or 
she must be anonymous. 
Trying to deduce who a person is, based on a username, will be difficult if not 
impossible. A username such as terminator does not reveal anything about a 
user. Is the user a male or female? Even if someone were to have a more 
traditional username such as sarah, how would one know that ‘sarah’ is a 
female? How would one know that Sarah is the person’s real name? Even if 
Sarah were the user’s first name, the user’s real name is not yet known. What 
is her last name? Without knowing her last name (and other given names), 
what she looks like, sounds like, or where she lives, it will be very difficult to 
determine which person is the user ‘sarah’. 
Is the user ‘gates’ anonymous? This user has revealed his identity—Bill Gates, 
the founder of Microsoft Corporation. If one accepts that ‘gates’ is the Bill 
Gates, then ‘gates’ is not anonymous. If one does not, ‘gates’ must be 
anonymous because ‘he’ (or ‘she’) has not admitted any other names. 
An Anonymous remark 
According to the Webster’s dictionary, the adjective anonymous is also used to 
describe something ‘given, written, etc. by a person whose name is withheld 
or unknown.’ In other words, anything done or made by someone that cannot 
be named is anonymous. In the context of online conversations, an anonymous 
remark is a remark that is not tagged by a user’s username (ie is a remark that 
cannot be traced to a user). 
The remarks in the following hypothetical conversation are technically not 
anonymous because each is tagged by a username: 
bob: excuse me people 
bob: does anyone know whether i should buy Apple or Microsoft shares? 
terminator: Microsoft of course! 
gates: buy Apple shares while Steve Jobs is there 
A name tag on one’s jacket identifies one to strangers. In a similar way, a 
username tag on one’s remarks identifies one’s remarks. The tag on one’s 
jacket can be removed. Similarly, the tags on one’s remarks can also be 
removed. The username tags are present because of the underlying 
 
4
 The composition of a person’s full (real) name may differ according to culture and 
race. The author’s own name is one such example where it begins with a given 
name, followed by a surname, and ends with two other given names. 
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conversation system.
5
 Any conversation system can remove the username tags 
from the remarks of its users. Without the username tags, the remarks become 
anonymous: 
excuse me people 
does anyone know whether i should buy Apple or Microsoft shares? 
Microsoft of course! 
buy Apple shares while Steve Jobs is there 
Is the remark below a non-anonymous remark? ‘Yes,’ by definition. However, 
there are two kinds of non-anonymous remarks. 
terminator: Microsoft of course! 
If one knew that ‘terminator’ was Sarah Parker (ie if ‘terminator’ were not 
anonymous), the remark above would in fact, be an identified remark. An 
identified remark is a non-anonymous remark. An identified remark can be 
traced to a specific person in the real world. 
Some element of anonymity would exist in a remark if its author were 
anonymous. If ‘terminator’ were anonymous, the remark by ‘terminator’ 
cannot be traced to a person in the real world. However, the remark cannot be 
regarded as an anonymous remark because it can be traced to a user (ie 
‘terminator’). Nonetheless, the author sees no reason why a remark tagged by 
an anonymous username cannot be called a semi-identified (or semi-
anonymous) remark. 
Research issues 
From the discussions in this chapter alone, three simple ways of achieving 
anonymity in online conversations (ie conversational anonymity) have been 
described: 
1 by using a mysterious username 
2 by pretending to be someone else (ie by using a false name) 
3 by using a conversation system that does not tag remarks with 
usernames 
Is conversational anonymity this easily attained in reality? How has 
conversational anonymity been supported? What problems may confront 
someone anonymous or someone seeking anonymity? How can or should 
conversational anonymity be supported? These are the research questions—the 
last being the research problem. 
It is not the intention of this research to question the value or need for 
conversational anonymity. The use of anonymity as a personal protection 
 
5
 A text-based online conversation system is a piece of software that enables people to 
engage in an online conversation. The phrase conversation system will often be 
used without the words text-based and online for brevity. 
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against such things as reprisal, prejudice, or ridicule is surely not new. 
Although anonymity is not always necessary or wanted, there is no doubt that 
it is useful to and sought by some people. In short, the author has accepted 
that conversational anonymity can be (or can be made) useful. 
Chapters in this thesis 
There are five other chapters in this thesis. Chapter 2 (Preliminary Findings) 
explains how conversation systems and services have been supporting 
conversational anonymity and why the author believed the support could be 
improved. 
Chapter 3 (In-depth Research Strategy) describes specific research goals and 
the strategies developed to achieve them. Chapter 4 (Implementation) shows 
how the author’s theories were implemented and refined. 
Chapter 5 (Analysis and Discussion) evaluates the final outcomes. Chapter 6 
(Conclusion) asserts the thesis of this research. 
2  |  P r e l i m i n a r y  F i n d i n g s  
6 
 
Chapter 2 
Preliminary
Findings
2 Preliminary Findings 
2.1 The existing path to Anonymity 
The author has delved into the literature for answers to two important 
questions: 
1 What provisions exist in text-based online conversation systems
6
 and 
services for anonymity? 
2 What tactics have users been using to attain conversational 
anonymity? 
Continued literature searches could not provide the answers to these 
questions. Instead of hoping and waiting for someone to find the answers, the 
author decided to conduct a field study. 
Various conversation services, systems, and source codes were examined. No 
claim is made that the field study was exhaustive. However, every 
conversation system or service that had openly claimed to support 
conversational anonymity was carefully examined. After two years of field 
study, the author found his answers. 
2.1.1 Methods of attaining Anonymity 
The pretend (or deception) technique is the use (or disclosure) of 
fabricated information. More specifically, it involves the adoption of a false 
 
6
 Any piece of software that enables people to engage in a text-based online 
conversation can be considered a text-based online conversation system. Electronic 
mail (e-mail) systems however, do not qualify because the exchange of e-mail is an 
act of correspondence rather than conversation. The author defines a conversation 
as an exchange of single or short remarks in real-time. Systems that do not allow 
users to send and receive messages in real-time cannot be regarded as an online 
conversation system. Systems that support voice or video transmissions in 
addition to text messages (ie desktop or multimedia conferencing systems) also do 
not belong under text-based online conversation systems. 
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name (ie a name concocted or belonging to someone else) as one’s ‘full real 
name’. To make the deception more believable, various ‘tricks’ might be 
used—eg an e-mail account that reinforces one’s false name,
7
 a scanned 
photograph (of someone that matches one’s concocted image), or a co-
conspirator to back one’s claims. 
A person using the pretend technique will not seem mysterious (or 
anonymous for that matter). The person will not appear to be secretive about 
his or her identity. In reality, such a person is a mystery because much of 
what is known about the person is untrue and useless. Such a person is 
anonymous because his or her real name remains unknown. 
A less devious approach can be called the alias (or nondisclosure) 
technique. This is where one openly refuses to reveal one’s real name. One 
withholds information instead of giving false information. A name will be used 
(usually one’s username) but it will be obvious to others that the name is not 
one’s full real name. The name (or more exactly, alias) will appear to be too 
odd or whimsical (eg Batman or Terminator), improbable (eg Elvis Presley or 
Marilyn Monroe), or incomplete (eg Bill or Sarah). People will know that one is 
anonymous (or trying to be anonymous). 
The pretend and alias techniques can be used on any conversation system. 
They do not require any special provision to be made by the underlying 
conversation system. The absence of face-to-face contact and use of typed 
messages are all that is required to support the pretend and alias techniques. 
These conditions are ‘naturally’ present when people converse online. 
The third technique is only possible on certain conversation systems. The 
nameless technique creates anonymity by allowing users to make 
anonymous remarks. It usually involves one having to select an option that 
instructs the conversation system to remove one’s username from one’s 
remarks. 
Two types of Anonymity 
It should be slowly becoming obvious that the ‘type’ of anonymity created by 
the nameless technique is different to that created by the alias or pretend 
technique. The alias and pretend techniques make a user anonymous while 
the nameless technique makes the user’s remarks anonymous. 
The pretend and alias techniques create what the author calls identity 
anonymity. Identity anonymity exists when a user’s full real name is not 
known. It exists when a username cannot be traced to a real name (or when a 
user cannot be traced to a physical person). A question such as ‘Who is 
Terminator?’ or ‘Is Sarah Parker using the name Terminator?’ indicates that 
identity anonymity exists. 
 
7
 If one were to pretend to be ‘Sarah Parker’, one might have an e-mail address such 
as sarah_parker@hotmail.com 
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Authorship anonymity is created when a remark cannot be traced to a user. 
Authorship anonymity is recognised when a question such as ‘What did 
Terminator say?’, ‘Who said this?’, or ‘What did Sarah Parker say?’ is asked. The 
nameless technique creates authorship anonymity. 
Identity anonymity and authorship anonymity can exist together or on their 
own. Both are present when a remark cannot be traced to someone in the real 
world. Identity anonymity but not authorship anonymity would exist if the 
remark were traced to an anonymous user. Authorship anonymity but not 
identity anonymity would exist if a group of identified users
8
 were able to use 
the nameless technique to make anonymous remarks—the participants would 
not be anonymous but their remarks would. 
2.1.2 Obstacles to Anonymity 
It was not always possible to use a particular technique successfully. Hence, it 
is not always possible to attain a specific type or level of anonymity. 
The design of a conversation system for example, determined whether the 
nameless technique could be used. Unlike the alias or pretend technique, the 
nameless technique can only be used if the underlying system permitted the 
removal of the username tags from remarks. One cannot force a system to 
remove one’s username from one’s remarks. Many systems were not designed 
to support ‘nameless’ remarks. Many did not provide any method of creating 
anonymous remarks. On such systems, authorship anonymity could not be 
attained. 
Even when the nameless technique was supported, authorship anonymity 
might not always be attained. If there were only two participants in a meeting, 
a remark not made by one must obviously belong to the other participant! 
Idiosyncrasies (ie one’s peculiarities and eccentricities)
9
 that exist in one’s 
remarks can also foil the nameless technique. If ‘bob’ knew that ‘terminator’ 
always typed in upper case, ‘bob’ would still be able to identify the remarks 
made by ‘terminator’ (even when the username terminator was not present): 
bob: does anyone know whether i should buy Apple or Microsoft shares? 
MICROSOFT OF COURSE! 
Identity anonymity cannot always be attained either. Circumstances may not 
permit one to use a mysterious username. Discussions of a confidential or 
private nature for example, may only be open to identified users. If one were 
 
8
 ie an identified user is a user whose real name is known. 
9
 For example, spellings or misspellings of certain words, grammatical errors, or use 
of certain smileys or phrases. A smiley is simply an arrangement of characters that 
attempts to show one’s facial expression—eg :-) or :) to represent a smile on 
one’s face. 
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forced to use an identified username,
10
 identity anonymity cannot be 
attained.
11
 
Identity anonymity may also be prevented if one’s network address were not 
protected. Every computer connected to a network should have a unique 
network address. A computer connected to the Internet for example, will have 
a unique Internet Protocol address (IP address). A conversation system 
essentially knows the network addresses of all its users (because the 
addresses are used to route messages to each user’s computer). The fact that 
the system knows the addresses is not the problem. The problem occurs when 
the system exposes one’s network address to the system administrator or 
other users. It may be possible to trace a network address to a particular 
computer (or locale) and ultimately, to a person. When network addresses are 
exposed, one may have to connect from a multi-user host computer or a 
computer shared by several people (such as one in a computer laboratory or 
an Internet cafe)
12
 to attain and retain identity anonymity. 
2.1.3 Problems after attaining Anonymity 
Authorship anonymity (or more precisely the nameless technique) can hinder 
communication. Examine the following scenario. 
‘Bob’ questions a group of people anonymously: 
should I buy Apple or Microsoft shares? 
Since ‘terminator’ does not know who asked the question, the reply cannot be 
made in private.
13
 The user ‘Terminator’ is forced to respond in public: 
terminator: Microsoft of course! 
‘Gates’ can only respond in public as well. However, ‘he’ decides to do it 
anonymously: 
buy Apple shares while Steve Jobs is there 
Since ‘bob’ does not know that ‘gates’ suggested Apple shares, ‘bob’ cannot 
question ‘gates’ in private. If every remark were tagged by the appropriate 
 
10
 An identified username is the username of an identified user. In other words, an 
identified username can be traced to a real name. 
11
 Of course, one could always resort to the nameless technique (ie authorship 
anonymity) if it were supported. The fact that one’s username is not anonymous 
will not matter because one’s remarks would not be tagged by one’s (non-
anonymous) username. 
12
 An Internet cafe (or Net cafe) provides public Internet-access in addition to the 
usual services of a café. 
13
 Before a private message can be delivered, a recipient (or more precisely, the 
recipient’s username) usually needs to be specified. 
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username (ie if the nameless technique were not used), no one would have any 
problem making private remarks. 
The alias and pretend techniques can also create predicaments. Once a person 
becomes anonymous (ie attains identity anonymity), the person cannot make 
identified remarks (ie remarks that the person can take credit). Identified 
remarks require the use of an identified username. In other words, one cannot 
be anonymous and yet make identified remarks. To be able to make identified 
remarks, ‘terminator’ has to reveal and prove that she is Sarah Parker.
14
 Only 
then will people know that a remark belonging to ‘terminator’ is a remark 
belonging to Sarah Parker. 
If one wanted to make both identified and semi-identified remarks, two 
usernames would be needed—one identified and one anonymous.
15
 Sarah will 
need to be ‘terminator’ when she wants to make identified remarks. She will 
need to use an anonymous username such as mickey when she does not want 
to make identified remarks. A change of username usually requires a user to 
leave a conversation (ie meeting), exit the system, re-enter the system under a 
different username, and return to the meeting. At the very least, this is 
troublesome. 
Change of usernames may not go undetected either. Returning too soon may 
expose that the user that left and the one that arrived are the same person! If 
the return were delayed, the topic of conversation could have changed or 
worse, the meeting could have ended! Exposed network addresses can also foil 
username changes. If the network addresses of two users were identical, one 
could speculate that the two are the same person. In fact, it should be possible 
to tell that two users are the same person if both have the same 
idiosyncrasies. 
An unsuccessful changeover if not realised by a user, can be a serious 
problem. There is incalculable danger believing one is anonymous when one is 
not in reality. In theory, the amount of danger would be proportional to the 
amount of protection anonymity has provided. There is little danger when one 
has used anonymity to make an inconsequential remark. On the other hand, 
there may be dire consequences if one had made complaints against one’s 
employer. 
 
14
 The author would like to remind the reader that ‘Sarah Parker’ is not a real person. 
15
 The author would like to remind the reader that a semi-identified (or semi-
anonymous) remark is different to an anonymous remark. A semi-identified remark 
is a remark that points to an unidentified (ie anonymous) user or username. In 
comparison, an anonymous remark does not point to any user. Semi-identified 
remarks are the result of identity anonymity while anonymous remarks create (or 
are the result of) authorship anonymity. 
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Loss of Anonymity 
Although highly unlikely, ‘terminator’ may accidentally reveal that ‘he’ is Sarah 
Parker. A slip-up may also expose the fact that one is not who one claims to 
be. On one occasion, the author had accidentally used the pronoun his when 
he should have used her. This single blunder foiled weeks of successful 
pretence. The possibility of making a slip-up is ever present. 
Identity anonymity can usually be restored by changing one’s username. The 
problem is that one will become a stranger. Certain meetings may not be open 
to a stranger. Certain people may not want to speak to a stranger. All the 
merits, reputation, and relationships gained through the exposed username 
would be lost (or would have to be forgone). 
Of course, loss of identity anonymity can also happen without one’s 
knowledge. Much can be discovered about a person by eavesdropping on the 
person’s conversations. Any conversation system can be built with 
eavesdropping capabilities. In fact, some systems deliberately support this 
capability! Sarah may be ‘terminator’ to one user and ‘Peter Smith’ to another. 
Sarah may be herself (ie Sarah Parker) to yet another. By eavesdropping on the 
conversations of ‘terminator’, one may learn that the user ‘terminator’ is Sarah 
Parker in real-life. Intrusions on privacy may never be known to anyone except 
the intruder. 
Loss of authorship anonymity can also occur without one’s knowledge. Again, 
any conversation system can be built to give certain people (eg a system 
administrator) the ability to deanonymise anonymous remarks. There is also 
incalculable danger in thinking that one’s remarks are anonymous when they 
are not. 
Authorship anonymity may also be lost because of prolonged interaction. The 
longer a group of people interact, the more obvious each person’s 
idiosyncrasies become. Patterns not initially obvious may begin to emerge. 
Even if a remark cannot be traced to a specific user, it may now be possible to 
determine which remarks have come from the same source. When that 
happens, some authorship anonymity has been lost. When that happens, 
certain remarks become semi-anonymous (or semi-identified) instead of truly 
anonymous. 
Once one has put anonymity to real use, one has to begin worrying about 
being exposed. The potential for loss of anonymity does not end just because 
one has stopped embracing anonymity (ie stopped using an anonymous alias). 
The danger of being exposed only ends when people have stopped trying to 
deanonymise one’s (anonymous) remarks or usernames. Such may be the price 
of anonymity. 
Relying on multiple techniques should better protect a user. Sarah Parker for 
example, could assume the name Peter Smith (ie the pretend technique) and 
use the alias terminator as her username (ie the alias technique). When she has 
to make ‘risky’ remarks, she could also resort to the nameless technique (in 
addition to the tag and pretend techniques). Should the nameless technique 
fail, her remarks would only be traced to the user ‘terminator’. Sarah would 
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still have the protection of (identity) anonymity. Should the alias technique 
fail, Sarah would still enjoy identity anonymity because the user ‘terminator’ 
would point to Peter Smith (which does not exist in reality). Sarah will 
continue to enjoy some form or level of anonymity until people are able to 
trace her remarks to her full real name, Sarah Parker. 
2.2 Case studies 
The following is a selection of systems and services that illustrate and 
elaborate the points made in the previous section. 
2.2.1 The UNIX Talk program 
The Talk program is designed to enable two UNIX users to engage in an online 
conversation from within their shell accounts. Talk works like a telephone 
conversation. One party will initiate the ‘call’. Instead of a telephone number, 
the account detail of the ‘receiver’ (ie a combination of the receiver’s login 
name and IP address) is provided. If the receiver accepts the call, the screens 
of both parties are divided into two equal portions. Whatever one party types 
is displayed in one of the portions on both screens. Transcript 2.1 shows how 
the screen of ‘sarah’ may look after a brief conversation.
16
 The text in bold 
represents the text ‘sarah’ had typed. 
hi sarah 
this is a surprise. do i know you? 
yes 
from the beginning? 
it may take a while 
 
 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Hello Bob 
No you don't but it doesn't matter that you don't. 
Have you seen Star Wars Episode 1? 
Well, please tell me about it :) 
Yes, if you don't mind. 
I'm all ears! :) 
 
Transcript 2.1: One’s remarks always appear in the lower portion 
 
16
  As with all the transcripts throughout this chapter, the people are fictitious and the 
conversations have been mocked. Nonetheless, the transcripts themselves are real 
because they were generated using actual systems. 
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Talk has no support for anonymity. In fact, it should not be used if one 
requires anonymity. Although the remarks one makes are not tagged by one’s 
username, authorship anonymity cannot be attained because there are only 
two parties in the conversation. At least three people must be in a 
conversation before the nameless technique can generate authorship 
anonymity. 
Identity anonymity is possible but with some difficulty. Talk requires that 
each party know the shell account of the other. In a telephone conversation, 
the telephone number of the caller can be hidden. In a Talk conversation, the 
‘telephone numbers’ (ie the shell accounts) of both parties are exposed. 
Since ‘bob’ knows that ‘sarah’ is sarah@surf.bond.edu.au, ‘bob’ can use the 
finger command in UNIX to learn more about ‘sarah’: 
finger sarah@surf.bond.edu.au 
Login name: sarah                       In real life: Sarah Parker 
Directory: /home/sarah                  Shell: /bin/csh 
On since Feb 15 00:03:53 on ttyqb from surf 
No Plan. 
If Sarah wanted to be anonymous, details of her real name would have to be 
removed: 
finger sarah@surf.bond.edu.au 
Login name: sarah                       In real life: Not Available 
Directory: /home/sarah                  Shell: /bin/csh 
On since Feb 15 00:03:53 on ttyqb from surf 
No Plan. 
Her username (ie login name) would also need to be more anonymous. She 
should have used a username like ‘terminator’: 
finger terminator@surf.bond.edu.au 
Login name: terminator                  In real life: Not Available 
Directory: /home/terminator             Shell: /bin/csh 
On since Feb 15 00:03:53 on ttyqb from surf 
No Plan. 
Alternatively, she could have impersonated the Duchess of York: 
finger sarah@surf.bond.edu.au 
Login name: sarah                       In real life: Sarah Ferguson 
Directory: /home/sarah                  Shell: /bin/csh 
On since Feb 15 00:03:53 on ttyqb from surf 
No Plan. 
Of course, Sarah could have simply concocted a fictitious identity: 
finger jane_smith@surf.bond.edu.au 
Login name: jane_smith                  In real life: Jane Smith 
Directory: /home/jane_smith             Shell: /bin/csh 
On since Feb 15 00:03:53 on ttyqb from surf 
No Plan. 
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Such changes to one’s shell account are only possible by the root user (ie the 
system administrator of surf). Unless ‘sarah’ can make (or get someone to 
make) any of those changes she may not be able to attain identity anonymity. 
Even then, everything may be in vain if the system administrator were 
someone that did not respect confidentiality (ie were someone that would tell 
‘bob’ that ‘sarah’, ‘terminator’, or ‘jane_smith’ is Sarah Parker in real-life). 
Before Sarah can be anonymous to anyone, she may need to be anonymous to 
her system administrator or Internet Service Provider. She may have to utilise 
the pretend technique from the onset (ie have the system administrator 
believe that she is ‘Jane Smith’). 
2.2.2 Internet Relay Chat 
Whether people required anonymity or not, the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) was 
an improvement over the Talk program. IRC allows people to choose a 
username that is different to their shell account.
17
 Furthermore, conversations 
are not limited to two people. 
Although multi-party conversation is supported, authorship anonymity 
remains impossible. That is because IRC does not support the creation of 
nameless remarks. Every remark is tagged by a username—see Transcript 2.2. 
The text in bold represents what the user ‘bob’ had typed. 
*** terminator has joined channel #fishing 
<terminator> Hello everyone! 
hello terminator 
hello terminator 
<terminator> What are you two up to? 
<sam> planning a fishing trip 
/whois terminator 
*** terminator is ~terminator@modem1.bond.edu.au 
*** on channels: #fishing 
*** on irc via server irc-2.mit.edu :Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
*** terminator has been idle 2 seconds. 
<terminator> Can I come? 
<sam> sure :) 
i'm afraid terminator can't 
i'm afraid terminator can't 
<terminator> Why not? :( 
<sam> why not bob? 
err, because he's in Australia and we're in Michigan? 
err, because he's in Australia and we're in Michigan? 
Transcript 2.2: Every remark will be tagged by a username in IRC (bob’s view) 
The /who command allows users to determine the IP address of each other. 
This provides a way to authenticate one another. Of course, it also makes 
 
17
 In fact, a UNIX shell account is not needed to use IRC. 
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attaining identity anonymity more difficult than it should. To prevent people 
from tracing one’s IP address to one’s ‘door steps’, one’s personal computer 
should not be used. Depending on the amount of anonymity required (or the 
consequences of losing anonymity), one may have to resort to a computer 
open to the public—such as a computer in an Internet cafe or a coin-operated 
Internet booth in a shopping mall. 
As a consolation, the username and IP address combination (ie 
terminator@modem1.bond.edu.au) may not necessarily be the e-mail address 
or shell account of ‘terminator’. Since IRC does not require any party to have a 
shell account, performing a finger on terminator@modem1.bond.edu.au may 
not return any useful or the right information.
18
 
Nevertheless, two things will be known about ‘terminator’. ‘Bob’ will know that 
‘terminator’ is connected from Australia (because of the .au) and is perhaps a 
student or staff at Bond University (because looking up www.bond.edu.au 
would have brought ‘bob’ to the university’s web page). Although ‘terminator’ 
(ie Sarah Parker) is still anonymous (to ‘bob’), she would have been ‘more’ 
anonymous if her IP address were never exposed. 
Does IRC have any provision that is useful to anonymity? The author has 
identified two potentially useful provisions. First, IRC does not allow users to 
reserve usernames. In other words, the ‘terminator’ one day may not be the 
same ‘terminator’ the next. By using a very common username (eg ‘john’, 
‘jane’, ‘bob’, ‘mary’…), one would essentially be sharing a username with other 
people. As a result, one’s idiosyncrasies become harder to isolate because it 
would be fused with those of others. Unfortunately, the fact that IP addresses 
are exposed means that it is possible for people to distinguish one ‘john’ from 
another (since the username and IP address combination will be reasonably 
unique). 
The other potentially useful feature is the /nick command. It allows a user to 
change his or her username without having to leave the system—see 
Transcript 2.3 below. Such a provision could make the transition to and from 
anonymity less troublesome. However, it is unfortunate that IRC announces 
changes to one’s username. As such, the /nick command was not as helpful to 
anonymity as it could have been. 
/nick shark 
*** bob is now known as shark 
i like shark better 
i like shark better 
 
18
 IRC clients exist for all major operating systems. 
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*** terminator is now known as termite 
that's cute 
that's cute 
<termite> Yes I do think so too. 
Transcript 2.3: Changing nicks
19
 using the /nick command (bob’s view) 
2.2.3 Town Meeting 
Town Meeting 2.0 (TM) by Adam Stein was the only conversation system found 
to have openly claimed support for conversational anonymity: ‘Anonymous 
mode available—everyone says what they really think.’
20
 
TM supports identity anonymity in two ways: by allowing users to dictate 
their username, and by concealing their network addresses. Both provisions 
are extremely important as the TM client and server software runs on an 
AppleTalk local area network (instead of the Internet). If TM did not conceal 
the network addresses, one might be able run down the hallway to check who 
was at a particular computer! 
Authorship anonymity is supported because TM supports the nameless 
technique. An option under one of the menus (see Figure 2.1) allows a user to 
switch between anonymous and non-anonymous
21
 remarks. When the 
anonymous option is selected, the remarks that one creates appear without 
one’s username. 
 
Figure 2.1: Using the menus to toggle the Anonymous mode 
Like all systems that have attempted to support the nameless technique, TM 
does not address the two-person problem. Assume that ‘bill’, ‘ally’, and ‘sue’ 
are the only people in a meeting. Someone has been making nameless (ie 
 
19
 A username is called a nick (or nickname) in IRC. 
20
 An excerpt from the Town Meeting Read Me file accompanying the software. 
21
 The author categorises identified remarks (ie remarks traceable to an identified 
username) and semi-identified remarks  (ie remarks traceable to an anonymous 
username) as non-anonymous remarks. 
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anonymous) remarks. Once ‘ally’ left the meeting however, ‘bill’ would have 
been able to trace the last two nameless remarks to ‘sue’ (since no other user 
was present)—see Transcript 2.4. 
what do you think about the latest G3 Macs? 
bill: what do you think about the latest G3 Macs? 
they are getting cheaper 
yes they are 
bill: yes they are 
think i should get one? 
bill: think i should get one? 
i don't like the way they look 
the old G3 looked much better 
ally has left the conference. 
At this point, ‘bill’ selects the List People in Conference command from the menus, 
causing TM to display a list of participants… 
People in Conference: 
bill 
sue 
i agree. i don't like the new look either 
bill: i agree. i don't like the new look either 
can't i buy the older model and upgrade the processor? 
bill: can't i buy the older model and upgrade the processor? 
you can't 
why not? 
bill: why not? 
the processor is stuck to the motherboard :-( 
Transcript 2.4: The last two nameless remarks must belong to ‘sue’ (bill’s view) 
The last two ‘anonymous’ remarks would have been semi-anonymous or even 
identified (if the username sue were not anonymous). TM should have 
prevented ‘sue’ from creating a nameless remark because there were only two 
parties present. 
It is possible for the anonymous mode to be selected before a user enters a 
conversation. If ‘sue’ had done that, her username would be replaced by 
Anonymous—an automatically generated alias.
22
 When she enters a meeting, 
TM will announce that ‘Anonymous has entered the conference’ instead of ‘sue 
has entered the conference.’ The participants list will also show a participant 
called Anonymous instead of sue. If that were the case, ‘bill’ would have only 
known that the last two remarks were made by ‘Anonymous’. ‘He’ should not 
know that ‘sue’ was present. 
Do automatically generated usernames provide a way of addressing the two-
person problem? The author believes they do but it will mean that the 
 
22
 Anonymous 2, Anonymous 3, Anonymous 4… would be used if more than one 
person had preselected the anonymous mode.  
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anonymous mode cannot be disengaged for the duration of the meeting (or 
until other anonymous parties join the conversation). If ‘sue’ (ie ‘Anonymous’) 
were to deselect the anonymous mode, the ‘sudden’ introduction of the 
username sue should enable ‘bill’ to deduce that ‘sue’ was ‘Anonymous’—thus, 
deanonymising any nameless remark previously traced to ‘Anonymous’. The 
author believes that preventing a user from making nameless remarks when 
there are fewer than three participants is a better solution. 
The TM implementation of the nameless technique also failed to address the 
most fundamental problem with authorship anonymity—how do people 
respond to an anonymous remark privately? TM allows private remarks to be 
directed to any automatically generated alias. However, how would one know 
which automatically generated alias should be the recipient (since the original 
remark would not be tagged by an automatically generated alias)? If 
‘Anonymous’, ‘Anonymous 2’, and ‘bill’ were in a meeting, which of the two 
anonymous users should ‘bill’ direct the private response to? 
Even if there were only one automatically generated alias (ie even if 
‘Anonymous’, ‘ally’, and bill’ were the only ones in a meeting), how could ‘bill’ 
be sure that a nameless remark did not come from ‘ally’? Although ‘ally’ did 
not preselect the anonymous mode, ‘she’ would still be able to make 
anonymous remarks. Since ‘bill’ would not know whether ‘ally’ or ‘Anonymous’ 
made the nameless remark, he would have to make a public response—ie 
direct his response to both ‘ally’ and ‘Anonymous’. 
The author has also discovered a loophole (or conceptual flaw) that may 
enable someone to unravel the user hiding behind an automatically generated 
alias (ie determine that ‘Anonymous’ is actually ‘sue’). Figure 2.2 to Figure 2.5 
explains. 
 
Figure 2.2: ‘Bill’ selects Send Message from the menus and begins composing a 
private message to ‘Anonymous’
23
 
 
23
 ‘Bill’ does not know that ‘Anonymous’ and ‘sue’ are the same person. 
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Figure 2.3: ‘Anonymous’ (ie ‘sue’) clicks on the Respond button to reply 
 
Figure 2.4: ‘Anonymous’ sends the reply 
‘Sue’ should be identified as Anonymous because she has preselected the 
anonymous mode and has not had it deactivated. However, that is not what 
TM does… 
 
Figure 2.5: From the reply, ‘bill’ will know that ‘Anonymous’ is ‘sue’ 
Eavesdropping may also be a concern on TM. Although TM does not 
specifically support eavesdropping, it can still occur. The server logs every 
remark except for private remarks created using the Send Message provision. 
The logs are displayed on the screen at the server. Two people might not use 
Send Message to converse if they were the only people in a meeting. While a 
third user might not be present in the system, there could be a third person 
following the conversation at the server (ie outside the system)! The system 
should have warned every user that every remark made without using Send 
Message would be recorded. Such a warning should be present each time a 
user joins a meeting or starts the software. 
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2.2.4 The Virtual-Eye System 
Figure 2.6 shows two users having an online conversation in a ‘multi-user 
virtual environment’ called Habitat (Morningstar & Farmer 1990). 
 
Figure 2.6: Two avatars engaging in an online conversation
24
 
The two avatars
25
 (ie users) appear to be able to recognise one another even 
though the avatars and remarks do not seem to be tagged by a username. The 
head and body of the avatars are different but that is certainly not enough to 
make every avatar unique (or recognisable). There must have been a way to 
tell the name of an avatar. What if there was no way of telling the avatars 
apart? Midway through the field study the author began creating what became 
the Virtual-Eye (ViE) system. 
Usernames are not used in the ViE system. There are no participant lists. 
Instead of usernames, nondescript avatars are used. Every avatar is identical. 
They have no faces, features, or labels—see Figure 2.7 on the next page. Even 
if the users were to know one another in real-life, they should not be able to 
identify who was behind a particular avatar just by looking at an avatar 
because every avatar is identical. 
 
24
 Source: http://www.communities.com/picture/habitat.gif 
25
 An avatar is essentially an object on the screen representing a user (ie an icon of a 
user). 
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Figure 2.7: Three nondescript avatars 
Meetings are held within virtual rooms. A virtual room is presented in a first-
person perspective (ie a user would not see his or her avatar in the view). When 
a user makes a remark, a dialogue balloon will appear above the avatar that 
represents the user—see Figure 2.8. 
 
Figure 2.8: The dialogue balloon identifies the avatar that made the last remark
26
 
The user’s remark will not be tagged by any username. The only ‘link’ between 
a remark and an avatar will be the dialogue balloon. However, such a link is 
temporary. The balloon repositions itself as different people speak. Once the 
balloon moves away, the link between a remark and an avatar will only exist in 
a person’s memory. If one were to forget, there is essentially no simple way of 
determining which remark belonged to which avatar (and vice-versa). 
What is the purpose of the nondescript avatars and the dialogue balloon? 
When a user enters an occupied room for the first time, he or she would not 
see a bunch of avatars spread across the room. The avatars of the other 
 
26
 The tag me: only appears on the screen of the speaker—helping the speaker to 
identify what he or she has said. 
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participants will be grouped as a group-avatar at the entry (ie left-most) 
position. This leaves seven free positions.
27
 By dragging the balloon while it is 
above a group-avatar, the speaker can be separated—see Figure 2.9.
28
 
 
Figure 2.9: Separating the speaker from a group-avatar 
Once separated a user can then ‘double click’ the avatar of the speaker to 
establish a private communication channel—see Figure 2.10. In essence, one 
can now finally question the speaker of an anonymous remark in private! 
 
Figure 2.10: A diamond indicates that a private communication channel has been 
established with an avatar
29
 
Individual avatars can be ‘dragged’ and ‘dropped’ onto each other to form new 
group-avatars—see Figure 2.11 below. By moving, grouping, and separating 
avatars, users can rank participants according to a criteria. An avatar (ie a 
person) with interesting ideas for example, can be separated and left to exist 
as an individual avatar. The avatar with the most interesting idea could be 
place further to the right. Those that have not made any useful contribution 
could be left as a group at the entry position. People of similar ideas could be 
grouped together so one could ‘double click’ the group-avatar to establish a 
private channel with a group of people. 
 
Figure 2.11: Merging two individual avatars into a group 
 
27
 A room has a maximum of eight positions on to which to place avatars (much like a 
row on a chess board). 
28
 The reason for such a technique was to encourage selection by merit (by what a 
person says) rather than other attributes (eg the choice of a person’s username). 
29
 Once private communication is established, other avatars are greyed because one 
will no longer receive remarks from other avatars (ie from people represented by 
the other avatars).  
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Although the ViE system appeared to work in theory, it was less than ideal in 
practice. First, there is no sensible way for users to be non-anonymous or 
make non-anonymous remarks. That is because usernames are not supported. 
A user can add a name to his or her remark—eg ‘buy Apple shares while Steve 
Jobs is there (Sarah Parker)’. The problem is that anyone can do the same—ie 
add ‘(Sarah Parker)’ or any other name to their remarks. Too much emphasis 
has been placed on anonymity that non-anonymity was forgotten! 
A greater problem however, is the fact that the conversation process has 
become very complicated. As soon as a meeting involves three or more 
parties, the conversation process is added with the need to: 
• follow the movements of the dialogue balloon, 
• rearrange avatars, 
• remember the significance of avatars, and 
• recall the significance of avatars. 
The author halted all work on the ViE system because of these problems.
30
 
2.2.5 The Mudde Pathetique MUD 
Crumlish (1997) wrote ‘I’m not going to go into the multi-user domains, or 
MUDs, that thrive on the Internet, powered mainly by the energy of college 
students staying up or procrastinating’ under a chapter entitled Chatting, 
Conferencing, and Virtual Worlds.
31
 While that may be true, the author strongly 
believes that to neglect MUDs is to create an imperfect perception of ‘chatting’ 
(ie online conversations). It might have been excusable to ignore MUDs when 
there were only 275 on the Internet.
32
 In less than a year however, MUDs 
increased to 440.
33
 As recently as April of 1999, the MUD Connector
34
 listed 
1,334 MUDs. The presence of MUDs on the Internet should not be ignored. 
MUDs are ‘clever’ conversation systems capable of supporting an almost face-
to-face meeting experience. 
 
30
 This thesis and Lee 1993 may well be the only record that the ViE system ever 
existed. 
31
 Apart from Multi-User Domain, the acronym MUD has also been expanded to 
Multiple User Dimension, Multiple User Dungeon, or Multiple User Dialogue (Smith 
1992)—all of which are synonymous. 
32
  Scott Geohring’s The Totally Unofficial List of Internet Muds (26 March 1993) 
published through the rec.games.mud.announce Internet newsgroup. 
33
  The Totally Unofficial List of Internet Mud (22 January 1994) published through the 
rec.games.mud.announce Internet newsgroup. This was the last list Geohring 
compiled. 
34
 http://www.mudconnect.com/ 
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The Mudde Pathetique (MP)
35
 is a MUD on the Internet. Transcript 2.5 attempts 
to show the type of interaction possible on MP. 
Terminator has arrived. 
look 
Penny Lane 
You are on Penny Lane.  Emerald Avenue is to the west and Penny Lane continues in 
eastward direction. 
Sam the Salmon King is standing here. 
Terminator the good guy is standing here. 
Obvious exits: 
East  - Penny Lane 
West  - Emerald Avenue 
who 
Players 
------- 
[ 1 Wa] Terminator the good guy 
[ 1 Wa] Ally Cat 
[ 1 Wa] Sue the Cowgirl 
[ 1 Wa] Bob is JR's brother! 
[ 3 MA] Sam the Salmon King 
Terminator says "hello everyone!" 
Terminator smiles happily. 
smile 
You smile happily. 
say hello terminator 
You say, "hello terminator" 
Terminator says, "what are you two up to?" 
Sam says, "planning a fishing trip" 
Terminator flips head over heels. 
Terminator says, "can i come?" 
Sam smiles happily. 
Sam says, "sure" 
say where are you in real-life terminator? 
You say, "where are you in real-life terminator?" 
Terminator says, "Gold Coast" 
Sam tells you, "where is that bob?" 
tell sam i believe in Australia or Africa 
You tell Sam, "i believe in Australia or Africa" 
say where is that terminator? 
You say, "where is that terminator?" 
Terminator says, "Australia" 
hug terminator 
You hug Terminator. 
say i'm afraid you can't come... we're in Michigan, USA 
You say, "i'm afraid you can't come... we're in Michigan, USA" 
Terminator sighs loudly. 
Transcript 2.5: The MP transcript reads like a page off a novel (Bob’s view) 
 
35
 MP (flysex.berkeley.edu port 2999) has since been renamed ZeeMUD and now 
runs at mud.zeemud.org port 4000. 
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MP projects a user into a virtual body (or character) and places it (along with 
those of others) on a virtual world. A character is more than a ‘puppet’. A user 
becomes embodied in his or her character. The user becomes the character. 
The look command describes what Bob’s character ‘sees’. It shows that ‘bob’ is 
in a place called Penny Lane
36
—re-examine Transcript 2.5. The look command 
also shows that ‘terminator’ and ‘sam’ are present in the room.
37
 
The say command allows ‘bob’ to speak to everyone in Penny Lane. Says will 
not be heard by people in other rooms. The tell <character> command is 
used to speak to a specific user. 
Commands such as smile and sigh allow users to create non-verbal cues. The 
user ‘terminator’ did not have to construct a sentence to explain how ‘he’ felt—
the sigh command was all that was required. Certain ‘social’ commands can be 
(or need to be) applied to another user. The hug command for example, 
requires someone to ‘hug’. MP brings a hug ‘alive’ by describing the action in a 
way appropriate to each party: 
When ‘bob’ typed the command hug terminator 
‘bob’ would read You hug him. 
‘terminator’ would read Bob hugs you. 
‘sam’ would read Bob hugs Terminator. 
The use of different pronouns heightens the sense of interaction and creates 
the illusion of ‘physical’ contact. The fact that people are actually typing in 
front of their computers miles from one another can become less apparent. In 
the author’s view, MP is more than a piece of software to support online 
conversations—it is as Bruckman (1992) and Reid (1993) have described, a 
‘text-based virtual reality.’ 
The pretend and alias techniques can easily be employed on MP because IP 
addresses are protected. One simply has to choose an anonymous name for 
one’s character to be anonymous. The administrators of MP did not require 
users to provide any real-life identification. 
Authorship anonymity is technically possible even though the nameless 
technique is not supported in MP. Anonymous remarks can be created by first 
making one’s character ‘invisible’. MP (and virtually every MUD that supports 
invisibility) replaces one’s username with the pronoun someone when a user 
cannot detect invisibility—see Transcript 2.6 on the next page. 
 
36
 Penny Lane was one of thousands of interconnected rooms that formed the MP 
virtual world. 
37
 The who command lists all the users online (ie users from every room). 
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Someone has arrived. 
Someone says, "hey bob!" 
look 
Penny Lane 
You are on Penny Lane.  Emerald Avenue is to the west and Penny Lane continues in 
eastward direction. 
Sam the Salmon King is standing here. 
Terminator the good guy is standing here. 
Obvious exits: 
East  - Penny Lane 
West  - Emerald Avenue 
say who's there? 
You say, "who's there?" 
Someone falls down laughing. 
Transcript 2.6: The username of an invisible character is replaced by the pronoun 
someone (Bob’s view) 
A remark tagged by someone has a similar effect as a nameless remark. Who is 
‘someone’? Which user said ‘hey bob!’? If ‘bob’ does not know, the remark ‘hey 
bob!’ is anonymous. 
The problem with invisibility is that it does not always work. Some users can 
detect invisibility and they can expose who is invisible—see Transcript 2.7.
38
 
say sam who else is here? 
You say, "sam who else is here?" 
Sam says, "i see luke" 
Someone pokes Sam in the ribs. 
Someone says, "shhhhhh" 
Transcript 2.7: ‘Sam’ exposing who is invisible (Bob’s view) 
The other concern about invisibility is that it can be used for eavesdropping. 
Invisibility and sneaking (ie the ability to enter a room without generating the 
usual ‘…has arrived’ notice) are features accessible to every user. These 
provisions provide a way for someone to sneak into a meeting, eavesdrop on 
the conversation, and sneak out. These provisions give everyone a potential to 
jeopardise anonymity. 
The author had come to learn that wizards (ie superusers)
39
 could also become 
invisible. Alarmingly, a non-superuser has no way of detecting an invisible 
superuser! 
 
38
 The ability to see invisible characters can be purchased using the virtual coins one 
gathers through the course of the game. MP is a text-based conversation system. 
However, it is also a multi-user computer game where users are able to pit their 
characters against computer-controlled characters (called monsters). Coins are 
collected from ‘dead’ monsters. 
39
 Superusers are users that have access to certain system functions (not available by 
a normal user). In a way, superusers are administrators that manage a system from 
within the system. 
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To learn what ‘powers’ the MP superuser might have, the author examined the 
MERC 2.2 source code.
40
 Both MERC and MP were based on the DIKUMUD
41
 
source code. Two additional concerns emerged after examining the MERC 
code: 
1 Although one’s IP address was concealed from all users, it was not 
concealed from every superusers. 
2 Although the private channel (ie tells) could not be eavesdropped by 
any user, it could be eavesdropped by some superusers. 
In short, a MERC MUD does not adequately protect one’s privacy and 
anonymity from superusers. The author believed the same was true about MP. 
2.2.6 Foothills 
Foothills (FH)
42
 is another MUD. It is not a game like MP, however. Rather, its 
purpose is to support online conversations (just like the Internet Relay Chat 
and Town Meeting). Concerns about eavesdropping and invisible intruders so 
profound on MP did not seem to be an issue on FH.
43
 FH supports lockable 
private rooms. Once a user locks his or her room, uninvited users cannot 
enter. The FH administration also gives written assurances on privacy: ‘…we 
guarantee that anything you do in private cannot be snooped or intercepted 
by anybody but the people you intended to talk to.’ 
FH allows people to choose their usernames. However, before a username can 
be reserved (ie protected by a password), a person will have to disclose his or 
her e-mail address. E-mail addresses are probably collected to prevent people 
from reserving multiple usernames. Whatever the reason, one will have 
essentially revealed one’s real-life identity to the FH administration by 
disclosing one’s e-mail address (unless one has supplied an anonymous e-mail 
 
40
 The Merc 2.2 system is the work of Michael Chastain, Michael Quan, and Mitchell 
Tse. The Merc 2.2 source code was obtained via anonymous ftp from 
ftp.math.okstate.edu. 
41
 The DIKUMUD system is the work of Sebastian Hammer, Michael Seifert, Hans 
Henrik Staerfeldt, Tom Madsen, and Katja Nyboe. 
42
 toybox.infomagic.com port 2010 
43
 FH is based on a system called Elsewhere II (EW2) by Simon Marsh. An inspection of 
the EW2 source code (ftp://toybox.infomagic.com/pub/foothills/src/EW-
too.tar.Z) revealed that EW2 does not support character invisibility (or 
sneaking). Of course, there is no way of confirming what FH superusers can or 
cannot do because the FH source code itself is not available for study. 
2  |  P r e l i m i n a r y  F i n d i n g s  
28 
 
account).
44
 Fortunately, FH does not publicise one’s e-mail address. The 
administrators will know one’s e-mail address but other users will not (in 
theory). 
Even after disclosing one’s e-mail address, there is no reason why one cannot 
use an unregistered username when one requires a greater degree of identity 
anonymity. The administration should not know who is behind an 
unregistered username. FH also facilitates identity anonymity by concealing 
every user’s IP address. 
Authorship anonymity has also been deliberately supported by FH. The 
nameless technique is implemented as the echo command—see Transcript 2.8. 
This implementation of the nameless technique is also flawed because users 
are not prevented from making echoes when there are insufficient participants 
to result in authorship anonymity. Furthermore, echoes can only be made by a 
registered user. 
Terminator says 'should I buy Apple or Microsoft shares?' 
+ Microsoft 
echo buy Apple shares while Steve Jobs is there! 
+ buy Apple shares while Steve Jobs is there! 
Transcript 2.8: Echoes are prefixed by a ’plus’ 
A more serious concern is the fact that superusers are able to deanonymise 
echoes (ie view echoes with the usernames attached). The problem is even 
more serious as the author only knew this fact because he had examined the 
EW2 source code. He might not have known had he not. The author does not 
believe it is acceptable for the administration not to warn users about this 
particular capability of the superusers. 
The finger command within FH was also viewed as a potential hindrance to 
anonymity. The time stamps returned could be used to foil username 
changeovers. If ‘terminator’ and ‘sarah’ were suspected to be the same person, 
the time stamp of one could be compared with the stamp of the other. ‘Sarah’ 
and ‘terminator’ might be the same person if they were always seconds apart—
see Transcript 2.9 on the next page. 
 
44
 An anonymous e-mail account does not expose one’s real-life identity in the e-mail 
address itself or in the header portion of an outgoing e-mail message. Page 13 
described how a UNIX e-mail/shell account could be tweaked for anonymity. 
Alternatively, one could always supply the FH administration with the e-mail 
address of someone else. In recent years however, it has become increasingly 
simple to create an ‘anonymous’ e-mail account. There are numerous services on 
the Internet (such as Microsoft’s Hotmail) that provide web-based e-mail accounts to 
people without verifying details of their identity. By supplying false personal 
details, one would effectively have an ‘anonymous’ e-mail account. 
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finger sarah 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sarah loves to meet people 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sarah was last seen at 09.08:14 PM-Sat, 15 February. 
Her total login time is 19 days, 3 hours, 5 minutes and 12 seconds. 
-------------------------------- plan -------------------------------- 
Get to know you better! 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
finger terminator 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Terminator the newbie, so treat me nicely. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Terminator has been logged in for 21 minutes and 38 seconds since  
   09.09:10 PM-Sat, 15 February. 
His total login time is 21 minutes and 50 seconds. 
-------------------------------- plan -------------------------------- 
I must write myself a proper plan sometime ... 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Transcript 2.9: The finger command can be used to learn more about a user 
More case studies will not be necessary because they will not reveal any new 
provision for anonymity or new concern for a user seeking anonymity. 
2.3 Updated literature search 
A second survey of the literature was conducted at the end of the field study. 
By this time, several relevant sources had emerged. Their relevance is 
discussed below. 
Terminology 
Nunamaker et el (1991) used the term content anonymity to describe the 
difficulties in attributing a specific comment to a specific person. One could 
say that content anonymity is the same as the author’s notion of authorship 
anonymity. 
The term pseudo-anonymity was used by Detweiler (1993b) to refer to the 
anonymity created by using a pseudonym (ie an alias) instead of one’s real 
name.
45
 Pseudo-anonymity appears to be very similar to the author’s notion of 
identity anonymity. 
 
45
 The word pseudonymity was later found in Reid 1993, Fromkin 1995, and Rigby 
1995. Much to the author’s surprise, pseudonymity was also found in various 
dictionaries. The author was not aware that pseudonymity and pseudonymous (the 
adjective form of pseudonymity) were two established English words. 
2  |  P r e l i m i n a r y  F i n d i n g s  
30 
 
Misuse of Anonymity 
Nunamaker et el (1991), Reid (1991, 1993), Detweiler (1993a, 1993b), and May 
(1994)
46
 have in different degrees blamed anonymity for various condemnable 
acts (ranging from insults to libels to extortion). While the author concedes 
that anonymity can be used for condemnable purposes, he does not believe 
that anonymity should be blamed. The author believes that anonymity is not 
the root of the problem. Would insults stop if people were not anonymous? In 
the author’s opinion, ‘No.’ The blame should rest entirely on the people 
behind each act. Those that use (or rather, abuse) anonymity for condemnable 
purposes should be blamed. 
According to Detweiler (1993a), the proper way to use anonymity is: 
• not to use it frivolously, 
• not to use it to provoke, harass, or threaten others, 
• not to use it to evade conventions or rules, and 
• not to use it where it is not welcomed by other users. 
Why do people abuse anonymity? Why does Wallace (1999) write that ‘the 
Internet has features that might unleash certain forms of aggressive behaviour 
in just about anyone’? The author agrees with Reid (1993) that anonymous 
users cannot be penalised easily or more precisely, cannot be penalised in 
real-life easily. People on the Internet (or rather, people conversing online) are 
either anonymous or geographically separated, or both. Perhaps people have 
been abusing anonymity simply because they could and because there were 
no serious repercussions. 
Guidelines for supporting Anonymity 
No guidelines or standards have been expressly developed to help system 
designers and administrators provide support for conversational anonymity. 
The closest to a set of guidelines (which is a set of recommendations for 
supporting anonymity in electronic mail and newsgroups) was also found in 
Detweiler 1993a. 
Detweiler
47
 recommended that administrators declare in writing the 
unacceptable uses of anonymity along with the consequences. If anonymity 
were abused, users should be warned. If warnings were ineffective, Detweiler 
suggested: 
• limiting the offender’s use of anonymity, 
• revoking the offender’s account, 
 
46
 Sources that are more recent include Flinn and Maurer 1995, Fromkin 1995, Rigby 
1995, Suler 1997a, and Wallace 1999. 
47
 All that the author knows about Detweiler is the name L Detweiler. The author is 
unable to ascertain if Detweiler is in fact a real name. 
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• preventing access to the offender (ie forcing the offender to another 
service), and 
• contacting the offender’s local administrator or network access 
provider. 
In Detweiler’s view, the ultimate penalty for abusing anonymity was to forfeit 
the offender’s anonymity (ie expose the offender’s identity and actions). 
Obviously, this option would only be available if the offender’s real identity 
were known. What if a user had refused to identify himself or herself (ie had 
adopted the alias technique)? Should such users be prevented from using a 
service? What if the user had provided false information (ie had adopted the 
pretend technique)? More seriously, what if the offender had no qualms losing 
anonymity? 
It seemed to the author that responses other than a stern warning could only 
be made with the assistance of the underlying conversation system. To know 
which user to penalise for making a particular anonymous remark, every 
nameless remark might need to be logged by the system in a deanonymised 
form (ie with the username tags intact). To contact an offender’s service 
provider, the system may need to keep a record of each user’s IP address (or 
addresses). Such measures obviously compromise a user’s anonymity and 
privacy. The author believed that Detweiler was aware of this and hence ‘his’ 
recommendation that users be warned of any logging and monitoring activity. 
Presumably, the warnings would allow users that require a high degree of 
anonymity to seek other services. 
Another interesting demand by Detweiler was that all programming bugs be 
candidly revealed. Presumably, such knowledge would enable a user to avoid 
certain functions until they were fixed. 
Finally, Detweiler wanted administrators to take precautions to ensure the 
security of the system from physical and network-based attacks and 
infiltration. The author agrees but adds that the administration should also 
protect all user-related data from as many members of the administration as 
possible. A superuser that does not need to know the IP addresses of the users 
should not be privy to such information. 
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2.4 Preliminary conclusions 
How should conversational anonymity be supported? While the details are not 
yet clear, five ends (ie requirements) are obvious: 
1 Anonymity should be acknowledged. 
This is not simply a demand that anonymity be allowed to exist. 
Neither is it simply a demand that the word anonymity be present in 
the blurbs and documentation. It demands treating anonymity as a 
feature of the service and not simply an ‘accidental’ by-product of non-
face-to-face electronic communication. To acknowledge anonymity is to 
make deliberate changes to the system functions, standard procedures, 
and administrative practices for the benefit of anonymity (and the users 
needing anonymity). 
2 Anonymity should not be impeded but should be simple to attain. 
This demands removing every possible impediment to anonymity. 
3 Non-anonymity (or identification) should be supported. 
This demands supporting anonymous and non-anonymous 
conversations. It demands making provisions to allow users to identify 
themselves and make identified remarks. 
4 Anonymity should be protected. 
This demands that preventable loss of anonymity does not occur. It 
demands protecting a user’s anonymity from other users and from 
members of the administration. 
5 Use of anonymity should be controlled. 
This demands regulating the use of anonymity and penalising those 
that violate the regulations (ie misuse anonymity). 
At the start of the field study, the author was concerned that he would 
discover a system that was perfect for conversational anonymity. By the end 
of the study, the author found no system that he could consider flawless, 
complete, or exceptional (not even the author’s own Virtual-Eye system). 
Town Meeting (TM) was perhaps the most ideal conversation system for 
anonymity. It contains more provisions for anonymity than other systems. TM 
acknowledges anonymity in its documentation and user-interface. Identity 
anonymity is easy to attain because every user’s network address is protected. 
Since users cannot eavesdrop on one another, anonymity is further protected. 
In addition, administrators will not be able to add hidden functionality to TM 
because it is distributed as an executable binary. TM also supports the 
nameless technique (and hence, authorship anonymity). Going to and from 
authorship anonymity is a simple matter of selecting and deselecting a menu 
option. 
Despite these provisions, the author does not regard TM as the perfect system 
for conversational anonymity. There are at least four problems (ie areas for 
improvement) in TM. First, going to and from identity anonymity is 
troublesome. A user’s username cannot be swapped while the user is in a 
2  |  P r e l i m i n a r y  F i n d i n g s  
33 
 
meeting. A solution more akin to the /nick command would have avoided this 
problem. Second, TM supports the standard nameless technique, which has 
been found to be a hindrance to communication. Third, a few ‘flaws’ (see page 
16) exist that together could jeopardise anonymity. Even if the flaws seemed 
trivial, they should not be acceptable for a system that has openly claimed to 
support anonymity. Finally, TM does not provide capabilities to prevent users 
from misusing anonymity or to penalise those that did. 
Apart from TM (and the ViE system), other conversation systems appeared to 
have only tolerated anonymity. Anonymity was not ‘supported’. It was simply 
achievable. The absence of face-to-face contact and use of typed text had 
allowed users to be anonymous. Without special support for anonymity, the 
path to anonymity is unnecessarily difficult. 
The quest to determine how conversational anonymity should be supported is 
not yet over. Many specific problems have been identified and are in need of 
solutions. Answers that have been proposed also need elaboration and 
proving. In short, further research is needed. This work is described in the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
In-Depth Research 
Strategy
3 In-Depth Research Strategy 
3.1 Introduction 
Three goals were defined for the work beyond the preliminary investigation: 
1 Create the ideal method of introducing authorship anonymity into 
online conversations. 
The nameless technique does not enable participants to respond to 
anonymous remarks in private. The nondescript-avatar technique
48
 
provides such support but it also forces a style of conversing that is 
far too complicated and confusing. The author intends to find a new 
and better method of supporting authorship anonymity than the 
nameless and nondescript-avatar techniques. 
2 Create the ideal environment for conversational anonymity. 
Town Meeting is believed to be the most ideal environment for 
conversational anonymity at present. It is not a perfect environment, 
however. The author intends to create a better environment for 
conversational anonymity than Town Meeting. 
3 Create a set of guidelines and standards for supporting conversational 
anonymity. 
The strategy is to transform the outcome of Goal 2 into a set of 
guidelines and standards that can be used by system designers and 
administrators to reproduce the ‘idealism’. 
This chapter describes the first steps towards the three goals. It describes the 
work that was done before the start of any practical work. 
 
48
 The nondescript-avatar technique is the use of nondescript avatars (as 
experimented in the Virtual-Eye system) to create authorship anonymity. 
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3.2 Supporting Authorship Anonymity 
The main requirement for supporting authorship anonymity must be that 
users be allowed to create anonymous remarks (ie remarks that cannot be 
traced to a user or person in the real-world). There should however, be six 
other requirements: 
1 The ‘normal’ style of conversing is maintained 
The author defines the ‘normal’ style of conversing as a cycle of 
reading remarks, typing (or replying) remarks, and waiting for new 
remarks. The ‘normal’ style of conversing is maintained by the 
nameless technique. The nondescript-avatar technique on the other 
hand, forces an unusual style of conversing. 
2 Users are able to make non-anonymous (ie identified or semi-
identified) remarks 
Usernames were not supported for the nondescript-avatar technique to 
work. As such, non-anonymous remarks could not be made. The 
nameless technique does not prevent users from having usernames. A 
system simply omits a user’s username from his or her remarks when 
anonymous remarks are required. When they are not, the user’s 
remarks are tagged by the user’s username—resulting in semi-
identified remarks (or identified remarks if the user were using an 
identified username). 
3 Users are able to make public and private (ie one-to-many and one-to-
one) anonymous remarks 
The nameless technique can easily accommodate this requirement. 
Some changes to the Foothills server for example, would allow the echo 
command to accept an additional argument (ie echo <username>) and 
hence, allow a private echo to be sent to a specific user. 
4 Users are prevented from making ‘anonymous’ remarks when 
authorship anonymity cannot be attained 
When there are only two participants in a meeting, each will be able to 
identify the remarks of the other. Authorship anonymity cannot be 
attained in such circumstances. A system should only allow 
anonymous remarks to be made when there are three or more 
participants in a meeting. 
5 The source of an anonymous remark is only known to the underlying 
conversation system 
A system must not enable anyone to deanonymise anonymous 
remarks. 
6 Users are able to make private (anonymous or non-anonymous) 
responses to anonymous remarks 
The six additional requirements essentially attempt to ensure that authorship 
anonymity does not hinder communication and is adequately protected. The 
challenge was to find a way to satisfy the six requirements simultaneously. 
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Simple changes to the standard nameless technique would see the first five 
requirements satisfied. The sixth requirement however, remained a puzzle. 
A username is usually used to specify the recipient of a private message. 
Usernames are understood by users and by the conversation system. A remark 
tagged by a username tells a person where it came from. A remark addressed 
to a username tells the system where to deliver the remark. The system can 
deliver a remark as long as a destination is supplied. When a remark is not 
tagged with a username, a user may not know who should receive the reply. 
The problem with the standard nameless technique is not that the system 
cannot deliver the message. The problem is actually that a user cannot specify 
the recipient. 
The username replacement method 
In a way, a nondescript avatar played the role of a username tag. The 
nondescript avatars replaced use of usernames. Instead of addressing one’s 
remarks to a username, one directed the remarks at an avatar. The ViE system 
was able to understand avatars just as a conventional system understood 
usernames. The server knew which avatar belonged to which user (or more 
precisely, which client). Since usernames are not used, a sender will not know 
which user has received his or her remark. All the avatars are identical. An 
avatar does not reveal whom it represents. Unlike a username, a nondescript 
avatar cannot be used to recognise a user. This is why authorship anonymity 
exists. 
A nondescript avatar provides a way for a user to reply an anonymous remark 
in private. It provides a way to satisfy the sixth requirement. Are there other 
ways of replacing username tags? 
Could TM’s automatically generated aliases (ie Anonymous, Anonymous 2, 
Anonymous 3...) be used to replace usernames? Examine the following 
possibility: 
say does anyone know whether i should buy Apple or Microsoft shares? 
Anonymous 1 says 'does anyone know whether i should buy Apple or Microsoft 
shares?' 
Anonymous 2 says 'Microsoft' 
Anonymous 3 says 'Microsoft of course!' 
Anonymous 4 says 'buy Apple shares while Steve Jobs is there' 
say who is Steve Jobs? 
Anonymous 1 says 'who is Steve Jobs?' 
Anonymous 4 says 'Jobs is one of the original founders of Apple computers' 
Anonymous 4 says 'he left Apple a while back but he has returned to be the acting 
CEO' 
Anonymous 2 says 'why did he leave if Apple is that great?' 
Anonymous 4 says 'dunno' 
‘Anonymous 1’, ‘Anonymous 2’, ‘Anonymous 3’, and ‘Anonymous 4’ are 
‘usernames’ generated by the system. They conceal the actual usernames of 
the four users—much like someone is used to conceal the usernames of 
invisible users in The Mudde Pathetique. 
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The idea is to use an automatically generated ‘username’ to specify the 
destination for a private message: 
tell "anonymous 4" why are Apple shares a good investment? 
You tell Anonymous 4 'why are Apple shares a good investment?' 
Anonymous 4 tells you 'the share prices are a bargain' 
Has requirement 6 been satisfied? ‘Yes.’ However, the use of automatically 
generated aliases does not create anonymous remarks. Although Anonymous 4 
is not the recipient’s username, all anonymous remarks made by the recipient 
would be tagged by Anonymous 4. In essence, this method is not very 
different to the alias technique. An automatically generated alias is not very 
different from an anonymous username. Every remark tagged by a particular 
number will belong to a particular user.
49
 Remarks tagged by an automatically 
generated alias should be seen as semi-anonymous rather than anonymous. 
To make the remarks anonymous, a new alias (or rather, number) would need 
to be allocated to each remark: 
say does anyone know whether i should buy Apple or Microsoft shares? 
Anonymous 1 says 'does anyone know whether i should buy Apple or Microsoft 
shares?' 
Anonymous 2 says 'Microsoft' 
Anonymous 3 says 'Microsoft of course!' 
Anonymous 4 says 'buy Apple shares while Steve Jobs is there' 
say who is Steve Jobs? 
Anonymous 5 says 'who is Steve Jobs?' 
Anonymous 6 says 'Jobs is one of the original founders of Apple computers' 
Anonymous 7 says 'he left Apple a while back but he has returned to be the acting 
CEO' 
Anonymous 8 says 'why did he leave if Apple is that great?' 
Anonymous 9 says 'dunno' 
tell "anonymous 4" why are Apple shares a good investment? 
You tell Anonymous 4 'why are Apple shares a good investment?' 
Anonymous 11 tells you 'the share prices are a bargain' 
By changing every user’s ‘username’ continually, the remarks made each user 
become more difficult to identify. They become as difficult to identify as 
remarks that are not tagged by any username. Are ‘Anonymous 4’ and 
‘Anonymous 6’ the same person? It is very likely (by looking at the content of 
the conversation) but there is no real way of knowing. Are ‘Anonymous 3’ and 
‘Anonymous 8’ the same person? No one can really be sure (unless there were 
only two people in the meeting). 
Authorship anonymity has been achieved because a number does not reveal 
anything about the user it represents. Furthermore, a number does not reveal 
which remarks belong to a particular user. Even if everyone knew that the 
 
49
 Although every remark associated to a particular nondescript avatar belongs to one 
person, there is no way of knowing which remarks are associated to a particular 
avatar once the dialogue balloon moves away. Unless one has perfect memory, 
authorship anonymity will exist. 
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remark tagged by Anonymous 4 belonged to ‘Sarah Parker’, Sarah’s other 
remarks could still be anonymous because they will not be tagged by 
Anonymous 4. 
The author calls this approach the tag technique. In theory, the tag technique 
has fulfilled the six requirements. It remains to be seen whether the tag 
technique can be implemented and whether it hides any usability problems (as 
the nondescript-avatar technique did). 
3.3 The theoretically ‘ideal’ environment for 
Anonymity 
What is an ideal environment for conversational anonymity? Is the answer in 
pondering what anonymous users need from a conversation system and the 
system’s administrators? Is the answer simply a ‘reverse’ of the imperfections 
that were identified in the preliminary investigation? Is the answer the five 
demands described at the end of Chapter 2? The author believes that all these 
help to define the word ideal. 
If the author required anonymity, he would want to be able to identify those 
services that deliberately support (or acknowledge) anonymity from those that 
simply tolerate anonymity. Anonymity is deliberately supported when a 
system’s functions (what a system does and what it allows its users to do), 
standard procedures (ie what users and administrators are required to do), 
and administrative practices (ie what administrators are allowed to do) have 
been designed to suit anonymity. 
The author would want to know what provisions have been made for 
anonymity, how they work, how they should be used, and what risks are 
associated with their use. The author would want the administrators to 
guarantee that his anonymity and privacy would be protected. He would want 
to know the ‘powers’ of the superusers. 
Nothing should be allowed to jeopardise the author’s anonymity. In fact, the 
author should be the only person capable of exposing his real-life identity.
50
 If 
the author were to reveal his identity to the administration, the author would 
want the knowledge to remain confidential (ie protected). The author does not 
want the administration to expose his identity to any party (not even to a 
government agency) without his explicit permission. 
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 To reveal or expose one’s identity is not to jeopardise one’s anonymity. To 
jeopardise one’s anonymity is to reveal one’s identity by accident. A user should be 
allowed to reveal but not jeopardise his or her anonymity. 
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The author should be able to attain every ‘shape and size’ of anonymity using 
the means provided by the service. The author should not have to resort to 
external means to obtain the anonymity he needs.
51
 
It should also be possible for the author to be identified. It should be possible 
for the author to embrace and discard anonymity at any time. He should also 
be able to switch between an anonymous and identified username without 
being noticed. In fact, the author should be able to make anonymous and non-
anonymous remarks without any difficulty. 
Finally, the author would want the administrators to provide an environment 
where there is law and order. When anonymity is properly controlled, it (ie 
anonymity) cannot be used for certain purposes. The provisions made for 
anonymity should not allow a user to do anything that is prohibited. The 
administrators need to be able to penalise those that abuse anonymity without 
compromising the anonymity of the ‘innocent’. 
3.3.1 Supporting every ‘shape and size’ of Anonymity 
Having created and analysed who-done-it scenarios (such as the one below), 
the author realised that many ‘forms’ of anonymity exist. The notion that 
anonymity exists as identity anonymity or authorship anonymity has become 
too elementary. 
 Sherlock Holmes and Dr Watson walked towards Mrs White. ‘Do you know 
who could have done this to Harold?’ Holmes asked. ‘No, I don’t. Who would 
want to hurt my Harold? You knew him Holmes. He was a kind and gentle 
person.’ she replied in tears. ‘Well, it must be someone on board this ship,’ 
said Watson, ‘a man strong enough to overpower young Mr White.’ 
 Holmes and Watson began to question the passengers in the adjacent 
cabins. They were now at Mr Lloyd’s cabin. ‘I saw a man leaving the room 
about midnight,’ said Mr Lloyd. ‘Do you know who he is?’ Holmes asked. ‘No, I 
couldn’t see his face,’ Lloyd replied. 
 No one else knew anything and so the housekeeping staff was summoned. 
They were individually questioned. Mrs Brown sat quietly—looking quite 
unaware of the crime that had occurred. ‘What can you tell me about Mr and 
Mrs White, the occupants of this cabin?’ Holmes asked. ‘I unlocked the door 
for Mrs White earlier. She seemed to have locked herself out,’ Mrs Brown 
explained. ‘That’s not true! She’s lying!’ Mrs White interrupted. ‘Who is she?’ 
asked Mrs Brown and looking very puzzled. 
 ‘We have an impostor!’ exclaimed Watson. Holmes nodded in agreement. 
‘We have two mysterious murderers,’ Holmes added, ‘Mr Lloyd and Mrs Brown 
must have seen one each.’ Mrs Brown suddenly turned pale. ‘Murderers?’ she 
asked. Holmes and Watson both gave a nod. ‘Mrs Brown, come with me during 
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 As an example, the author should not have to tweak his UNIX shell account to 
obtain identity anonymity. 
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meal time,’ Holmes requested, ‘We’ll find them.’ ‘I’m afraid,’ was Mrs Brown’s 
response, ‘I’m sorry but I will do no such thing Sir.’ 
After analysing such who-done-it scenarios, the author arrived at three 
‘conclusions’: 
1 Anonymity is relative 
A person can be anonymous to one person but not to another. Mrs 
Brown could not recognise Mrs White—Holmes and Watson however, 
could. The anonymity of one person must be spoken in relation to 
certain people. 
2 Anonymity is dynamic 
The more clues Holmes gathered, the less anonymous the suspects 
became. However, if the wrong clues were gathered, the suspects 
would become more anonymous. 
3 Anonymity exists because of five main reasons: 
i unknown facts: where there is no information available 
ii insufficient facts: where there is some information available, but 
incomplete (eg missing last name) 
iii non-unique facts: where the information available (although 
complete) cannot be traced to a single person 
iv wrong ‘facts’: where false information has been accepted as the 
truth 
v inaccessible facts: where pertinent information (such as a person’s 
identity) has been purposefully withheld by a third-party 
Forms of Anonymity 
Based loosely on the five causes
52
 of anonymity, the author proposed five 
forms of anonymity (ie the forms model):
53
 
1 Absolute-anonymity 
Absolute-anonymity is present when there is no assessable or proven 
fact about the person in question. If the murder took place in at a 
hotel, Holmes and Watson might only be able to guess that the 
murderer is someone strong. Absolute-anonymity would exist because 
the attribute strong is not an (accurately) assessable fact. 
 
52
  ie unknown facts, insufficient facts, non-unique facts, wrong facts, and inaccessible 
facts. 
53
 The order of this list does not necessarily suggest a decreasing ‘degree’ or ‘level’ of 
anonymity—hence the word forms. It is certain that there can be greater and lesser 
degrees of anonymity. Common sense suggests that a person hidden among ninety-
nine other suspects is more anonymous than someone among two is. The number 
of suspects seems to be a reasonable way of measuring anonymity. Another 
possibility is the amount of known facts about the person. In any case, the forms 
model does measure or describe the depth of anonymity. It does however, provide 
a consistent and concise method of describing why anonymity exists. 
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2 Profiled-anonymity 
Profiled-anonymity is present when the facts do not lead to any suspect 
(or when the facts lead to indefinite suspects). If Holmes and Watson 
only knew that the murderer is a female, profiled-anonymity would 
exist. 
3 Confined-anonymity 
Confined-anonymity exists when all possible suspects are known but the 
person responsible cannot be determined. Since there murderer is 
someone on board a ship and everyone on board the ship is known, 
confined-anonymity would exist. 
4 Hidden-anonymity 
Hidden-anonymity exists when wrong facts have been accepted. The 
pretend technique creates hidden-anonymity. The impostor achieved 
hidden-anonymity from Mrs Brown after successfully impersonating 
Mrs White. 
5 Protected-anonymity 
Protected-anonymity exists when a person’s identity has been 
intentionally withheld. One could say that protected-anonymity exists 
because Mrs Brown had refused to identify the impostor. 
Table 3.1 summarises the differences between the five forms of anonymity. 
Table 3.1: A simple comparison of the different forms of anonymity 
 Absolute-
Anonymity 
Profiled-
Anonymity 
Confined-
Anonymity 
Hidden-
Anonymity 
Protected-
Anonymity 
Can the 
(anonymous) 
person be 
recognised? 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
suspects 
0 0 or more 2 or more 1 1 
Is the real-life 
identity of each 
suspect known? 
No No Yes ‘Yes’
54
 No
55
 
Absolute-Anonymity 
Absolute-anonymity is the pinnacle of anonymity. An absolutely anonymous 
person is someone whose identity (ie real name) is not known. He or she is 
 
54
 Since the suspect has secretly assumed a false identity, no one would realise that 
the real-life identity of the suspect is not known. 
55
 However, the real-life identity of the suspect is known to a third-party. 
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also someone whose presence cannot be recognised instantly. Table 3.2 
describes how absolute-anonymity may be supported. 
Table 3.2: Attaining/Supporting Absolute-Anonymity 
User System/Service 
1 Keep one’s real-life identity concealed. 1 Function without asking users to 
provide any real-life facts. 
2 Allow users to choose usernames. 2 Change one’s username as often as 
possible. 
3 Allow users to change usernames in 
secret. 
3 Avoid systems (or services) that do not 
support anonymous remarks. Rely on 
anonymous remarks. 
4 Support anonymous remarks. 
 
4 Recognise one’s idiosyncrasies and 
keep them concealed. 
 
5 Avoid systems (or services) that do not 
protect one’s network address. 
5 Conceal the users’ network address.
56
 
6 Use a method of connecting to the 
network that does not ask for one’s 
real-life identity and is not exclusive to 
one’s self or a fixed
57
 group of 
people—eg an Internet cafe. 
6 Open the system to the Internet (ie 
public). 
Once a mysterious person can be profiled (ie recognised), absolute-anonymity 
no longer exists. Anything about a person that can be repeatedly observed can 
be used to form a profile of the person. A person’s username, alias, IP address, 
e-mail address, and idiosyncrasies are things that allow the person to be 
recognised. 
Profiled-Anonymity 
The advantage of absolute-anonymity is greater protection. However, the 
advantage of profiled-anonymity is the ability to develop continuity, merit, 
reputation, and relationships. Table 3.3 (on the next page) describes the path 
to profiled-anonymity. 
 
56
 If the IP addresses were not protected, it might be possible for one user to finger 
another user’s host computer and obtain a list of online (or non-idle) users. 
Anonymity would now be confined to this list of people. If their real names could 
be determined, confined-anonymity would exist (instead of absolute-anonymity). 
57
  Or confined-anonymity will result instead. 
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Table 3.3: Attaining/Supporting Profiled-Anonymity 
User System/Service 
1 Anything that leads to one’s real name 
has to be concealed. 
1 Function without asking users to 
provide any real-life facts. 
2 Allow users to choose and password-
protect usernames. 
2 Use an anonymous alias as one’s name 
and username. 
3 Allow users to change usernames. 
3 Conceal one’s idiosyncrasies when 
conversing with real-life 
acquaintances.
58
 
 
4 Use a method of connecting to the 
network that does not ask for one’s 
real-life identity and is not exclusive to 
one’s self or a fixed
59
 group of people. 
4 Conceal the users’ network address. 
 5 Open the system to the Internet. 
Confined-Anonymity 
Confined-anonymity is created when a meeting is confined to a group of users 
or people. Table 3.4 describes ways to support confined-anonymity. 
Table 3.4: Attaining/Supporting Confined-Anonymity 
User System/Service 
 1 Allow users to choose and password-
protect usernames.
60
 
1 Avoid systems (or services) that do not 
support anonymous remarks. Rely on 
anonymous remarks. 
2 Support anonymous remarks. 
 
2 Conceal one’s idiosyncrasies.  
3 Remove uninvited or unknown parties 
from meeting. 
3 Support access restriction.
61
 
 
58
 Idiosyncrasies would not have to be concealed among strangers. 
59
  Or confined-anonymity will result instead. 
60
 This allows users to identify themselves. 
61
 ie support meetings lockable private rooms (such as Foothills). 
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Hidden-Anonymity 
Hidden-anonymity is created when wrong or false pieces of information (eg a 
false name) have been accepted as facts. Table 3.5 (on the next page) 
describes how hidden-anonymity can be achieved and supported. 
Table 3.5: Attaining/Supporting Hidden-Anonymity 
User System/Service 
1 Keep one’s real-life identity concealed. 1 Do not ask users to prove their 
identity. 
2 Use a false name. Pretend to be 
someone else.
62
 
2 Allow users to choose and password-
protect usernames. 
3 Fabricate idiosyncrasies.  
4 Use a method of connecting to the 
network that does not verify one’s 
identity and is not exclusive to one’s 
self or a fixed group of people. 
 
Protected-Anonymity 
Protected-anonymity exists because one person has decided or agreed not to 
expose one’s real-life identity to another person. Table 3.6 describes what 
might be needed to support protected-anonymity. 
Table 3.6: Attaining/Supporting Protected-Anonymity 
User System/Service 
1 Avoid systems (or services) that do 
not guarantee confidentiality of 
identity. 
2 Conceal one’s real-life identity from 
certain parties. 
1 Conceal the users’ real-life identity 
(from other users). 
2 Allow users to choose and password-
protect usernames. 
3 Allow users to change usernames. 
3 Use an anonymous alias as one’s 
name and username. 
4 Address users by their username. 
 5 Conceal every user’s network 
address. 
 
62
 ie the pretend technique. 
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Supporting the five forms of Anonymity 
By combining the requirements from all the five forms of anonymity, the 
author arrived at a mini-framework for system designers and administrators: 
1 Do not ask a user to reveal or prove his or her real-life identity. 
2 Do not reveal a user’s real-life identity to other users (ie do not 
deanonymise usernames). Users should always be address by their 
usernames. 
3 Allow a user to choose his or her username. 
4 Allow a user to decide whether to password-protect his or her 
username. 
5 Allow a user to change his or her username. 
6 Hide a user’s network address. 
7 Support anonymous remarks. 
8 Allow users to keep unauthorised participants out of a meeting. 
9 Open the system (or service) to the Internet. 
If the nine directives were supported, a user should be able to choose which of 
the five forms of anonymity to embrace. 
Levels of Anonymity 
It was after the author had proposed the forms model that he came across a 
paper entitled Levels of Anonymity (Flinn & Maurer 1995). What is a ‘level’ of 
anonymity? Flinn and Maurer described how different user identification 
techniques create different ‘levels’ of anonymity—see Table 3.7. 
Table 3.7: Flinn and Maurer’s Levels of Anonymity (continued next page) 
Level 5 identification 
(Super-identification) 
 
• The identity of each user is known (to the system and 
administrators). 
• No user is able to impersonate another. 
• The system is aware of a user’s activities. 
Level 4 (Usual) 
identification 
• The identity of a user is known. 
• Each user is assigned a single username that is protected 
by a password. Entry is only permitted with the right 
password. 
Level 3 
(Latent or Potential) 
identification 
• The identity of every user is known. 
• Each user is assigned a master username and password. 
• Initial entry to the system requires the master username 
and password. Upon entry, a user can create and use 
other usernames. The user will assign a password to his 
or her alternate username. The alternate username and 
password can then be used to enter the system in the 
future. 
• The system knows which usernames belong to the same 
person but the knowledge is hidden from other users. 
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Level 2 (Pen-name) 
identification 
• User can have multiple self-chosen usernames—each 
protected by a password. 
• The system does not know which usernames belong to 
the same person. 
Level 1 (Anonymous) 
identification 
• Entry into the system is controlled using a common access 
password. 
• Users do not have usernames. Users cannot be addressed 
directly by the system or other users. 
Level 0 identification • No identification of user. ‘This basically corresponds to 
turning on a PC that is not password protected.’ 
• The system does not keep any records of a user. 
Could Flinn and Maurer’s Levels of Anonymity model (Levels model) be used to 
describe a user’s degree of anonymity? Is each ‘level’ of identification only a 
name or is it literally a measure of anonymity? Is a user with a lower 
identification level ‘more’ anonymous? 
What constitutes greater anonymity? Common sense suggests that fewer facts 
are known about a more anonymous user. In other words, a non-registered 
user Foothills user should be more anonymous than a registered user (since a 
registered user’s e-mail address would be known). For the Levels model to 
agree with common sense, a non-registered user would need to have a lower 
level of identification (or higher level of anonymity). According to Table 3.7 
(above), a registered Foothills user would have a Level 3 identification. A non-
registered user would have a Level 2 identification. In this instance, the Levels 
model appears to agree with common sense. 
Further investigations revealed that it is not always possible to match a user 
or system to a particular ‘level’ of identification. A system such as Town 
Meeting (TM) does not support protected usernames but does provide the 
ability to restrict access to a meeting via a common access password. A TM 
user cannot be classified under Level 2 identification since usernames cannot 
be reserved (ie since password-protected usernames are not supported). Level 
1 identification will not be correct even though a common access password is 
supported because every user has a username. Perhaps more levels are 
needed in the Levels model. 
The Levels model also fails to consider the anonymity among users. If user A 
were to know the identity of user B but not user C, C would obviously be 
‘more’ anonymous than B. B would be ‘less’ anonymous because the identity of 
B would be known to A and could be jeopardised by A (by accident or 
otherwise). To gauge a user’s level or degree of anonymity more justly, two 
perspectives must be considered: 
1 how much the system and administrators know about a user, and 
2 how much other users know about a user. 
The Levels model only considers the first point. 
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Measuring the potential for loss of Anonymity 
The author believed that a ‘better’ way to gauge a user’s depth of anonymity 
was to measure the anti-anonymity factors (ie factors that could jeopardise the 
user’s anonymity). He believed that a user exposed to fewer ‘risks’ (ie fewer 
anti-anonymity factors) would be someone more anonymous. 
A user’s anonymity is ‘lessen’ (or at risk) when: 
1 the user has disclosed true personal details, either real-life (eg one’s 
real name or address of residence) or virtual (eg one’s e-mail address) 
to the administration. 
2 the information submitted by the user is verified in some way—eg a 
user is asked to send an e-mail from the e-mail address submitted. 
3 the user makes long-term use of a username—enabling others to 
develop a profile of the user. 
4 the user’s identity is known to another user—‘doubling’ the danger of 
slip-ups.
63
 
5 the user’s idiosyncrasies are unique and obvious. 
6 the system is only open to a specific group of people—ie the 
participants are known. 
7 the user had ‘logged on’ directly from his or her private computer at 
home instead of a multi-user host or a public computer at an Internet 
cafe. 
Circumstances that can ‘enhance’ or increase a user’s anonymity (ie pro-
anonymity
64
 factors) are: 
1 when the system keeps a user’s personal details (eg IP addresses) and 
activities confidential from (or inaccessible to) other users. 
2 when the system keeps a user’s personal details and activities 
confidential from (or inaccessible to) administrators. 
3 when there are many participants and a high participation rate.
65
 
4 when private communication is not supported. Limiting participants 
to public comments helps to prevent participants from corroborating 
(ie exposing their identity to one another) in secret. If one knew three 
out of four participants in a meeting, one might be able to work out 
who was using the fourth username. 
5 when authorship anonymity and identity anonymity are supported (or 
possible). 
 
63
 Instead of one, there are now two people that could make the slip-up. 
64
 The absence of a pro-anonymity factor could be seen as an anti-anonymity factor. 
65
 Thereby, increasing the number of decoys and the chances of misprofiles. 
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The Anti-Anonymity Checklist 1 
Most of these factors have been put into what the author calls the Anti-
Anonymity Checklist 1 (or AAC1). The AAC1 is a list designed to gauge the 
amount of anti-anonymity factors associated to a specific user in a particular 
situation—see Table 3.8. 
Table 3.8: The Anti-Anonymity Checklist 1 
 Factors Points 
1 A username can be protected by a password: 1 point. 
A user uses a password-protected username: 2 points. 
1–2 
2 A user has provided (ie submitted) true real-life information to the 
system or an administrator. 
2 
3 Administrators have access to the user’s real-life details. 2 
4 User’s privacy can be compromised. 2 
5 User’s personal details are made public. 2 
6 Remarks are tagged by user’s username. 1 
7 Anonymous remarks can be deanonymised. 1 
8 User idiosyncrasies are recognised. 2 
9 Private communication is supported. 1 
10 Meeting or conversation can be restricted to a specific group of 
people: 1 point. 
Real-life identity of the group is known (ie a closed meeting): 2 
points. 
1–2 
11 Participants connected from the same locale (ie room or building). 2 
12 User’s real-life identity is known to one or more participants: 1 
point. 
One or more participants have not guaranteed to keep the user’s 
identity confidential: 2 points. 
1–2 
Weights were assigned to each factor—two points were assigned to a factor 
that could lead to loss of identity anonymity. These points could be totalled 
and converted to a percentile. A higher percentage should suggest that a user 
is less anonymous. Of course, a rating of 100% should not suggest that a user 
is not anonymous. It should only indicate that the user is less anonymous 
than one with a lower percentage. Similarly, a rating of 0% does not suggest 
that anonymity cannot be lost. 
The AAC1 checklist should allow the author to make simple comparisons 
between various circumstances and systems. Consider the following example. 
Sarah Parker used the pretend technique and became ‘Peter Parker’. She chose 
the username ‘peter’ to reinforce her deception. Assume that ‘bill’ knew ‘peter’ 
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was Sarah but had agreed to keep it a secret. What AAC1 rating did Sarah 
possess? 
Table 3.9 shows that Sarah has an AAC1 rating of 39% on a typical Internet 
Relay Chat (IRC) server. 
Table 3.9: AAC1 analysis of Sarah on IRC 
 Factors Points 
1 Password-protected username is not supported. 0/2 
2 Personal details submitted? No. 0/2 
3 Admin knows Sarah’s IP address. 1/2 
4 Compromised privacy? No. 0/2 
5 Lack of Confidentiality? IP addresses are exposed. 2/2 
6 Remarks tagged by username? Yes. 1/1 
7 Deanonymisation of anonymous remarks? Anonymous remarks not 
supported. 
N/A 
8 Known Idiosyncrasies? N/A 
9 Private communication supported? Yes. 1/1 
10 Meetings can be restricted. Closed meeting? Assume no. 1/2 
11 Proximity? IRC is open to the Internet. 0/2 
12 Sarah is not anonymous to some participants? Yes, but ‘bill’ has 
agreed to provide confidentiality. 
1/2 
 Total 7/18 
 Percentage 39% 
On Town Meeting (TM), Sarah would have a rating of 34%—see Table 3.10 
(below) 
Table 3.10: AAC1 analysis of Sarah on TM (continued next page) 
 Factors Points 
1 Password-protected username is not supported. 0/2 
2 Personal details submitted? No. 0/2 
3 Admin has access to personal details? No. 0/2 
4 Compromised privacy? Yes, The TM server logs all non-private 
remarks. 
1/2 
5 Lack of Confidentiality? No. 0/2 
6 Remarks tagged by username? No, the nameless technique is 
supported. 
0/1 
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 Factors Points 
7 Deanonymisation of anonymous remarks? A flaw in TM may allow 
people to deanonymise anonymous usernames (and remarks). 
0.5/1 
8 Known Idiosyncrasies? N/A 
9 Private communication supported? Yes. 1/1 
10 Meetings can be restricted. Closed meeting? Assume no. 1/2 
11 Proximity? TM is not open to the Internet. 2/2 
12 Sarah is not anonymous to some participants? Yes, but ‘bill’ has 
agreed to provide confidentiality. 
1/2 
 Total 6.5/19 
 Percentage 34% 
What do these figures suggest? Did Sarah have a 39% ‘probability’ of exposure 
on IRC (and 34% on TM)? There is no evidence to support or deny such a claim. 
Is Sarah more anonymous on TM than IRC? ‘Yes,’ according to the AAC1 
ratings. It also makes sense because one’s IP address (which is exposed on 
IRC) can be traced to one’s personal computer. How significant is the 5% 
difference? The author does not know. 
What if ‘bill’ did not know that Sarah was ‘david’? Common sense suggests that 
Sarah would now be ‘more’ anonymous (or less at risk). The IRC ratings 
dropped (by 5.6%) to approximately 34% while the TM ratings dropped by 
(5.3%) to approximately 29%. These drops in percentages correctly reflect the 
new circumstance. However, how significant is the additional 0.3% drop 
experienced on IRC? Why would the removal of ‘bill’ provided more benefit on 
IRC? 
Common sense suggests that if ‘bill’ had exposed the identity of ‘david’ on 
IRC, it would have been possible for people to identify Sarah’s presence even 
if she were to use a new username (because Sarah can be recognised by her IP 
address). On the other hand, if ‘bill’ had exposed ‘david’ on TM, Sarah could 
simply used a different username to regain some of the identity anonymity 
lost. In other words, ‘bill’ was a greater threat to Sarah on IRC. Hence, the 
removal of ‘bill’ would have caused a greater drop (in risk) on IRC. Perhaps the 
AAC1 is more accurate than the author has expected. 
The accuracy of any anti-anonymity factor checklist will depend on the factors 
and correct weight assignment to each factor. The more comprehensive a 
checklist, the more accurate the measurement should be. Is accuracy 
important? What is the value of knowing that ‘david’ might be 5% ‘more’ 
anonymous (or 5% more protected) on TM? While absolute accurate is always 
important in any scientific study, the author believes it is not possible with 
anonymity. The author’s own belief that anonymity is dynamic and relative 
tells him that anonymity cannot be measured with absolute accuracy. By using 
the same checklist for analysis, relative accuracy should be possible. 
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The author sees the AAC1 percentages as indicators for comparison rather 
than probability predictions. If the AAC1 was able to show that one 
environment was ‘safer’ than another was, it has already served a useful 
purpose. 
3.3.2 Strategies for protecting Anonymity 
Realising that users can be ignorant (ie forgetful or careless), system designers 
and administrators should remove every possible danger to anonymity.  If a 
particular danger cannot be removed, users should be warned about the 
danger before they are allowed to use the service. Such warning can be 
included in the promotional materials, sign-up instructions, or login process. 
What dangers to anonymity can be removed? A system can be built to detect 
certain keywords. Multi-User Domain (MUD) systems will usually allow a user 
to specify the gender for his or her character (ie virtual body). On such 
systems, pronoun checks could be performed on a user’s remarks. If the 
wrong pronoun were found, the system could alert the user and allow the user 
to make a correction if needed. Alternatively, the system could allow a user to 
specify a set of keywords to detect. Such a provision would allow simple slip-
ups and idiosyncrasies
66
 to be avoided. 
Flinn and Maurer (1995) suggested the idea of automatically modifying a 
user’s (or every user’s) remarks to a specific style of writing. Such a provision 
(which Flinn and Maurer called style scramblers) would certainly benefit 
authorship anonymity. When all remarks appear to have the same style of 
writing, it may be impossible to determine which remarks belong to which 
user. 
According to Flinn and Maurer, the style scrambler could also be used to 
create distinctly different styles of writing. This should be particularly useful 
to the pretend technique. If one were to pretend to be someone ‘uneducated’, 
the style scrambler could be made to introduce grammatical errors on 
purpose. Of course, Flinn and Maurer have yet to demonstrate that their ideas 
are implementable. It is certain however, that technologies to correct spelling 
and grammatical errors in one’s remarks already exist. 
Another danger that is easily removed is the ‘two-person’ problem. A system 
can prevent a user from using an authorship anonymity technique (such as the 
nameless or tag technique) when there are fewer than three active users in a 
meeting. Users that could not have possibly made a particular anonymous 
remark cannot be counted as an active user. 
One’s anonymity will also require protection from other users. If ‘bob’ were to 
know the identity of ‘terminator’, ‘bob’ could jeopardise the anonymity of 
 
66
 If one had the habit of including a smiley :) in one’s remarks, the smiley could be 
specified as one of the keywords to filter. 
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‘terminator’. What could ‘terminator’ do if ‘bob’ were to expose the real name 
of ‘terminator’? There are two obvious options: 
1 ‘Terminator’ can resort to an authorship anonymity technique (such as 
the tag and nameless techniques) to attain authorship anonymity (ie to 
make anonymous remarks). Even when people know who ‘terminator’ 
is, the remarks made by ‘terminator’ can remain mysterious (ie 
anonymous). 
2 ‘Terminator’ can assume a different username—one that is not known 
to ‘bob’. 
How did ‘bob’ know the identity of ‘terminator’? How did ‘terminator’ lose 
identity anonymity? Could that loss have been prevented? There are at least 
four ways ‘bob’ could have known that ‘terminator’ was ‘Sarah Parker’: 
1 Sarah revealed her real name to ‘bob’ (or someone told ‘bob’ that Sarah 
Parker was the real name of ‘terminator’). 
The author believes there is little the administration or system can do 
to prevent this possibility. Just as a user should not be deprived of 
anonymity, the user should also not be deprived from being 
identifying himself or herself (especially when it does not jeopardise 
the anonymity of another user). The administration can however, help 
a user who had lost (or given up) anonymity to gain it back. Sarah (ie 
‘terminator’) should be allowed to change her username. The change 
should be done with minimal difficulty and repercussion. Sarah should 
be able to retain all her ‘privileges’ (or settings) she had while she was 
‘terminator’. 
2 ‘Bob’ eavesdropped on a conversation where ‘terminator’ revealed her 
identity to someone else. 
Avoiding this possibility simply requires the removal of all 
eavesdropping provisions. A user should not be able to conceal his or 
her ‘attendance’ in a conversation. A user should not be able to 
intercept any message not addressed to the user. The author believes 
that these requirements should also apply to the system’s 
administrators. 
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3 ‘Bob’ traced the username Terminator to an identified username (eg to 
‘sarah_parker’). 
This could have happened when Sarah was swapping usernames. Two 
users sharing the same network address might reveal that both are the 
same person. The same would happen if two users shared the same 
idiosyncrasies. Username changes can also be foiled if a user did not 
include a ‘reasonable’ delay.
67
 
A system can help to make username changes more ‘successful’ by: 
• concealing the network address of users, 
• not arranging a participants-list in the order in which users had 
entered the system (or meeting), 
• not ‘time-stamping’ a user’s entry and exit, and 
• not informing other users that a user has left or entered the 
system (or meeting). 
The last suggestion seems to go against the earlier recommendation 
that no one be allowed to ‘sneak’ into a meeting. If one could sneak 
into a meeting, one could potentially eavesdrop on a conversation. In 
view of that, perhaps it should not be considered. 
The problem with idiosyncrasies is more complicated. The author has 
repeatedly demanded that one’s idiosyncrasies be recognised and hid. 
It may also help if one were to fabricate a set of ‘idiosyncrasies’ for each 
of one’s usernames. By exhibiting different ‘idiosyncrasies’, one may be 
able to persuade others to believe that a different person is behind 
each of one’s usernames. 
4 ‘Bob’ was able to use a flaw (or provision) to access personal details on 
‘terminator’. Alternatively, a member of the administration might have 
given certain (privileged) information to ‘bob’. 
This possibility can be avoided if real-life information is not requested 
or recorded. Is it possible to operate a service without knowing the 
users’ identity? It is certain that the task of capturing data can be fully 
automated. A user should not have to provide information through an 
administrator or operator. The user should be able to enter any 
required data on his or her own. Verification of any data should also be 
automated. In fact, the operations of a service should be automated as 
much as possible. The rationale is that a system can be engineered (ie 
forced) to maintain perfect confidentiality whereas people cannot. 
Whatever is known about a user must be kept in confidence. Nothing 
should be disclosed to a third party without the user’s explicit consent. 
Administrators of every level need to respect or be taught (or forced) to 
respect privacy and anonymity. 
 
67
 A participant that joins a conversation just after (or before) one leaves may expose 
the fact that the two are the same person. 
3  |  I n - d e p t h  R e s e a r c h  S t r a t e g y  
54 
 
3.3.3 Operating a service with Anonymous users 
Knowledge of each user’s identity is important for managing resources, offline 
communication, and accountability. How would these functions be performed 
if the identity of the users were not known? 
Names are an important resource—perhaps the most important in a 
conversation service. If not managed properly, people would not be able to 
have the username they desire. One way of ensuring that all the ‘popular’ 
names have not been used is to limit the number of names a person can 
reserve (ie protect by a password). There would certainly be more unused 
names if each person were only allowed to reserve one username. 
How would such a policy be policed? How would the administrators tell that 
two usernames have been reserved by one person? The author could not find 
a definitive answer. An alternative to preventing users from reserving multiple 
usernames is the deletion of usernames that are not in regular user. Two 
usernames should be freed (for others to use) if they have not been used for a 
period of time. It does not matter whether both usernames belonged to one or 
two different people. A user that does not have the time (or no longer wants) 
to use a service should be removed. 
Disk space may be another issue for concern. The amount of data stored about 
each user can vary from system to system. In the case of MUDs, an 
exceptionally large amount of data may be stored. This is because each 
reserved username (ie ‘character’) is essentially a virtual body. Each ‘body’ can 
be equipped with various ‘armour’ and ‘weapon’. Details of each character’s 
equipment have to be recorded. 
To discourage players from over-equipping their characters, a ‘fee’ is usually 
charged. It is usually proportional to the size of a user’s file (or rather, to the 
number of items collected). The more equipment a user amasses, the larger 
the user’s file gets.
68
 The larger the file, the more the user has to pay. A user’s 
equipment will not be saved if the user does not have sufficient virtual 
coins.
69
 A user that does not have the time to play will not have enough coins 
to retain his or her equipment. This simple economic burden provides a way 
to keep the size of files from growing unreasonably large. Such a burden can 
also be used to delete a user’s file altogether (and free the username). 
Network bandwidth is another important resource. As the number of online 
users increase, the size of the bandwidth available to each user shrinks. As 
transmission rates drop, remarks begin to take longer to appear. Connections 
begin to be broken because the client and server cannot verify each other’s 
existence. 
 
68
 Even though the amount of free disk space has become less of a concern (as large 
capacity hard drives are now becoming very affordable), it remains a fact that a 
larger database or file will take longer to access (ie read into memory). On a slower 
hard drive, a whole computer may freeze while data is read. 
69
 Users earn ‘coins’ by taking them from defeated ‘monsters’. 
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Bandwidth is wasted when users leave multiple characters online (ie 
multiplay). Even when a user’s characters are not generating remarks, 
bandwidth is still being used because (public) remarks will need to be 
transmitted to the user’s computer. If each user were to establish two 
connections to a server (ie have two online characters), the network bandwidth 
would be unnecessarily reduced. Again, how do the administrators know 
which characters or users are the same person in real-life? There is no clear 
solution. Again, the answer may be to disconnect idling users. Two 
connections should be severed whether both belong to one person or two 
different persons. The rationale is that a user that does not want to converse 
with others should not be on a conversation system. 
When network performance drops below an acceptable level, an administrator 
may choose to ‘lock up’ a system.
70
 Users that attempt username changes
71
 at 
such a time may find themselves unable to re-enter a system. Even if a system 
were only closed to visitors, it would affect anonymity because one might not 
be able to create and use an anonymous username—see Transcript 3.1. 
Please enter your name:zorro 
 
       -----=====>>>>> Foothills <<<<<=====----- 
 
      Sorry, this program is temporarily closed to new players. 
      Please try again soon, or if you wish to have a character 
                      registered send email: 
      specifying a character name, the password you wish to use, 
           and your email address to the address below. 
 
         fha@toybox.infomagic.com 
 
      Please mail any comments or questions to those addresses. 
Transcript 3.1: A system may prevent one from creating an anonymous username 
If a user’s e-mail address is not collected, how will the administrators be able 
to communicate with an offline user? ‘Passive’ communication may be the 
answer. Instead of sending a piece of information to a user, the administrators 
can leave a piece of information for the user to collect. A website (or bulletin 
board) can be established to communicate general news. An ‘e-mail system’ 
(where a user’s username will suffice as the ‘e-mail address’) can be integrated 
into the conversation system. This will enable a messages to be left for a 
specific user. 
While no personal information may be requested from users, certain users 
may volunteer information. Some information may also be freely available. A 
user’s network address for instance, can be obtained from the network 
 
70
 Of course, network performance is not the only reason why a system may be 
closed. The next subchapter (ie Ch 3.3.4) will explain other reasons. 
71
 To switch between anonymity and non-anonymity. 
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protocol. How should such ‘free’ information be handled? The author believes 
that every piece of information about a user should be treated as confidential. 
If possible, no information should be recorded. Storage and use of personal 
information should be transparent. Anything that is recorded about a user 
should be revealed to the user. A user should also be told who has access to 
which piece of information (about the user). 
3.3.4 Strategies for controlling Anonymity 
How can the administrators penalise (anonymous) users that abuse 
anonymity? A solution may be to demand that every user identify himself or 
herself before being allowed to use the service. In return, the administrators 
would have to assure users that their identities would be concealed from one 
another. By knowing the real-life identity of a user, real-life actions can be 
taken. This possibility or ‘threat’ may be sufficient to discourage users from 
abusing anonymity. 
A ‘better’ solution may be to grant anonymity to (or rather, protect the 
anonymity of) a user as long as the user abides by certain conditions. Should a 
user break any rule, the administrators would have the right to deny the user 
access to anonymity (eg prevent the user from creating anonymous remarks), 
or as Detweiler (1993a) suggested, forfeit the protection given to the violator 
(eg expose the user’s IP address). 
Is it possible to penalise a user without compromising or reducing his or her 
anonymity? Banishment (or ‘denial of service’) is the strategy adopted by 
many public conversation services. A system can be designed to reject 
network connections from a specific computer or site. Such bans can be 
imposed without exact knowledge of the violator’s identity. 
The author believes that an administrator should only need to supply the 
violator’s username and specify the type of ban to impose. An administrator 
should not need to know the violator’s network address—the system should 
know the network addresses of every user. 
A system should be designed to allow the provision for creating anonymous 
remarks or new usernames to be completely disabled. Where there are no 
known ‘suspects’, these fundamental provisions for anonymity can be 
disabled. 
Another strategy may be to equip users with the ability to insulate themselves 
from anonymous users. ElseWhere II (EW2) systems such as Foothills allow 
users to block private communication from specific users (or from all users). 
Furthermore, registered users are able to move their conversations into their 
private rooms. These rooms can then be locked to keep strangers out. 
Another way of controlling anonymity is to confine the ability to create 
anonymous remarks to certain rooms or events (eg a brainstorming session). A 
system may for example, equip a chairperson (or host) with the ability to 
control when anonymity is permitted and when not. 
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The strategies, techniques, and ideas that have been proposed in this chapter 
represent the beginnings of a framework for supporting conversational 
anonymity. The task ahead is obvious—to implement the proposed provisions. 
That is described in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
Implementation
4 Implementation 
4.1 Introduction 
Can the proposed provisions outlined in Chapter 3 be implemented? Will the 
provisions work together? These were the challenges for the author. 
A conversation system was needed to serve as the foundation for 
implementing the proposed provisions. The MERC 2.2 source code was chosen 
not because of any single compelling reason. There several ‘good’ reasons, 
however: 
1 The MERC system did not provide any special support for anonymity—
enabling the author to make fair comparisons between the ‘naturally 
occurring’ form of anonymity and a deliberately supported form. 
2 The MERC source code (written in C) could be compiled without any 
change on Ultrix,
72
 which was the operating system of the host 
computer available for the author to conduct his research. 
3 The author believed that MERC (and most combat-oriented MUDs) 
could offer a ‘superior’ kind of interaction—one that was similar to 
meeting face-to-face. 
MERC is an adventure-oriented multi-user domain (MUD) system (like The 
Mudde Pathetique). It did not bother the author that MERC was a game. He 
believed the ‘play’ element could in fact, be used to attract people to the 
system. 
Oz was the name given to the resulting (MERC) MUD after it had undergone a 
series of modifications. Oz was still an adventure MUD. However, it was now 
providing some support for anonymity. Everything that was needed to 
introduce the tag technique was implemented on Oz. 
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 Digital Electronic Corporation’s version of the UNIX operating system. 
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4.2 Implementing the Tag technique 
Oz needed to assign numbers to anonymous remarks. It needed to know 
which number belonged to which user. Users needed a way to specify whether 
remarks were to be tagged by their username or with a number. 
New communication commands 
A set of commands (ie the tag commands) was added to enable the tag 
technique to be used—see Table 4.1. The tag commands were designed to 
resemble their non-anonymous counterparts. From a user’s point of view, 
communicating anonymously simply required the addition of the prefix A
73
 to 
an existing communication command—eg asay instead of say. 
Table 4.1: Commands for using the tag technique 
Syntax Purpose 
asay <remark> Send an anonymous message to everyone in the same 
room. A number replaces the sender’s username. 
atell <character> 
<remark> 
Send an anonymous message to a single user.  A 
number replaces the sender’s username. 
atell <number> <remark> Send an anonymous message to a mysterious recipient. 
A number replaces the sender’s username. 
ashout <remark> Send an anonymous message to everyone online. A 
number replaces the sender’s username. 
tell <number> <remark> Send a non-anonymous message to a mysterious 
recipient. 
When a user makes an anonymous-say (ie an asay), Oz would allocate a 
number to the user.
74
 This number would take the place of the user’s 
username—see Transcript 4.1 (below). A maximum of twenty tags ensured that 
users would only have two digits to type. Once ‘20’ was used, ‘1’ would be 
reallocated (ie reused). 
asay Does anyone know the way to ultima? 
20: Does anyone know the way to ultima? 
asay doesn't anyone know? 
1: doesn't anyone know? 
ashout Does anyone know the way to ultima please? 
You (anonymously shout): Does anyone know the way to ultima please? 
3 (to you): What do you have to offer in return? 
 
73
 A for Anonymous. 
74
 The relationship between a tag and a username would be maintained in memory. 
This information would not be recorded on any file. It would not be accessible to 
any user or superuser. 
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atell 3 i have 100000 coins for you 
You (anonymously tell 3): i have 100000 coins for you 
5 (to you): OK, I'll meet you in 5 minutes at the boar inn 
Transcript 4.1: The tag technique creates remarks that are tagged by numbers 
instead of usernames 
When a remark is directed to a number, Oz will look up the tag-username 
records to convert the number into a username. Oz will then proceed to find 
an online user that matches the username. Once a match is found, the 
message is delivered. 
What would happen if a remark were directed at a number that had not been 
assigned to anyone? What if a number referred to a user that had left the 
system? 
Undeliverable Anonymous remarks 
MERC (and therefore, Oz) had been designed to generate an error message 
when a remark cannot be delivered. Such feedback was believed to be 
detrimental to anonymity. It might allow a person to determine the user 
behind a particular number (or more precisely, a particular remark). Someone 
that understood the tag technique could guess that ‘7’ was ‘sue’—see 
Transcript 4.2. 
ashout Does anyone know the way to ultima please? 
You (anonymously shout): Does anyone know the way to ultima please? 
3 (to you): what do you have to offer for that information? 
atell 3 i have 100000 coins 
You (anonymously tell 3): i have 100000 coins 
5 (to you): ok, i'll meet you in 5 minutes at the boar inn 
atell 5 who are you? how will i know you? 
You (anonymously tell 5): who are you? how will i know you? 
7 (to you): i'll come on as iris 
atell 7 oh, ok 
You (anonymously tell 7): oh, ok 
Sue has left the game. 
atell 7 oh yeah and I'll be ZZZZ 
Sorry, that person is no longer online. 
Transcript 4.2: A delivery error may reveal that ‘7’ was ‘sue’ 
The problem is compounded further by the fact that ‘sue’ will not know that 
‘she’ has been ‘discovered’ (ie that she has lost authorship anonymity). The 
author believed that any loss of anonymity if avoidable should be avoided. If 
delivery errors were not reported, perhaps one would be left to wonder 
whether the recipient: 
• did not want to respond, 
• was still thinking about a reply, or 
• was no longer online. 
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The author believed that leaving a user uncertain (or frustrated) was 
preferable to putting someone’s anonymity at risk. Oz was consequently made 
to suppress error messages when a remark could not be delivered to a number 
(ie to a mysterious recipient). 
The decoy checker 
There were other ways of foiling the tag technique. The tag technique would 
not work if there were insufficient people to act as one’s decoy. Decoy checks 
were introduced to ensure that the tag technique could not be used unless 
there were more than three participants.
75
  
The checks involved more than ensuring that there were three users in a 
room. Transcript 4.3 shows that there are five users (including ‘terminator’) at 
the Entrance to the Grunting Boar Inn. Why did the author (or rather, the 
decoy checker) prevent ‘terminator’ from making an asay? 
look 
Entrance to the Grunting Boar Inn 
You are standing in the entrance hall of the Grunting Boar Inn.  The hall 
has been wisely decorated with simple but functional furniture.  A small 
staircase leads up to the defunct reception room and the bar is to the east. 
Sue the Cowgirl is here. 
Ally Cat is sleeping here. 
Bob is JR's brother! is sleeping here. 
(Invis) Luke Skywalker is here. 
asay does anyone know the way to ultima? 
Sorry, can't do that right here. Too few people around to be anonymous this way. 
Transcript 4.3: The decoy checker stopping ‘terminator’ from making an asay 
The asay was not permitted because the decoy checker had only detected two 
valid parties in the room—ie ‘sue’ and ‘terminator’. 
The users ‘ally’ and ‘bob’ were not considered because their characters were 
‘asleep’. A user cannot make an asay (or any other remark) while his or her 
character is ‘asleep’. 
The user ‘luke’ was not counted because ‘his’ character was invisible. Consider 
this scenario. If ‘sue’ were not able to see invisible characters, ‘she’ would not 
know that ‘luke’ was present. If the decoy checker counted invisible 
characters, there would have been three valid parties (ie ‘terminator’ and ‘luke’ 
and ‘sue’). Asays would have been possible. If ‘luke’ had made an asay, ‘sue’ 
might be led to believe it was made by ‘terminator’ (since ‘she’ would not know 
that ‘luke’ was present). The user ‘terminator’ would have become a ‘scapegoat’ 
instead of a decoy. If ‘sue’ were able to see ‘luke’, she would have traced the 
asay to two users—‘terminator’ and ‘luke’. She would not have jumped to any 
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 A gathering of three users is the theoretical minimum—ie one speaks while the 
other two serve as a decoy for each other. 
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conclusion. The author did not want to give anonymity to one user at the 
expense of another. To avoid such ‘injustice’, invisible characters were not 
counted. 
The decoy checker would also ignore characters that were not under any 
human control. Any character listed by the look command but not by the who 
command (ie is on the look-list but not the who-list) would be a computer-
controlled character
76
 or a link-dead character. When a user exits Oz 
‘gracefully’, the user’s character is removed from a room. However, if a user 
were to be unexpectedly disconnected (because of network problems), the 
user’s character would not be immediately removed. Such a character is called 
link-dead.
77
 A link-dead character is not under anyone’s control and could not 
have made any remarks. 
Although the decoy checker prevented ‘terminator’ from making an asay (in 
Transcript 4.3 on the previous page), it does not mean that anonymity cannot 
be attained. It simply meant that ‘terminator’ could not use the tag technique 
to attain anonymity. The user ‘terminator’ would be able to make semi-
anonymous remarks if the username terminator were anonymous. 
The problem created by multiplaying 
The decoy checker works on the assumption that a different character is 
controlled by a different person. In reality, one person could be controlling 
two or more characters. It is possible that a meeting among four users is really 
a meeting between two people—one person may be controlling three 
characters. In such a scenario, the decoy checker would have (wrongly) 
concluded that there were sufficient participants. 
The rules of Oz clearly stated that no one should use two characters at a time. 
However, there was no simple way of policing this rule. The author could not 
identify people that were multiplaying nor prevent multiplaying from 
occurring. Identical IP addresses could certainly be a sign but not necessarily 
proof of multiplaying. People connecting from one common UNIX host for 
example, would have the same IP address. 
Again, this problem could be solved if Oz knew the (identity of the) person 
behind every character. If that were possible, Oz will know which usernames 
belong to the same person. Oz would be able to prevent a person from 
bringing a second character into the virtual world. There are several 
‘problems’ with this solution, however. First, how will users prove who they 
are? Would users be willing to provide information such as their credit card 
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 These computer-controlled characters are part of the game. When ‘killed’, they 
provide users with coins, points, and equipment. 
77
 Oz would eventually remove link-dead characters from the landscape. A link-dead 
character is not immediately removed because that would enable the character to 
continue ‘playing’ (eg ‘fighting’) while its owner made attempts to re-establish 
connection. 
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number or passport number? Second, would the author be able to verify any 
of the information provided? Since Oz was not operating as a pay service, 
such verification methods were not feasible. 
Could e-mail addresses be used to identify a person? In theory, ‘no’. Web-
based e-mail services such as Microsoft’s Hotmail (www.hotmail.com), Yahoo’s 
Yahoo! Mail (www.yahoo.com), and Netscape’s Webmail (webmail.netscape.com) 
were giving away e-mail accounts without verifying that people were who they 
claimed to be. In other words, a person could easily have several anonymous 
e-mail addresses. 
How was multiplaying addressed then? The author found his ‘solution’ when 
assessing the number of characters a person could realistically control. The 
author recalled instances (during the field study) where he could successfully 
control two characters at time. In fact, the author could even engage in two 
different conversations simultaneously (where each character was engaging in 
its own conversation). Playing the role of two people was mentally stressful 
but not impossible. Could someone manage three identities (ie characters) 
simultaneously in one meeting? The author tried but could not manage three 
conversations in three windows. Of course, this does not mean it cannot be 
done. Even if it were possible, what would drive someone to attempt such 
feats? The author believed that raising the minimum number of participants 
(required by the decoy checker) from three to four was a sensible way to 
address the problem created by multiplaying. Although this change was not 
necessarily a solution, it would remove the problem of multiplaying among 
three users. For multiplaying to foil authorship anonymity, a person would 
now have to play the part of three different people at a meeting. 
If users were to use the alias or pretend technique in conjunction with the tag 
technique, multiplaying would not be such a menacing problem. Should a user 
be robbed of authorship anonymity, the ‘exposed’ (ie deanonymised) remark 
would only be traced to an anonymous username or a false name (ie to a 
fictitious person). Should a user be robbed of authorship anonymity, he or she 
would still be left with identity anonymity. 
The problem of multiplaying could be removed if users were to conduct closed 
meetings. There are no anonymous users in a closed meeting. Every user in a 
closed meeting would be a different person. Could Oz support closed 
meetings? 
For closed meetings to be possible, a group of people need to be able to 
identify themselves, and keep anonymous or uninvited users out of the 
meeting. The first requirement was possible since users could create 
password-protected characters. No one could use a particular password-
protected username without knowing the proper password—no one could be 
‘terminator’ except ‘Sarah Parker’. The second requirement could not be met, 
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however. Oz did not provide a reliable way of keeping uninvited guests 
(including superusers)
78
 out of a room (ie meeting). 
Lockable chambers 
Lockable chambers were introduced to support closed meetings. Every user 
has access to a lockable chamber. The chamber command will bring a user into 
his or her chamber. The chamber lock command is used to lock and unlock 
one’s chamber—see Transcript 4.4. 
chamber 
You see a chamber belonging to Terminator. 
Isn't it time for a description? 
Sue enters for a visit. 
Sam enters for a visit. 
Sam smiles happily. 
Gates enters for a visit. 
Sue says 'hello Terminator!'. 
say glad all of you could come 
You say 'glad all of you could come'. 
chamber lock 
*Click* Your chamber is locked. 
Transcript 4.4: A chamber can be locked once the expected participants have 
arrived (Terminator’s view) 
Once locked, no one (including superusers) will be able to enter one’s 
chamber.
79
 Once locked, the gathering would become a private meeting. If 
‘terminator’, ‘sam’, ‘sue’, and ‘gates’ knew each other’s identity (ie real name), 
the gathering would have become a closed meeting.
80
 
To prevent disruptions to a closed meeting (or any private meeting), the 
earmuff command was introduced. Anyone with earmuffs activated would not 
receive non-local communication such as shouts and tells—see Transcript 
4.5
81
 below. 
tell sam where is Luke? 
Sam doesn't want to be disturbed. 
Sam says 'let's have our earmuffs on'. 
 
78
 MERC (and therefore, Oz) allowed a superuser to enter any and every room in the 
virtual world. 
79
 The ‘line-tapping’ (ie the snoop <character>) command was also removed from 
superusers. If it were not, the head superuser would have been able to intercept the 
transmissions between Oz and someone in the locked chamber (eg the owner of the 
chamber). The head superuser would have been able to read most of the remarks 
made in the locked chamber. 
80
 Asays made in a private or closed meeting should create what the author calls 
confined-anonymity (see page 42). 
81
 With earmuffs on, one would not receive ashouts and atells as well. 
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nod 
You nod solemnly. 
earmuffs 
Earmuffs are on. You will stop hearing tells and shouts. 
say where is Luke sam? 
You say 'where is Luke sam?'. 
Transcript 4.5: Earmuffs and a locked chamber essentially allow a group of people 
to isolate themselves completely from everyone else (Terminator’s view) 
4.3 The Oz experience 
Oz
82
 was now fully operational and ready for ‘real’ use: 
 
                                 Welcome to Oz 
 
           Oz ...  ... . . .   Oz...  .. . .......Oz........oz...... 
 
     Oz was created from the Merc (diku mud) code by Kahn, Hatchet, Furey. 
          Diku mud originally by Hans Henrik Staerfeldt, Katja Nyboe, 
               Tom Madsen, Michael Seifert, and Sebastian Hammer. 
                                Oz code by Drew. 
 
    By what name do you wish to be known? 
The initial group of users were people that the author had invited from The 
Mudde Pathetique. The author knew many of them personally—even their real-
life identity. Some of these people became superusers on Oz. The 
‘distinguished’ role of the head superuser was (obviously) filled by the author. 
This position gave the author the opportunity to put anonymity to use during 
the ‘staff’ meetings. 
4.3.1 The first six months of operation 
Superuser meetings were held at least once a month. The tag technique 
proved to be particularly useful in these meetings because it enabled 
anonymity to be introduced without the use of anonymous usernames. This 
was important since the author needed the superusers to use their official 
usernames for identification. The author did not want any non-superuser to be 
present in those meetings. 
For most of the time, the author was not able to tell the origin of the 
numbered remarks (ie remarks anonymised by the tag technique). On 
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 131.244.15.53 port 2000 
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occasions however, he was able to recognise certain idiosyncrasies and 
therefore, knew (or rather, was able to guess) the origins of a remark. Examine 
the following phrases the author had extracted from a meeting log. It is highly 
likely that all these remarks belong to ‘felicity’:
83
 
Felicity says 'cant believe that,..'. 
Felicity says 'well,...'. 
4: well,.. i guess the weight thing is inevidable 
18: well,.. this should be dealt with on a personal basis in my opinion. 
5: I like to hang with mortals,.. and follow them.. 
Perhaps ‘felicity’ was not aware of ‘her’ idiosyncrasy. Perhaps she was not 
concerned that her remarks might not be anonymous. Perhaps she did not 
require anonymity. Even if these were true, it did not mean that anonymity 
was not useful. 
The author found that anonymity (or more precisely, the tag technique) had 
helped him (as the head superuser) to consider the ideas of others without 
bias or prejudice (ie negative bias). Although the author wanted to give equal 
treatment to every superuser, it was not always possible. Ideas from certain 
people were somehow able to command ‘more’ attention and consideration. 
The author believes that ‘real’ equality was only possible when the comments 
were anonymous. 
The pace of a meeting also helped in some way to keep the remarks 
anonymous. There were too many asays that there was no time available to 
look for idiosyncrasies or to figure who might have made a particular 
(anonymous) remark. After reading an asay, the author would usually have 
enough time to voice his own view before another asay presented itself to be 
read. 
As the months went by, a problem with the tag technique became more 
apparent. To make an anonymous remark, the author had to remember to use 
the tag commands. There were numerous occasions where the author forgot. 
The author had made numerous says when he wanted to make an asay. Such 
‘accidents’ could have serious consequences if one were using an identified 
username. The concern about using the wrong command was itself part of the 
problem. The worry was starting to distract the author. The author wanted 
such stress and accidents to be removed. The phantom command was 
introduced to eliminate solve this problem. 
The Anonymous mode 
The phantom command activates the anonymous mode. Once activated, all 
communication is automatically anonymised using the tag technique. In other 
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 Of course, the author has no way of knowing for sure. Anyone could have added a 
comma and ellipsis to implicate ‘felicity’. 
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words, all shouts become ashouts, all tells become atells, and all says become 
asays—see Transcript 4.6. 
say let's begin our meeting 
You say 'let's begin our meeting'. 
phantom 
Your character name will be concealed in ALL your conversations. 
A [numbered tag] will replace your name for anonymity. 
You have been Phantomised! 
Type PHANTOM again to dePhantomise yourself. 
? say We will have about 10 minutes to raise problems 
12: We will have about 10 minutes to raise problems 
? say Please remember to use the new phantom command 
13: Please remember to use the new phantom command 
14: Why are most of the wizard commands logged? 
? say So no one will dare to abuse their power? 
15: So no one will dare to abuse their power? 
16: doesn't drew trust us? 
17: are our convos logged too? 
Transcript 4.6: The anonymous mode ensures that all of one’s remarks are 
(technically) anonymous (Drew’s view)
84
 
The anonymous mode can be disengaged at any time to make non-anonymous 
remarks (ie says, tells, or shouts)—see Transcript 4.7. However, it (ie the 
phantom command) would be an additional command that one has to type if 
one had to make both anonymous and non-anonymous remarks. The 
anonymous mode is best used if one does not need to make non-anonymous 
remarks frequently. 
? phantom 
You have been dePhantomised. Your name returns. 
say Your conversations will never be logged 
You say 'Your conversations will never be logged'. 
say Nothing will be logged without your knowledge 
You say 'Nothing will be logged without your knowledge'. 
say ok, let us continue 
You say 'ok, let us continue'. 
phantom 
Your character name will be concealed in ALL your conversations. 
A [numbered tag] will replace your name for anonymity. 
You have been Phantomised! 
Type PHANTOM again to dePhantomise yourself. 
Transcript 4.7: The anonymous mode needs to be deactivated to make non-
anonymous remarks (Drew’s view) 
Another problem emerged as more meetings were conducted. Each time the 
author decided to discuss a matter anonymously, he would have to ‘order’ the 
 
84
 The ? in the user’s prompt serves as an indicator that the anonymous mode is 
active. 
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participants (ie superusers) to engage the anonymous mode (or remind them 
to use asays instead of says). This was not very practical. A way to ‘force’ 
everyone in a meeting into the anonymous mode was believed to be 
necessary. 
Mirages (Anonymous rooms) 
A Mirage is an anonymous room (or a room where the anonymous mode was 
always active). Remarks made within a Mirage are automatically anonymised 
by the tag technique. By meeting in a Mirage, the remarks of every participant 
will be technically anonymous. 
The author went a step further. He tried to conceal the presence of the people 
in a Mirage. The entry and exit messages (eg ‘Sam walks in’ or ‘Sam leaves 
south’) were suppressed. In essence, people could ‘sneak’ in and out of a 
Mirage. No one is suppose to know who is or was in a Mirage. 
Commands that would reveal the location of users would not work in a Mirage. 
The look command for example, will not reveal who is present—see 
Transcript 4.8. 
look 
The Shout 
This is the gathering place of angry crowds when they feel injustice 
has been done since the Judge's chambers are just above. 
This place is PHANTOMised. You can't be sure who is around you. 
say is there anyone here? 
1: is there anyone here? 
Transcript 4.8: Is there anyone in the Mirage? 
To prevent users from revealing their presence or establishing the presence of 
others, social commands were also disabled—see Transcript 4.9. If ‘sam’ could 
be ‘hugged’, one would know that ‘sam’ was present. 
laugh 
You can't do that here. You're in a Mirage. 
hug sam 
You can't do that here. You're in a Mirage. 
Transcript 4.9: Social commands cannot be used in a Mirage 
The decoy checker was also modified to make exceptions for Mirages. A room-
level (ie local) checks is not performed in a Mirage. This was done so no one 
could be sure if there were people in a Mirage. If a local decoy check is 
performed, one will for example know that there are at least three other users 
in the Mirage. If there were only three other users online, one would know that 
they were in the Mirage! 
The decoy checker will only perform system-wide (ie global) checks. This 
means that an asay can be made in a Mirage as long as there are four or more 
users online. They do not necessarily have to be present in the Mirage. In fact, 
one would be able to make an asay in a Mirage even if there were no one in it. 
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To ensure that users understood these technicalities and were not led to make 
wrong ‘conclusions’, an extra ‘warning’ was added—see the text in bold in 
Transcript 4.10. 
look 
The Shout 
This is the gathering place of angry crowds when they feel injustice 
has been done since the Judge's chambers are just above. 
This place is PHANTOMised. You can't be sure who is around you. 
You cannot be sure if anyone is here listening to you. 
Transcript 4.10: A user will be warned that he or she may be the only person in a 
Mirage 
Is it now impossible to determine who is or was in a Mirage? As the author 
eventually realised, it would be possible for someone in a room adjoining the 
Mirage to know who went into a Mirage. There are several ways of leaving
85
 a 
Mirage but only one for entering—via an adjacent room. How was this problem 
addressed? 
By increasing the adjacent rooms of a Mirage, the number of paths into a 
Mirage is increased. Clustering several Mirages together also increases the 
paths.
86
 Since there are more than one entry-exit point into a Mirage, it will be 
impossible for one person to spot everyone entering the Mirage.
87
 This was the 
author’s solution. 
Since no one should know who is or was in a Mirage, an asay will be traced to 
everyone on the who-list. If there were a hundred active users online, there 
would be ninety-nine suspects (even if there were only four people in the 
Mirage). In a non-Mirage, an asay in a room of four would only lead to three 
suspects (even if there were ninety-six other active users online). This is one 
of the benefits of a Mirage. 
Unfortunately, no one was as thrilled as the author was. The introduction of 
Mirages was met with the same lack of enthusiasm as the tag commands and 
the decoy checker. Perhaps the players and superusers had not found a real 
need or appreciation for anonymity. Perhaps players wanted to be able to 
identify one another (to form alliances that would be useful in the game). 
Perhaps users did not find anyone in the Mirages to speak to. On a very ‘busy’ 
day, there could be as many as ten to twenty players online. Of course, twenty 
is a small number when compared to 2,652 rooms that made up the Oz 
 
85
 The chamber and visit <character> commands will bring a user from a Mirage to 
a chamber. The recall command will bring the user to the main room. The jump 
command will bring the user to a random room. 
86
 A single Mirage would have a maximum of six entry-exit points (ie north, south, 
east, west, up, and down). A pair Mirages would have a maximum of ten entry-exit 
points. A cluster of three would create a maximum of fourteen entry-exit points. 
87
 A character (ie user) can only be in one room at a time. Unless a person was 
multiplaying, he or she will only be able to monitor one entry-exit point at a time. 
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landscape. Even on a busy day, this ratio meant that there was less than a one 
percent probability (ie 20/2652) that a Mirage would be inhabited!
 88
 
How did the author make use of Mirages? The author could not. He could not 
conduct the superuser meetings in a Mirage because there was no way of 
knowing whether a non-superuser was present. Furthermore, there was no way 
of making non-anonymous remarks in a Mirage. What if a Mirage could be 
locked? What if a private chamber could be converted into a Mirage (and vice-
versa)? 
Private-Mirages 
The chamber mirage command converts one’s private chamber into a private-
Mirage—see Transcript 4.11. 
look 
You see a chamber belonging to Drew. 
Isn't it time for a description? 
Sue the Cowgirl is here. 
Sam the Salmon King is here. 
Gates is Microsoft is here. 
chamber mirage 
Your chamber is transformed into a Mirage. 
look 
You see a chamber belonging to Drew. 
Isn't it time for a description? 
This place is PHANTOMised. You can't be sure who is around you. 
You cannot be sure if anyone is here listening to you. 
say is terminator coming? 
15: is terminator coming? 
16: he should come 
17: terminator is always late 
chamber mirage 
Your chamber returns to normal. 
say I better unlock the doors 
You say 'I better unlock the doors'. 
chamber lock 
*Click* Your chamber is unlocked. 
look 
You see a chamber belonging to Drew. 
Isn't it time for a description? 
Sue the Cowgirl is here. 
Sam the Salmon King is here. 
Gates is Microsoft is here. 
Transcript 4.11: A chamber can become a private-Mirage (Drew’s view) 
 
88
 This is a very simplistic method of calculating probability but the author believed 
that pin-point accuracy in this case was not critical. 
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The author found private-Mirages to be extremely useful for conducting 
superuser meetings. The ability to lock a chamber before it was miraged (ie 
converted into a private-Mirage) meant that security was not compromised. 
Furthermore, the author could now force anonymity
89
 upon the superusers—
even upon those that might not want to be anonymous. 
How could non-anonymous remarks be made in a private-Mirage? One strategy 
was to set an agenda for the meeting. Items that required anonymity were 
identified. When these items were up for discussion, the (locked) chamber was 
converted to a private-Mirage. Once the item was discussed, the chamber was 
de-miraged.
90
 Miraging and de-miraging would throughout a meeting. 
The other strategy was to have a preliminary discussion without anonymity, 
then proceed to discuss certain issues with anonymity, before closing the 
meeting without anonymity. In any case, people could always make an 
anonymous remark (by using an asay) even when the chamber had been de-
miraged. 
What is the difference between a private-Mirage and those initially 
implemented? The earlier Mirages (ie permanent-Mirages) cannot be de-
miraged. With the introduction of private-Mirages, was there still a need for 
permanent-Mirages? The author believed there was. Once a private-Mirage is 
de-miraged, the look command would reveal who is present in the meeting. 
Since a permanent-Mirage cannot be de-miraged, no one can be sure who is 
inside. In other words, a permanent-Mirage will provide users with a greater 
degree of anonymity than a private-Mirage. 
Since the participants in a private-Mirage could be (or were) known, room-level 
decoy checks were re-introduced. At least four valid parties had to be present 
in a private-Mirage before an asay was allowed. This ensured that asays made 
in a private-Mirage would be realistically anonymous. 
Minor changes to the numbered remarks 
The appearance of the numbered remarks was made to resemble their non-
anonymous counterparts. The author wanted anonymity and non-anonymity 
to coexist seamlessly—see Transcript 4.12 below. 
asay who thinks this is a better format? 
[ 1/you ] say `who thinks this is a better format?'. 
[ 2 ] says `i think it is'. 
 
89
 A locked private-Mirage would create what the author called confined-anonymity 
(see page 42). 
90
 Before a private-Mirage was de-miraged (ie converted back to an ordinary chamber), 
Oz would send a warning (reinforced by an audible beep) to everyone in the 
chamber. The author believed the warning was needed to remind everyone that the 
remark they were about to would not be anonymous. What was meant to be an asay 
might have ended as a say had there been no warning. 
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ashout does anyone object this format? 
[ 3/you ] shouts `does anyone object this format?'. 
[ 4 ] tells [ 3/you ] `i like it'. 
atell 4 good! thanks 
[ 5/you ] tell [ 4 ] `good! thanks'. 
tell 4 great! by the way, who are you? 
You tell [ 4 ] `great! by the way, who are you?'. 
[ 6 ] tells you `do you really want to know Drew?'. 
tell 6 yes 
You tell [ 6 ] `yes'. 
Sue tells you `just me'. 
Transcript 4.12: Numbered remarks now have a novel-like appearance (Drew’s 
view)
91
 
Other changes include bolding the numbers representing others parties and 
pairing those representing one’s self with the pronoun ‘you’. 
4.3.2 The second six months of operation 
A further six months of observation provided few new conclusions. It was 
particularly difficult to know how the non-superusers were using the tag 
technique because Oz did not log the conversations of anyone. Although the 
author would spend many hours (virtually every single day) making 
observations, anything that had transpired in private or while the he was not 
online would have happened without his knowledge.
92
 
The activities and conversations of users were not monitored because it was 
believed to be inappropriate and unethical.
93
 Oz had become more than an 
experiment—it was providing a real service to real people. The author 
regarded the users as  ‘customers’ rather than subjects in an experiment. 
The author did however, observe people using the tag technique for trifle 
purposes—mainly to ‘clown’ around. Ashouts ranged from ‘guess who is this?’ 
to ‘I'm a REDNECK’, to more ‘playful’ remarks like ‘…is a wimp’ or ‘…is a loser’, 
to somewhat rude remarks that the author has chosen not to describe here. 
 
91
 One should note that although ‘sue’ and ‘drew’ had revealed their identities to each 
other, they would still be able to make anonymous remarks. This is because a 
different number would be used to tag their remarks. The next remark tagged by 7 
would not have necessarily come from ‘sue’. 
92
 All the conclusions described in this chapter are based on what the author had 
observed in person. 
93
 Except for a few instances, all of the transcripts in this thesis are technically 
examples (ie recreations). The events are real (in that something very similar did 
occur). The transcripts are real (in the sense that they were captured from real 
working systems). Nevertheless, the transcripts cannot be seen as verbatim 
accounts. Their main purpose is to serve as examples. 
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When the numbered remarks were getting tasteless, all that any superuser 
(including the author) could do was to caution everyone online or everyone in 
a particular room.
94
 No one specific could be cautioned. Cautioning did work, 
however. Perhaps the users believed that the author knew who were 
responsible. Although guesses could be made, no superuser could have known 
with absolute certainty who the guilty user was. It was clear that a more 
reliable method (than cautions or ‘empty threats’) was needed to police the use 
of the tag technique.
95
 
It was also concluded that invisibility was no longer beneficial to anonymity. 
Not only does invisibility compromise privacy, it can also interrupt the tag 
technique. There had been occasions where there were sufficient users online 
but an asay or ashout could not be made because some users were invisible. 
Since the decoy checker did not (and should not) consider anyone that was 
invisible, the tag technique could not be used. In fact, it would not be possible 
to use the tag technique even if there were a hundred users online if they were 
all invisible! 
Why had invisibility not been removed? Every attempt to remove invisibility 
had been strongly objected by the superusers and players. No one (except the 
author) seemed to be bothered by invisibility. What function did invisibility 
serve? The author believed that it simply gave players and superusers a sense 
of ‘power’—the power to spy on people. The author could not see any valid 
need for invisibility because anonymous remarks could now be made by using 
the tag commands.
96
 No one (not even superusers) should be allowed to be 
invisible. 
The author also concluded that the Oz landscape was far too large. A 
considerable reduction in the number of rooms should benefit permanent-
Mirages (and therefore, anonymity). The size of the landscape should equal 
the average number of online users (ie approximately ten rooms instead of 
2,652). The enormity of the Oz landscape was originally useful for privacy. 
The (only) way for a group of people to hold a private meeting was to find and 
meet at a rarely visited or ‘faraway’
97
 location. With the introduction of 
 
94
 Alternatively, the author could have used the tag <on/off> command to disable 
the tag technique completely (ie disable the tag commands, anonymous mode, and 
mirages). 
95
 Even if the superusers were not able to do anything (or were not present), a user 
could still ‘defend’ himself or herself. By using the channel -ashout command, 
one would stop receiving (or rather, hearing) ashouts. When earmuffs are put on, 
one would not receive anything except says and asays. If someone were abusing 
says or asays, earmuffs would not help. However, one could always move a meeting 
into one’s chamber. After locking one’s chamber, any uninvited party could be 
requested to leave or simply ‘kicked out’ (using the chamber remove <character> 
command). 
96
 Invisibility provided the only way an anonymous remark could be made on the 
original MERC. 
97
 ie a place that could only be reached by successfully traversing a long chain of 
rooms. 
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lockable chambers, a vast and complicated landscape was no longer necessary 
for privacy. 
It was no surprise that these plans were met with great objection. Many 
regular users began to leave Oz. Without their word-of-mouth, new players 
also stopped arriving.
98
 Even superusers began disappearing. Eventually, Oz 
became devoid of people. Once that happened, it was permanently closed.
99
 
The last user Oz welcomed was the author: 
                                  ___ 
                                 / _ \   _____ 
                                | / \ | |__  / 
                                | \_/ |   / /_ 
                                 \___/   /____| 
 
                              131.244.8.20 2000 
 
     Oz was created from the Merc (diku mud) code by Kahn, Hatchet, Furey. 
          Diku mud originally by Hans Henrik Staerfeldt, Katja Nyboe, 
               Tom Madsen, Michael Seifert, and Sebastian Hammer. 
                               Ozzy code by Drew. 
                                    v 0.8003  
                   
 Welcome! By what name do you wish to be known? Drew 
4.4 Full support for Anonymity 
The goal for the next phase of implementation was clear: to ensure that every 
possible provision or change that would be advantageous to anonymity (and 
the people requiring anonymity) was made. 
4.4.1 The new ‘Oz’ 
All the play elements (including invisibility) were removed. There were no 
longer any monsters to kill or points to earn. The landscape was reduced to 
 
98
 Although Oz was opened to the Internet, its existence was never made public.  
99
 Over the fifteen months of operation, Oz had moved from 131.244.15.53 to 
131.244.14.20 to 131.244.200.3 to 131.244.200.4 and finally to 131.244.8.20. 
There had been fourteen superusers. Just before Oz was closed, there were two 
hundred and seventy three active player files (ie two hundred and seventy three 
different password-protected characters). This figure excludes those characters 
that belonged to the author. There is no certain way of knowing how many 
different people had used Oz. Moreover, the figure does not include an unknown 
number of characters that had been deleted because of inactivity. 
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thirty rooms.
100
 Five out of the thirty rooms were clustered to create a single 
permanent-Mirage. 
The new ‘Oz’ was called TwiLIGHT ONE (T1). T1 was no longer an adventure 
MUD—it was now a ‘serious’ conversation system: 
You have connected to an online interactive communication system. 
TwiLIGHT virtual worlds are based on portions of code by Andrew LEE, 
Michael Chastain, Michael Quan, Mitchell Tse, Hans Henrik Staerfeldt, 
Katja Nyboe, Tom Madsen, Michael Seifert, Sebastian Hammer. 
Webpage:  http://www.geocities.com/TimesSquare/7127/ 
Email:    andrew_lee@bond.edu.au 
[privacy]  [anonymity]  [rated G]  [diku-ew2 style cmds]  [australia] 
 
                   - 
                   - 
 
                  Welcome To 
 |   | |     T w i L I G H T    O N E       | |  |   |    |     |      | 
             sand.it.bond.edu.au 7777 
 
                   - 
                   - 
 
                   - 
 
                   - 
 
Please enter your name: 
There were other less obvious but nonetheless important changes. 
The fundamental policy 
The fundamental policy of T1 is to operate without knowing the identities of 
its users. Any information that could expose the identity of a person was not 
requested or recorded. This was called the Limited Information Policy. 
What would be recorded about a user? The new examine <user> command 
reveals everything that is recorded about one’s character—see Transcript 4.13. 
examine terminator 
----------------------------  Public Information  ----------------------------- 
Terminator is back 
What do you looking at? 
----------  Private Details (may be examined by Senior SuperUsers)  ----------- 
Terminator is a Resident. 
Page pausing (pagelength): 23.   Highlighting (hilite): Off 
 
100
 Chambers are not counted as they are dynamically created rooms—ie a user’s 
chamber does not exist until the user is online. 
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Coins: 0 
 Character will be purged when coin amount is less than -1. 
 Every consecutive 7 days of absence will cost 10 coins. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Transcript 4.13: Checking what is recorded about one’s self (Terminator’s view) 
Every piece of information on record is classified as either public or private. 
The examine <user> command applied to another user will only return the 
information in the public portion—see Transcript 4.14. Anything a user uses 
to describe himself or herself (eg the username ie ‘drew’, title ie ‘keeps 
everything in order’, and description ie ‘You see someone with very sleepy 
eyes.’) is considered public information. Everything else is deemed private. 
look 
The TwiLIGHT square 
[Exits: north east west up] 
You are standing in the middle of a very large open square tiled with marble. 
Drew keeps everything in order is here. 
examine drew 
----------------------------  Public Information  ----------------------------- 
Drew keeps everything in order 
You see someone with very sleepy eyes. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Transcript 4.14: Learning more about ‘drew’ (Terminator’s view) 
The description field provides a way to control the degree of one’s anonymity. 
If ‘drew’ wanted to reveal more about himself, he could replace ‘You see 
someone with very sleepy eyes’ with more useful information—see Transcript 
4.15. 
edit description 
Type your personal description. When done, type .END by itself on a new line. 
Drew is Andrew Lee in real-life. 
You can e-mail me at: andrew_lee@bond.edu.au 
Write me at: School of Information Technology, Bond Uni, Australia 4229 
Phone me at: 61-75-55953380 
.end 
OK. 
examine drew 
----------------------------  Public Information  ----------------------------- 
Drew keeps everything in order 
Drew is Andrew Lee in real-life. 
You can e-mail me at: andrew_lee@bond.edu.au 
Write me at: School of Information Technology, Bond Uni, Australia 4229 
Phone me at: 61-75-55953380 
----------  Private Details (may be examined by Senior SuperUsers)  ----------- 
Drew is the Head Superuser. 
Page pausing (pagelength): 23.   Highlighting (hilite): Off 
Coins: 0 
No Purge ON. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Transcript 4.15: The description field can be used to identify one’s self (Drew’s 
view) 
The private section would only be accessible to the user and to a senior (ie 
‘veteran’) superuser. Was it necessary for any of the information in the private 
section to be available to anyone apart from the user? Although there were no 
concrete reasons, the author believed it was prudent to include such a 
provision. If T1 were a commercial service, this provision would have allowed 
a user’s account details (eg the user’s account number, amount owning, or 
credit card details) to be examined by the administration (and user). 
Penalising Anonymous users 
To satisfy the limited information policy, the banning procedure inherited 
from Oz (or more precisely, from MERC) was also changed. Previously, the 
head superuser would use the users command to extract a guilty party’s IP 
address. The ban command would then be used to impose a ban of the IP 
address—see Transcript 4.16. 
users 
[  1  0] Drew@SAND.KOWANDE.Bond.edu.au 
[  2  0] Tester@SURF.KOWANDE.Bond.edu.au 
2 users 
ban surf.kowande.bond.edu.au 
OK. 
ban bond.edu.au 
OK. 
Transcript 4.16: The process of banning a computer and site on Oz 
If the guilty party had left the system (or had been disconnected by a lower-
ranking superuser),
101
 the head superuser would have to obtain the IP address 
from the login logs.
102
  The logs would list which user had logged on from 
where and when. 
Automating the banishment procedure 
A different procedure was used on T1. The new autoban <user> command 
replaced the users command. A superuser would now only need to specify 
whom to expel. T1 would obtain the guilty user’s IP address from the network 
protocol and record it in the banned-IP file. T1 would then disconnect the 
guilty user. The benefit of automating the banishment procedure is that no 
one will need to know anyone’s IP address. 
 
101
 The ban (and users) command was only available to the head superuser (ie the 
author). Other superusers could only: prevent a user from doing anything (using 
the freeze <user> command), or remove the user from the system (using the 
disconnect <user> command). 
102
 This could only be done from the operating system. 
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What if an ‘innocent’ user was affected by an IP address ban? How could an IP 
(address) ban be reversed? T1 was designed to lift an IP ban after thirty days. 
Should an innocent party be affected, he or she would have wait the thirty 
days.
103
 An IP ban could be lifted before the thirty-day period but it would 
require the author to edit the banned-IP file (from the operating system).
104
 
Would the limited information policy be violated because the head superuser 
could examine the banned-IP file? ‘No,’ since anyone found abusing anonymity 
would have lost his or her right to anonymity. Every pair of username and IP 
address recorded in the banned-IP file would be a fact about a guilty user. 
Although the IP address of an ‘innocent’ user might be present in the banned-
IP file, it would not be paired with the innocent user’s username. In other 
words, the administration (or more precisely, the author) should not know the 
IP address of an innocent user. 
To ‘reduce’ the likelihood of IP bans affecting innocent users, the autoban 
command was deliberately designed to ban specific IP addresses (ie a 
machine) and not entire sites.
105
 In fact, there were other types of bans would 
be used before resorting to the autoban command. The sulock command 
allows T1 to be temporarily closed to non-superusers. The vislock command 
allows the system to be temporarily closed to visitors (ie users without a 
password-protected username). 
While testing the autoban command, the author stumbled across a potential 
problem. If the guilty user were online, T1 would be able to obtain the user’s 
IP address from the network protocol. Since IP addresses were no longer 
recorded in the login logs (to comply with the Limited Information Policy), 
how would T1 ban someone who was not online? A crafty troublemaker might 
have waited until there were no superusers online before creating any trouble 
and left the system before the author (ie head superuser) could take any 
action. 
Temporary logging of IP addresses 
The solution was to record the IP address of every user in a temporary login 
log. The temporary login logs would only contain pairs of usernames and IP 
addresses.
106
 Two temporary login logs will exist—each holding twelve hours 
 
103
 Should a superuser be affected by an IP address ban, he or she would know about 
the secret login method (ie the ‘backdoor’). The backdoor would only accept login 
attempts from superusers (ie superuser characters). 
104
 The ability to retrieve a violator’s IP address from the banned-IP file also enables 
the author to convert a thirty-day IP address ban to an indefinite IP address ban or 
a site ban (using the ban <IP or site address> command). By knowing a 
violator’s IP address, an e-mail complaint can also be sent to the violator’s Internet 
Service Provider. 
105
 The ban <site> command was not removed to enable a site ban to be erected if 
necessary. 
106
 The login logs contained usernames, dates, login times, and logout times. 
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worth of logins. When a third temporary login log is needed, the older of the 
existing two will be automatically deleted. Although the IP addresses of 
‘innocent’ users will be kept, they will only be held for a maximum of twenty-
four hours. 
When the autoban <username> command is invoked, T1 will first check to 
whether the user is online. If the user were no longer online, T1 would scan 
the temporary login logs. It would look for the last user with the matching 
username, retrieve the IP address, ban the address, and keep a record of the 
address in the banned-IP file. 
To ensure users understood that their IP addresses were temporarily logged, a 
warning (see the text in bold) was added to the login screen: 
Warning: Each time you use this system, your network address is held for 24 hours 
in discreet. If you had observed the conditions of use, your network address 
would be automatically forgotten after 24 hours. If you had not, it would be used 
to keep you off this system. 
Please enter your name: 
In addition, the contents of the temporary login logs are encrypted. It will not 
be possible for anyone to extract any information from those logs. The key 
used to encrypt the temporary login logs will be randomly generated by T1. 
Should T1 ‘crash’ or be shut off, the contents of the temporary logs would 
become useless—not even T1 would know how to decrypt the data it had 
encrypted. 
Enhancements to the Alias and Pretend Techniques 
When relying solely on the alias or pretend technique, username changes are 
necessary for one to switch between semi-anonymous (or semi-identified) and 
identified remarks. To facilitate username changes, the morph command was 
added—see Transcript 4.17 below. 
Luke says `I think Star Trek is dumb'. 
Luke shouts `I think Star Trek is dumb'. 
Gates laughs at Luke mercilessly. 
Luke slaps Gates. 
Vader slaps Gates. 
roll vader 
You roll your eyes at Vader. 
Gates rolls his eyes at Vader. 
shout trekies, visit luke 
You shout `trekies, visit luke'. 
Sue comes in for a visit. 
morph 
Are you sure about morphing (Y/N)? y 
New name to morph to: picard 
   This character name already exists. 
   Unauthorised access will not be tolerated. 
 
   To choose another name, simply press [return] at the password. 
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Password:  
Enter another name: borg 
Your character name is borg. Is that right (Y/N)? y 
Is this character a Male, Female or Not applicable (M/F/N)? n 
The TwiLIGHT square 
[Exits: north east west up] 
You are standing in the middle of a very large open square tiled with marble. 
visit luke 
[Exits: none] 
You see a chamber belonging to Luke. 
Isn't it time for a description? 
Luke Skywalker is here. 
Vader is here. 
Gates is Microsoft is here. 
Sue the Cowgirl is here. 
Kirk James T is here. 
Ally Cat is here. 
Bob is JR's brother! is here. 
Capt Picard of the USS Enterprise is here. 
Luke says `hello borg!'. 
say WE ARE BORG...RESISTENCE IS FUTILE! 
You say `WE ARE BORG...RESISTENCE IS FUTILE!'. 
Transcript 4.17: The user ‘terminator’ morphed into ‘borg’ (Terminator’s view) 
The changeover will be faster because ‘terminator’ does not have to quit the 
system and ‘borg’ does not be forced to read the usual welcome messages or 
the terms of usage. The changeover will be less noticeable because the 
character ‘terminator’ is removed from the system without leaving the usual 
‘Terminator has left T1’ message. No one should realise that ‘terminator’ has 
left (unless someone typed the look command or tried to send ‘terminator’ a 
private remark). 
The user ‘borg’ (ie previously ‘terminator’) will however, enter the system in 
the usual manner. Concerns for privacy dictated that no one be allowed to 
‘sneak’ into a non-Mirage. In other words, the user ‘borg’ has to find ‘his’ way 
back to where he was (ie back to the room where the debate was happening). 
Enhancements to the Tag technique 
The aemote and athink tag commands were added to allow users to be more 
‘expressive’—see Transcript 4.18 below. The slash and the blank spaces within 
the square brackets were also removed to simplify the appearance and reduce 
the length of a numbered remark. 
[8] says `will microsoft still be around in 2000?'. 
Gates thinks o O ( WHAT KIND OF QUESTION IS THAT? ) 
Gates thinks o O ( Of course we will! ) 
[9] giggles. 
aemote laughs loudly 
[10 you] laughs loudly. 
[11] thinks o O ( what's so funny? ) 
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athink What could possibly happen? 
[12 you] think o O ( what could possibly happen? ) 
[13] thinks o O ( doesn't 12 know murphy's law? ) 
Gates say `Who's Murphy? Is this person under my employ???' 
amote can't stop laughing 
[14 you] can't stop laughing 
Transcript 4.18: New tag commands to enhance interaction 
The other significant enhancement was the decapitalisation of the numbered 
remarks—see Transcript 4.19. This was done to remove any capitalisation 
idiosyncrasies. A built-in dictionary and thesaurus to standardise spelling and 
choice of words would have been beneficial but were not implemented 
because of the author’s lack of expertise and the fact that off-the-shelf 
products such as Casady & Greene’s Spell Catcher or Linguisoft’s Grammarian 
were available.
107
 
asay Who AM i? 
[1 you] say `who am i?'. 
asay HEY! Why is EveryThing In Lower CaseS? 
[2 you] say `hey! why is everything in lower cases?'. 
asay I LiKe to be DiFFerenT! 
[3 you] say `i like to be different!'. 
say I like to be differenT! 
You say `I like to be differenT!'. 
[4] tells you `your remarks won't be as anonymous as they could if you were 
different'. 
Transcript 4.19: The capitalisation checker helps to remove capitalisation 
idiosyncrasies 
Another way of addressing idiosyncrasies would be to request someone to be 
one’s messenger—see Transcript 4.20. By asking ‘bishop’ to convey one’s 
remarks, one’s idiosyncrasies become intertwined with the messenger’s.
108
 
Bob tells you `what do you think about macs?'. 
atell bishop please tell bob that macs are really great computers and are really 
great to use. Thanks! 
[5 you] tell Bishop `please tell bob that macs are really great computers and are 
really great to use. thanks!'. 
Bishop tells [5 you] `Macs are great and great to use?'. 
atell bishop yes, please tell that to bob 
[6 you] tell Bishop `yes, please tell that to bob'.  
Transcript 4.20: Using a messenger to hide one’s idiosyncrasies 
 
107
 Alternatively, speech-to-text technologies such as Apple Computer’s PlainTalk or 
Dragon System’s VoicePower Pro could be used to create sentences with words 
spelled (flawlessly). 
108
 Of course, this assumes that ‘bishop’ did not just ‘copy and paste’ one’s remarks to 
‘bob’. 
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The feedback of the decoy checker was also changed—see Transcript 4.21. In 
addition to protecting a user’s authorship anonymity, the decoy checker 
would now be helping to educate the user. 
asay this is a test 
Sorry, can't do that right here. Too few people to be anonymous this way. 
If not, they would have read:  [1] says `this is a test'. 
Transcript 4.21: Decoy checker giving feedback that is more useful 
4.4.2 The McTwilight Telnet client 
The McTwilight (MT) Telnet client (see Figure 4.1) was created to support two 
other provisions. 
 
Figure 4.1: The Macintosh-based McTwilight Telnet client 
Keyword screening 
To help screen certain keywords out of a user’s remarks, MT supports a 
feature called the word-blocker. The work-blocker will look for keywords 
(specified by the user) in every remark a user makes. When a match is found, 
MT will allow the user to make a correction—see Figure 4.2 on the next page. 
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Figure 4.2: The word-blocker has detected an ‘illegal’ keyword 
The word-blocker provision does not put any strain on the T1 server because 
the MT client will be performing the screening. The list of keywords (which 
can contain sensitive information) is managed by the MT client—ensuring that 
T1 server (and service) can continue to comply with the Limited Information 
Policy. 
Message encryption 
Although T1 has been designed to protect a user’s privacy, intrusions on 
privacy could still occur (at the packet level). Transmissions over a network 
can be intercepted (as it passes through various computers) and analysed. 
Furthermore, transmissions of a textual nature are particularly easy to 
analyse. Encryption will provide an additional level of privacy. Even if one’s 
messages were intercepted, no one should be able to understand what was 
communicated. 
To create encrypted asays and atells, one simply makes the appropriate 
settings (see Figure 4.3 on the next page) and engage the anonymous mode 
(via the phantom command). MT will automatically encrypt any says (and tells) 
while T1 will automatically convert the encrypted says (and tells) into asays 
(and atells). 
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Figure 4.3: Encryption and Decryption options in MT 
If a group of people had prearranged to use a common encryption key, the 
group would be able to decrypt (and hence, understand) each other’s remarks. 
Without the right decryption key however, an encrypted remark would appear 
as garbles: 
Gates says '~Lfh@llcme ak i2 hou ay r@yoX8<ilI ob8n @rsm k`'_c2sa?~'. 
As with screening, encryption and decryption is handled by the MT client and 
not the T1 server. The server will not even know that a message is encrypted. 
4.4.3 The T1 experience 
Unlike Oz, the existence of T1 was made public. T1 was listed on the MUD 
Connector,
109
 announced on various Internet newsgroups, and made the 
default destination on every copy of MT distributed.
110
 
T1 was open for a one hundred and twenty-six days.
111
 During that time, a 
total of 837 different usernames were recorded, of which forty-four were 
reserved (ie password-protected).
112
 
There were very few observations to make since people did not stay very long. 
Over half the visits (approximately 55%) lasted less than ten minutes.
113
 In fact, 
 
109
 http://www.mudconnect.com/ 
110
 MT was distributed through the non-commercial software distribution channels 
such as the INFO-MAC (ftp://wuarchive.wustl.edu/systems/mac/info-mac/) and 
UMICH (http://www.umich.edu/~archive/mac/) archives. 
111
 T1 was abruptly forced to close because the host used to run T1 was no longer 
accessible by the author. 
112
 These numbers do not include those characters belonging to the author. Again, 
there is no precise way of knowing the number of people using T1. However, since 
people were warned not to reserve multiple usernames, one could assume that 
there were at least forty-four different people. 
113
 This data was gathered from 1,472 login-logout records. This figure excludes the 
data generated by the author or the superusers. There were four superusers on T1. 
If they were considered, the results would have been skewed since the author and 
superusers would have undoubtedly stayed online for longer. 
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the median was only six minutes and forty-two seconds. Chart 4.1 provides a 
summary of the data. 
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Chart 4.1: Histogram showing most of the visits lasted less than ten minutes 
Why did so many people stay so briefly? Unlike Oz, there is nothing for a 
single user to do on T1. There was an average of eleven logins a day. In other 
words, approximately one person visited T1 every two hours. Most people 
would have rightly logged off when they found no one else online. 
The main room of Oz was almost always inhabited. It was the place where 
friends got together and strangers became friends. In contrast, the main room 
of T1 was almost always deserted (except for when a superuser was on duty). 
Where were the regular users? Whether alone or in pairs, regular users usually 
remain in chambers. Most of the time, the author found that their earmuffs 
were enabled and chambers locked. The author had the impression that the 
regular users were people that had made prior arrangements to meet on T1. 
Otherwise, they would have spent their time at the main room for an 
opportunity to meet new people. Perhaps visitors did not stay long because no 
one wanted to socialise with them. 
The low number of online users could also explain why so many usernames 
were not protected. Unless there are four or more active participants in a 
conversation, the decoy checker will not permit anyone to employ the tag 
technique. Perhaps people were forced to resort to the alias technique (ie ‘one-
off’ usernames) to be anonymous. 
Perhaps there were too many established online services on the Internet. 
While T1 was usually ‘empty’, places like Foothills had large numbers of 
people. Perhaps people did not find anything ‘special’ about T1. Perhaps 
people chose not to use T1 until they had a real need for conversational 
anonymity. Perhaps more time was needed for T1 to establish itself. 
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4.4.4 ‘Improving’ upon T1 
When the author secured use of a new host, he continued to search for ways to 
benefit anonymity and anonymous users. Putting anonymity above other 
considerations resulted in T1. What if there was no other consideration besides 
anonymity? This was the goal of the third round of transformation. 
One of the things that should be beneficial to authorship anonymity is the 
removal of all global participant lists. Without a who-list, one will not know 
who may be (or may have been) online. Without a who-list, one will not be able 
to trace an ashout to a list of users. The who command was modified to report 
the number of people online instead of whom they were—see Transcript 4.22. 
The absence of a global participant list should not change the interaction 
between people in a room. Everyone will know who is present because the 
look command was retained. 
who 
There are currently 5 persons and 1 officer online. 
Transcript 4.22: A summary replaces the who-list 
The new mark command allows users to change their point of entry (from the 
default arrival room). Any room except a chamber could now be used to enter 
the system—see Transcript 4.23. This command will effectively allow users to 
‘sneak’ onto the system. 
look 
Captain's Quarters 
[Exits: down]  
mark 
You mark this spot. From now on, you will enter the station here. 
Transcript 4.23: Marking an alternative entry point 
To increase the choice of entry points, the author tripled the landscape to 
sixty rooms. Would not increasing the number of rooms be disadvantageous 
to permanent-Mirages? ‘Yes,’ but the author considered the problem to be 
negligible—sixty rooms were still less than 2,652 (which was the number of 
rooms on Oz). 
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The new ‘T1’ was renamed TwiLIGHT Two (T2): 
You have reached a public interactive conversation system. 
The system is based on portions of code by Andrew Lee, Michael Chastain, 
Michael Quan, Mitchell Tse, Hans Henrik Staerfeldt, Katja Nyboe, Tom Madsen, 
Michael Seifert & Sebastian Hammer. 
 
MUD style commands | Anonymity                  ./\. 
                                              ./   .\. 
Welcome To                                  ./       :\. 
T w i L I G H T    T W O                  ./    .. ..:::\. 
The Space Station                       ./               :\. 
serpent.dstc.bond.edu.au 7777         ./                .:::\. 
                                    ./             .....::::::\. 
                                  ./                     ...::::\. 
                                 /....       ... ......:::::::::::\ 
                                     /.....             :::::::\ 
Warning: Each time you use this           \          ..../ 
system, your network address is            l.....  .::::l 
held for 24 hours in discreet.                ./  ..\. 
If you had observed the conditions of use,     \   ./ 
your network address would be automatically     \ ./ 
forgotten after 24 hours. If you had not,        \/ 
it would be used to keep you off this system. 
 
Please identify yourself: 
If one were to enter the ‘space station’ at a permanent-Mirage (and did not 
leave the Mirage), no one should know that one was online.
 
Since the look 
command will be disabled in a Mirage and one’s remarks will be tagged by 
numbers, one’s username does not appear anywhere. If one’s remarks were 
free from idiosyncrasies, one’s presence would have been completely 
concealed—potentially creating absolute-anonymity.
114
 
A cluster of five rooms was designated as the station’s only permanent-Mirage. 
The rooms in the permanent-Mirage are connected to each other but not to the 
rest of the station—stopping people being spotted ‘walking’ in or out of a 
permanent-Mirage. The recall, leave, or jump command will need to be used 
to leave the permanent-Mirage.
115
 The new Mirage command will bring a user 
into one of the five rooms in the cluster of permanent-Mirages—see Transcript 
4.24 on the next page. 
 
114
 Absolute-anonymity was explained on page 41. 
115
 The jump command brings a user to a random public room on the station. The 
recall and leave commands will bring a user back to the main room (ie the Station 
Square).  
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look 
Station Square 
[Exits: north east south west down]  
Picard is here. 
Luke is here. 
The transporter beams Picard somewhere. 
mirage 
The Cone 
[Exits: north east south west] [Mirage] 
It is too dark here. You can't be sure who is around you. 
Transcript 4.24: The mirage command in action 
Transcript 4.24 also shows what one will see when a user (ie ‘picard’) goes into 
the permanent-Mirage. Would not the words ‘The transporter beams Picard 
somewhere’ expose the fact that ‘picard’ went to the permanent-Mirage? ‘Not 
necessarily,’ because the same feedback is used in other commands (ie the 
chamber, visit, and jump commands). This is intentional so no one will know 
for certain where another user went. 
T2 was now complete. The author could not find any other changes that would 
be beneficial to conversational anonymity. Although the option of opening T2 
to the public was available, it was not taken. It was believed that T2 and T1 
were fundamentally identical. In fact, most of the key provisions in T2 (eg the 
tag commands) were already present in Oz. The author believed that 
observations would consume too much time. Furthermore, observations would 
not show that T2 was the most ideal environment for conversational 
anonymity. The next chapter describes several new methods of analysis and 
their results. 
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Chapter 5 
Analysis and 
Discussion
5 Analysis & Discussion 
5.1 Laboratory experiments 
Eight university students of different ethnicity, proficiency in English, and 
level of acquaintance
116
 were asked to participate in a series of experiments. A 
special four-room version of TwiLIGHT Two (T2) was created for this 
purpose.
117
 The eight students were distributed across a laboratory of twenty 
computers. 
Session 1: Control 1 
In the first session, everyone was free to choose his or her username. 
Everyone was taught how to use the non-anonymous communication 
commands (ie say, shout, and tell) and social commands. At no point was the 
objective of the experiment revealed. No one was instructed to conceal his or 
her identity. 
Some students were complementing their online conversations with verbal 
communication (by shouting across the lab). In the end, everyone was 
laughing, shouting, and typing. By following the online and verbal 
conversations, the author was able to discern which username belonged to 
whom. Two participants were in fact, using their actual names as their 
username. Some freely revealed their identity when asked. Some even 
revealed who other users were. 
Once the usernames became identified, the author was able to record 
idiosyncrasies. The author jotted down his observations. After twenty 
minutes, the participants were asked to exit the system. Each student then 
stood up to reveal his or her username. 
 
116
 Two of the subjects were siblings. 
117
 A smaller landscape was used to prevent the students from wasting time 
‘wandering’ around. 
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Session 2: Control 2 
In the second session, the students were specifically instructed to choose an 
anonymous username and to protect their identity as best they could. Their 
objective was to determine the person (ie identity) behind every username. No 
one was allowed to make any verbal comments once the experiment began. 
There was to be absolute silence. Furthermore, the laboratory lights were 
turned off during the experiment. 
Except for one person, everyone was recognised by at least one other 
person.
118
 It was not certain how people had managed to recognise one 
another. Personally, the author was able to identify several usernames because 
of the idiosyncrasies observed from the previous session. Once the author 
knew the idiosyncrasies of a particular person, the author could recognise the 
person even though a different username was used. 
It was a surprise however, that one person was able to escape exposure. It was 
agreed that this person’s online personality was distinctly differently from his 
real-life demeanour. This person had successfully masked his real-life identity 
by changing his personality. 
Session 3: The Test 
For the third session, students were introduced to the tag technique and 
anonymous mode. They were asked to select a new anonymous username and 
have the anonymous mode engaged. The objective of the experiment 
remained the same. 
The students had twenty minutes to determine who each other was. The 
results showed that there was only one user that was correctly identified. 
More remarkably, everyone was able to expose this person. Had the students 
been colluding? There was a more rational explanation. 
One particular student had developed an obsession using the whip <user> 
social command.
119
 This obsession began in the first session and continued to 
the third. Although social commands were not been allowed in an anonymous 
room (ie Mirage), they were not prevented when the anonymous mode was 
engaged—an oversight by the author.
120
 Since the tag technique did not 
anonymise the ‘output’ of social commands, everyone was able to trace the 
whipping habit to a username. Since everyone knew which person had the 
habit of whipping, they were able to tie the username to the person—resulting 
in one common exposed username. 
 
118
 The author’s personal ‘speculations’ were not included in the results. 
119
 The whip command produces the following comical message: <username> whips 
you in the rear with a wet towel *POW!* That hurts! 
120
 Social commands were later disabled during the anonymous mode. 
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Analysis of the experiments 
Table 5.1 describes the results of the laboratory experiments. The figures 
appeared to suggest that the students were more protected in the third session 
than the second. The use of the alias and tag techniques appeared to have 
provided a 75% improvement in protection than the use of the alias technique 
alone. 
Table 5.1: Results of the Laboratory Experiments 
 Number of 
Exposed Usernames  
Percentage of 
Exposure 
Session 1 N/A
121
 N/A 
Session 2 7 88% 
Session 3 1 13% 
The Anti-Anonymity Checklist 1 (AAC1) analysis also confirmed that students 
were most protected during the third session—see Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2: AAC1 Analysis of the Laboratory Experiments (continued next page) 
Factors 1 2 3 
    
1 Password-protected username is supported. 2/2 2/2 2/2 
2 Personal details submitted? No. 0/2 0/2 0/2 
3 Admin has access to personal details? No. 0/2 0/2 0/2 
4 Compromised privacy? No. 0/2 0/2 0/2 
5 Lack of Confidentiality? No.
122
 0/2 0/2 0/2 
6 Remarks tagged by username? Yes, except for 
Session 3.
123
 
1/1 1/1 0/1 
7 Deanonymisation of anonymous remarks? No. 0/1 0/1 0/1 
8 Known Idiosyncrasies? Idiosyncrasies began to 
emerge in Session 1 
0.5/1 1/1 1/1 
9 Private communication supported? Yes. 1/1 1/1 1/1 
10 Meetings can be restricted. Closed meeting? 
Yes. 
2/2 2/2 2/2 
 
121
 There is no data for Session 1 because users had not been asked to expose each 
other’s username. 
122
 Although users knew one another’s identity, it was not due to lack of 
confidentiality by the administration. 
123
 In Session 3, remarks were tagged by numbers. 
5  |  A n a l y s i s  a n d  D i s c u s s i o n  
92 
 
Factors 1 2 3 
    
11 Proximity? Users were in the same laboratory. 2/2 2/2 2/2 
12 User is not anonymous to some participants. In 
Session 1 users were not told to conceal their 
identity. 
2/2 0/2 0/2 
 AAC1 Rating 10.5/20 9/20 8/20 
 AAC1 Percentage 53% 45% 40% 
Although the trends in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 were the same, the magnitude 
of change was different. The percentage of usernames exposed dropped by 
75% (from Session 2 to 3) while the AAC1 percentages only dropped by 5%. 
One explanation for this is that the AAC1 percentages represented 
‘predictions’ while the percentages from counting (exposed usernames) 
represented actual data—predictions are not always actualised. 
A more accurate explanation is perhaps that a simple count of exposed 
usernames does not measure all the loss of anonymity that could have 
occurred. Some anonymity is lost: 
1 when a username is no longer mysterious, 
2 when a person’s remark can be recognised (because of idiosyncrasies 
in the remark), and 
3 when a person’s real name is known. 
Counting the number of exposed usernames merely considers one of the three 
dimensions. 
Even when the author was able to trace a remark to a person (ie expose a 
remark), he could not trace the exposed remark to a username.  It was as 
though users did not have any username. If the exposed remarks were tagged 
by usernames, the author would have been able to expose several usernames. 
The improvements in Session 3 should be more modest than the 75% 
(suggested by counting exposed usernames). Perhaps an improvement of 5% 
(as indicated by the AAC1 analysis) would be more accurate. 
Does a 5% improvement suggest that the tag technique was of little additional 
benefit? The author does not think so. The tag technique had made the task of 
profiling people more difficult. Although the author noticed new 
idiosyncrasies in Session 3, he did not know whose idiosyncrasies they were. 
Had the tag technique been used from Session 1, the author might not have 
been able to profile every student. 
The author strongly believes that the benefit of the tag technique (or any other 
provision for anonymity) should not be measured quantitatively. What is the 
price for anonymity? Someone that thinks anonymity is invaluable will also 
find every additional protection invaluable. 
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If the anonymity of the users in Sessions 1 and 2 was the type occurring 
naturally,
124
 the average of Sessions 1 and 2 (ie 49%) could be taken to 
represent MERC and any other conversation system that simply ‘tolerates’ 
anonymity. If that were accepted, is T2 approximately 9% (ie 49-40%) more 
‘superior’ than MERC? Since MERC does not support the tag technique, it is 
perhaps true to say that T2 is more ‘superior’. However, the 9% ‘advantage’ is a 
figure derived from three AAC1 percentages representing a specific set of 
circumstances—ie an online meeting between a group of people in a computer 
laboratory. Other circumstances might see a greater or lesser degree of 
‘advantage’. In short, the 9% advantage should not be treated as a valid 
comparison. The AAC1 analysis should not be used to make general 
comparisons between systems. 
The PANIC model and notation 
The author developed the PANIC model and notation based on what he 
understood about loss of anonymity. The acronym PANIC was derived from 
key elements that would contribute to loss of anonymity: P for a person (or a 
‘face’), A for an alias (or a username), C for a creation (or in this context, a 
remark), I for an idiosyncrasy (ie a clue), and N for a name (or more 
specifically, a full real name or real-life name). The PANIC elements were then 
used to construct simple ‘equations’ that described how anonymity could be 
lost (see Table 5.3). Subscripts were added to give the elements value. For 
example, to refer to person Sarah Parker, the author would use the expression 
P
Sarah Parker
. To refer to the name ‘Sarah Parker’, one could use the expression N
Sarah 
Parker. The subscript ‘?’ was used to show anonymityfor example, P? represents 
an anonymous person. 
Table 5.3: Loss of Anonymity in PANIC (continued next page) 
English Expression PANIC Expression 
An anonymous person becomes non-
anonymous once the person’s real name is 
known.  
P
?
 + N
x
 ⇒ P
x 
 
For example, the name Sarah Parker (N
Sarah 
Parker
) associated to
125
 an anonymous person 
(P
?
) makes the person non-anonymous (ie 
turns P? into P ). 
P
?
 + N
Sarah Parker
 ⇒ P
Sarah Parker
 
An anonymous username or
126
 remark 
associated to (or traced to) a non-
anonymous person becomes a non-
anonymous username or remark. 
(A|C)
?
 + (P|N)
x
 ⇒ (A|C)
x
 
 
124
 ie created because of non-face-to-face interaction and use of typed remarks. 
125
 The operator ‘+’ is used to indicate that there is a proven (or verifiable) connection 
between two elements, 
126
 The operator ‘|’ is used to replace the word ‘or’. 
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English Expression PANIC Expression 
An anonymous person or remark 
connected to an identified alias (ie non-
anonymous username) becomes non-
anonymous (or non-mysterious). In other 
words, a person using a non-anonymous 
alias is not anonymous. 
(P|C)
?
 + A
x
 ⇒ (P|C)
x
 
An idiosyncrasy observed in
127
 a person’s 
message exposes (or becomes) the 
person’s idiosyncrasy. 
C
x
(I
?
) ⇒ I
x 
 
Equally, an idiosyncrasy associated to a 
known person or identified username 
causes the idiosyncrasy to be identified. 
I
?
 + (P|A)
x
 ⇒ I
x
 
A known (or exposed) idiosyncrasy makes 
a remark non-anonymous. 
C
?
 + I
x
 ⇒ C
x
 
A message tagged by (ie associated to) an 
identified username renders the remark 
non-anonymous. 
C
?
 + A
x
 ⇒ C(A
x
) ⇒ C
x
 
A person’s idiosyncrasies or alias exposes 
the presence of the person. 
P
?
 + (A|I)
x
 ⇒ P
x
 
It was also discovered that most other concepts relating to anonymity could 
also be described in PANIC—see Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4: Other concepts described in PANIC (continued next page) 
English Expression PANIC Expression 
The use of a false name or idiosyncrasy to 
conceal (or replace)
128
 one’s real name and 
idiosyncrasy creates Hidden-Anonymity 
(HA). When X replaced his or her real-life 
name and idiosyncrasies with that of 
another person (ie Y), X ‘became’ another 
person (and received Hidden-Anonymity). 
P
x
 - (N & I)
x
 + (N|I)
y
 ⇒ P
y
 | P
?HA
 
Protected-Anonymity (PtA) is created when 
one person agrees to conceal another 
person’s real name. When X and Y agree to 
conceal the real-life name of X, Y receives 
Protected-Anonymity. 
(P
y
& P
x
) - N
x
 ⇒P
y
 & P
?PtA
 
 
127
 The expression ‘C(I)’ is used to show that ‘I’ is observed in ‘C’. 
128
 The operator ‘-’ is used to indicate removal (or concealment). 
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English Expression PANIC Expression 
A user who manages to conceal his or her 
real name receives Profile-Anonymity 
(PfA). 
A
X
 - N
x
 ⇒ P
?PfA
 
Confined-Anonymity (CA) is created when 
a user is able to conceal his or her 
remarks. 
C(A
x
) - A
x
 ⇒ C
?CA 
C
x
 - A
x
 ⇒ C
?CA
 
CA is created when a remark is traced to a 
group of people. 
C
?
 + (P|A|N)
x,y,z
 ⇒ C
?CA
 
CA is created when the username of an 
identified person is not known. 
P
X
 - A
x
 ⇒ A
?CA
 
CA is also created when a username is 
traced to a group of people. 
A
?
 + P
x,y,z
 ⇒ A
?CA
 
Absolute-Anonymity (AA) occurs when one 
is able to remove all the evidence 
connected to one’s remark. 
C(P|A|N|I)
x
 - (P & A & N & I)
x
 ⇒ C
?AA 
In other words, 
C
x
 - (P & A & N & I)
x
 ⇒ C
?AA
 
The Alias Technique works by associating 
a remark to anonymous alias instead of a 
person or identified username. 
C(P|A|N)
x
 - (P & A & N)
x
 + A
?
 ⇒ C
? 
C
x
 - (P & A & N)
x
 + A
?
 ⇒ C
?
 
The Tag Technique tries to sever the 
association between a remark and a user 
(or person). 
C(P|A|N)
x
 - (P & A & N)
x
 ⇒ C
? 
C
x
 - (P & A & N)
x
 ⇒ C
?
 
Besides providing a way to describe anonymity-related events, the PANIC 
expressions (or ‘equations’) has also provided the author with further insights 
into anonymity. The expressions seem to show that the scope and potential 
for loss of anonymity increases with the inclusion of more PANIC elements. It 
would seem that the five PANIC elements need to be kept apart or removed 
from a conversation to reduce loss of anonymity. This ‘discovery’ has 
unknowingly been the author’s strategy from the onset. In essence, the limited 
information policy (see page 75) attempts to remove real names (ie the N 
element) from the expression. The tag technique attempts to separate 
usernames (ie the A element) from remarks (ie the C element). Mirages attempt 
to remove usernames altogether. The capitalisation checker attempts to 
remove capitalisation idiosyncrasies from remarks (ie remove some of the I 
element). 
5.2 Pseudo-scenario analysis 
The Longman dictionary defines the word scenario as ‘a written description of 
a possible course of action or events.’ In Lee 94, the author used scenarios to 
describe various ‘imaginary’ systems in action. A pseudo-scenario describes a 
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‘real’ system in action. It describes a factual course of action or events. 
Although the circumstances might be ‘invented’, the events that follow are 
based on what a system allows. The transcripts found throughout Chapters 2, 
3, and 4 can be considered pseudo-scenarios. 
Pseudo-scenarios were used to compare the capabilities of three systems. A 
set of hypothetical problems was first created. Attempts were then made to 
address the problems using the different systems. The MERC system was 
included in this analysis to show the difference made by deliberate provisions 
for anonymity. The Elsewhere II (EW2) system was also included because the 
author believed it would represent most of the well-known social-oriented 
conversation systems on the Internet at the time. 
A working version of each system was required for the analysis. There was no 
problem getting MERC to compile and run. Although the EW2 source code was 
available, it could not readily compile on the host computer used by the 
author. That was not a great concern as there was an abundance of services 
based on EW2 on the Internet.
129
 
Scenario 1: Anonymous user harassing other users 
The following set of scenarios compares the options available to deal with 
problematic anonymous users. 
Scenario 1.1: When harassed by an anonymous user, what can user A (a 
non-superuser) do besides leaving the system or reporting the problem to 
a superuser? 
Options T2 MERC EW2/FH 
‘Mute’ the remarks 
of the harasser 
(with the help of 
the system). 
Move conversation 
into personal 
chamber. Lock 
chamber (chamber 
lock). Request 
unknown users in 
chamber to leave. 
Remove unknown 
users by force if 
necessary (chamber 
remove <user>). 
Engage earmuffs. 
- room bolt 
boot <user> 
earmuffs 
‘Hide’ from the 
harasser (by 
assuming a new 
identity). 
Morph to a new 
username. 
Quit and reconnect 
with new 
username. 
Quit and reconnect 
with new 
username. 
 
129
 The Foothills (FH) service was used in this analysis. 
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There were two distinct courses of action. Both options are supported by T2. 
However, not every system is designed to offer the first option. 
Scenario 1.2: What can a superuser do when the harasser ignores every 
warning?
130
 
Options T2 MERC EW2/FH 
Stop harasser from 
making further 
remarks. 
freeze <user> freeze <user> freeze <user> 
Disable harasser’s 
account (ie prevent 
harasser from 
using his/her 
username). 
deny <user> deny <user> banish <user> 
Disconnect 
harasser and reject 
future connections 
from harasser’s 
computer. 
Impose a thirty-day 
IP address ban on 
harasser (autoban 
<user>).
131
 
Determine 
harasser’s IP 
address (users). 
Impose an 
indefinite IP 
address ban on 
harasser (ban 
<IP>). 
- 
Impose ‘virtual’ 
fines. 
- Game punishment 
(eg deduction of 
gold, points, levels 
etc).132 
- 
Most systems allow some disciplinary action to be taken against a user 
without jeopardising the user’s anonymity. The actions possible varies from 
system to system. MERC for example, requires a wizard (ie superuser) to know 
the network address of a user before connections from the user’s computer 
can be banned. T2 and EW2 do not. 
 
130
 What if the harasser were to use the tag technique to harass people? A senior T2 
superuser could temporarily disable the tag technique (tag off). 
131
 T2 records the harasser’s IP address (in unencrypted form) in the banned-IP file. 
132
 This will require the harasser’s file to be editing from the operating system. 
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Scenario 1.3: The harasser reconnects from a different computer (ie 
different IP address or site), creates a new identity (ie new username), and 
continues harassment. What can a superuser do besides repeating the 
actions in Scenario 1.2? 
Options T2 MERC EW2/FH 
Temporarily 
prevent people 
from creating new 
username. 
Temporarily close 
the system to 
visitors
133
 
(vislock). 
Temporarily close 
the system to non-
superusers 
(wizlock). 
Temporarily close 
the system to 
visitors (newbies). 
Reject all 
connection 
attempts from 
harasser’s site. 
The Head 
Superuser 
examines the 
banned-IP file to 
obtain harasser’s IP 
address. Then 
banish harasser’s 
site indefinitely 
(ban <site>). 
Determine the 
harasser’s IP 
address (users) 
and banish 
harasser’s site 
indefinitely (ban 
<site>). E-mail a 
complaint to 
harasser’s ISP. 
Impose a ten 
minute site-ban on 
harasser (splat 
<user> 
<minutes>). 
Report the problem 
to harasser’s 
Internet Service 
Provider (ISP). 
The Head 
Superuser 
examines banned-
IP to obtain 
harasser’s IP 
address (and 
therefore, ISP). 
Email complaint to 
ISP. 
Checks the login 
logs (or harasser’s 
player file) to 
determine 
harasser’s IP 
address. 
Determine 
harasser’s IP 
address (check ip 
or check info). 
Scenario 2: User realises own idiosyncrasies 
Idiosyncrasies are a major hindrance to both authorship and identity 
anonymity. The following set of scenarios compares what a user with ‘strong’ 
idiosyncrasies has to do to attain conversational anonymity. 
Scenario 2.1: User A realises that ‘he’ has a distinct style of writing. User A 
wants to be anonymous and make anonymous remarks. He chooses an 
anonymous username. What else should user A do? 
Options T2 MERC EW2/FH 
Keep sentences 
brief—eg ‘yes’ or 
‘no’. 
Keep sentences 
brief. 
Keep sentences 
brief. 
Keep sentences 
brief. 
 
133
 ie people without an existing account. 
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Options T2 MERC EW2/FH 
Check for known 
idiosyncrasies in 
remarks before 
they are 
‘published’. 
Use the word-
blocker to check 
for idiosyncrasies. 
Manual check. Manual check. 
Resort to 
authorship 
anonymity—people 
should not know 
whose 
idiosyncrasies they 
have observed. 
Use the tag 
commands. 
- Use the echo 
command. 
Use the pretend 
technique (ie a 
false name) and 
introduce 
engineered 
idiosyncrasies to 
confuse others. 
Pretend technique. Pretend technique. Pretend technique. 
Use a messenger to 
convey one’s 
remarks. 
Messenger. Messenger. Messenger. 
While the task of overcoming problems with idiosyncrasies does not require 
help from the underlying conversation system, special provisions (eg the 
word-blocker in T2) can make the task easier. 
Scenario 2.2: User A made a slip-up that caused his username to be non-
anonymous. What can user A do in addition to changing his username? 
T2 MERC EW2/FH 
Prevent repeating the slip-
up. Set up the word-
blocker to identify the slip-
up. 
- - 
The word-blocker can alert user A before he makes an identical slip-up. 
Scenario 2.3: What if user A were not able to use a different username? 
T2 MERC EW2/FH 
Conceal one’s presence. Go 
into a permanent-Mirage 
(mirage). Converse from it. 
- - 
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Although, MERC provides a way for users to become ‘invisible’, it also provides 
a way for users to detect those that are invisible. In comparison, there is no 
simple way of checking who is hiding in a T2 permanent-Mirage. 
Scenario 3: Introducing Anonymity into formal meetings 
Scenario 3.1: What can a chairperson do to force every participant to 
adopt anonymity? 
T2 MERC EW2/FH 
Anonymise every 
participant’s remark Hold 
meeting in a Mirage 
(private-Mirage or 
permanent-Mirage). 
- - 
Scenario 3.2: How would ‘anonymous’ and identified remarks be made? 
Options T2 MERC EW2/FH 
Switch between 
identified and 
anonymous 
usernames. 
Morph between 
usernames. 
Everyone must do 
this together if 
meeting is not held 
in a private-Mirage. 
Everyone must 
quit the system 
together and 
reconnect with new 
username. 
Everyone must 
quit the system 
together and 
reconnect with new 
username. 
Participants are 
asked to use their 
identified 
username but make 
use of provisions 
for making 
anonymous 
remarks.  
Use the tag 
commands when 
anonymity is 
required. 
If meeting in a 
chamber, the 
owner can turn the 
chamber into a 
private-Mirage 
(chamber mirage) 
when anonymity is 
required. 
- Use the echo 
command when 
anonymity is 
required. 
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Scenario 3.3: How would a person respond to an anonymous remark in 
private? 
T2 MERC EW2/FH 
A user can respond using 
the tell <number> 
<remark> command (or 
the atell <number> 
<remark> command if the 
user wanted to remain 
anonymous as well). 
- - 
Scenario 3.4: How would the meeting be restricted to certain people? 
T2 MERC EW2/FH 
Arrange to meet at 
chairperson’s chamber. 
- Arrange to meet at 
chairperson’s room. 
Just before meeting 
commences, room is 
locked (chamber lock). 
Chairperson then removes 
unidentified users 
(chamber remove 
<user>). 
- room bolt. 
room boot <user>. 
Use the tag commands to 
make anonymous remarks. 
- Use the echo command to 
make anonymous remarks. 
Alternatively, chairperson 
turns the chamber into a 
private-Mirage when 
anonymity is required 
(chamber mirage). 
- - 
Conclusion of the pseudo-scenario analysis 
In Scenarios 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, and 3.3, T2 was able to provide a course of action 
when MERC and EW2 could not. In Scenario 3.4, T2 was able to provide 
solutions when MERC could not. In very simple terms, T2 had a four-scenario 
‘advantage’ over the other systems. When T2 is compared to its former self (ie 
MERC), there was a five-scenario ‘advantage’. 
The author believed that these figures suggested that T2 was able to address 
more anonymity-related problems than MERC (and EW2). The author believed 
that T2 could provide better protection against loss of anonymity and better 
control over the use of anonymity. 
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5.3 AAC1 range analysis 
The AAC1 range analysis involves calculating the AAC1 percentages for two 
scenarios—one representing a pro-anonymity (or high-anonymity) scenario 
while the other an anti-anonymity (or low-anonymity) scenario. The average 
between the two can then be used to represent the degree of anonymity 
supported by a system or environment. 
Table 5.5 describes the result of an AAC1 range analysis on T2. The high-
anonymity scenario could be seen as representing an infrequent anonymous 
user making ashouts from a permanent-Mirage. The low-anonymity scenario 
could be seen as representing a group of ‘friends’ conversing from within a 
locked chamber. T2 produced percentages that ranged from 13-50%. The 
average of 31% was used as the figure to represent T2. 
Table 5.5: AAC1 range analysis of T2 
 Factors High-Anon  Low-Anon 
1 Username concealed in high-anonymity scenario. 
Password-protected username used in low-anonymity 
scenario. 
0/2 2/2 
2 Personal details submitted? No. 0/2 0/2 
3 Administration has access to personal details? No. 0/2 0/2 
4 Compromised privacy? No. 0/2 0/2 
5 Lack of Confidentiality? No. 0/2 0/2 
6 Remarks tagged by username? Yes, in high-anonymity 
scenario. 
0/1 1/1 
7 Deanonymisation of anonymous remarks? No. 0/1 0/1 
8 Known Idiosyncrasies? Users in the low-anonymity scenario 
know one another very well. 
0/1 1/1 
9 Private communication supported? Yes. 1/1 1/1 
10 Meetings can be restricted by locking chamber. Closed 
meeting? Yes in low-anonymity scenario. 
1/2 2/2 
11 Proximity? N/A N/A 
12 User is not anonymous to some participants. Yes in low-
anonymity scenario. 
0/2 2/2 
    
 AAC1 Rating 2/18 9/18 
 AAC1 Percentage 13% 50% 
 Average Percentage 31% 
How much does T2 differ from Oz? The range analysis shows a 13% (44-31%) 
improvement in the level of protection—see Table 5.6 (on the next page). 
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Table 5.6: AAC1 range analysis of Oz  
 Factors High-Anon  Low-Anon 
1 Username concealed in high-anonymity scenario. 
Password-protected username used in low-anonymity 
scenario. 
0/2 2/2 
2 Personal details submitted? No. 0/2 0/2 
3 Admin has access to personal details? Only the head 
superuser can check user’s IP address. 
0.5/2 0.5/2 
4 Compromised privacy? Conversations can be 
eavesdropped by (invisible) users and superusers. 
2/2 2/2 
5 Lack of Confidentiality? No. 0/2 0/2 
6 Remarks tagged by username? Yes, in high-anonymity 
scenario. 
0/1 1/1 
7 Deanonymisation of anonymous remarks? No. 0/1 0/1 
8 Known Idiosyncrasies? Users in the low-anonymity scenario 
know one another very well. 
0/1 1/1 
9 Private communication supported? Yes. 1/1 1/1 
10 Meetings can be restricted by locking chamber. Closed 
meeting? Yes in low-anonymity scenario. 
1/2 2/2 
11 Proximity? N/A N/A 
12 User is not anonymous to some participants. Yes in low-
anonymity scenario. 
0/2 2/2 
    
 AAC1 Rating 4.5/18 11.5/18 
 AAC1 Percentage 25% 64% 
 Average Percentage 44% 
The range analysis was repeated for MERC and EW2—see Table 5.7 (below) and 
Table 5.8 (on the next page). 
Table 5.7: AAC1 range analysis of MERC (continued next page) 
 Factors High-Anon  Low-Anon 
1 Password-protected username is used in low-anonymity 
scenario. 
1/2 2/2 
2 Personal details submitted? No. 0/2 0/2 
3 Admin has access to personal details? Several ranks of 
superusers can check user’s IP address. 
1/2 1/2 
4 Compromised privacy? Conversations can be 
eavesdropped by (invisible) users and superusers. 
2/2 2/2 
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 Factors High-Anon  Low-Anon 
5 Lack of Confidentiality? No. 0/2 0/2 
6 Remarks tagged by username? 0.5/1
134
 1/1 
7 Deanonymisation of anonymous remarks? 1/1
135
 N/A 
8 Known Idiosyncrasies? 0/1 1/1 
9 Private communication supported? 1/1 1/1 
10 Meetings can be restricted? Closed meeting? 0/2 0/2 
11 Proximity?  N/A N/A 
12 Users are not anonymous to some participants? 0/2 2/2 
    
 AAC1 Rating 6.5/18 10/17 
 AAC1 Percentage 36% 59% 
 Average Percentage 47% 
Table 5.8: AAC1 range analysis of EW2/Foothills (continued next page) 
 Factors High-Anon  Low-Anon 
1 Password-protected username is used in low-anonymity 
scenario. 
1/2 2/2 
2 Personal details submitted? To protect one’s username, 
one has to supply one’s e-mail address. 
0/2 2/2
136
 
3 Admin has access to personal details? Several ranks of 
superusers can check user’s IP address. 
1/2 2/2
137
 
4 Compromised privacy? 0/2 0/2 
5 Lack of Confidentiality? 0/2 0/2 
6 Remarks tagged by username? 0/1
138
 1/1 
7 Deanonymisation of anonymous remarks? 1/1
139
 N/A 
8 Known Idiosyncrasies? 0/1 1/1 
 
134
 If a user were able to be ‘invisible’, anonymous remarks would be possible. 
135
 A user with the ability to ‘detect invisibility’ will be able to identify the remarks 
made by an ‘invisible’ user.  
136
 To own a password-protected username, users have to disclose their e-mail 
address. 
137
 Since user has provided an e-mail address, it can now be checked as well. 
138
 The echo command can be used to remove username tags. 
139
 Superusers are able to deanonymise echoes. 
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 Factors High-Anon  Low-Anon 
9 Private communication supported? 1/1 1/1 
10 Meetings can be restricted? Closed meeting? 1/2 2/2 
11 Proximity? N/A N/A 
12 Users are not anonymous to some participants? 0/2 2/2 
    
 AAC1 Rating 5/18 13/18 
 AAC1 Percentage 28% 72% 
 Average Percentage 50% 
The other well-known conversation system on the Internet is the Internet 
Relay Chat (IRC). Table 5.9 describes how IRC scored an average of 47%. 
Table 5.9: AAC1 range analysis of IRC 
 Factors High-Anon  Low-Anon 
1 Password-protected usernames are not supported. 0/2 0/2 
2 Personal details submitted? 0/2 0/2 
3 Admin has access to personal details? All superusers (or 
‘operators’) know user’s IP address. 
1/2 1/2 
4 Compromised privacy? 0/2 0/2 
5 Lack of Confidentiality? User’s IP address is publicised. 2/2 2/2 
6 Remarks tagged by username? Yes, because anonymous 
remarks are not supported. 
1/1 1/1 
7 Deanonymisation of anonymous remarks? N/A N/A 
8 Known Idiosyncrasies? 0/1 1/1 
9 Private communication supported? 1/1 1/1 
10 Meetings can be restricted? Closed meeting? 1/2 2/2 
11 Proximity?  N/A N/A 
12 Users are not anonymous to some participants? 0/2 2/2 
    
 AAC1 Rating 6/17 10/17 
 AAC1 Percentage 35% 59% 
 Average Percentage 47% 
Town Meeting (TM) was the final system analysed. The preliminary 
investigations concluded that TM was the most ideal environment for 
conversational anonymity. Is T2 more ideal than TM? Table 5.10 (on the next 
page) contains the results of TM. 
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Table 5.10: AAC1 range analysis of TM 
 Factors High-Anon  Low-Anon 
1 Password-protected usernames are not supported. 0/2 0/2 
2 Personal details submitted? 0/2 0/2 
3 Admin has access to personal details? 0/2 0/2 
4 Compromised privacy? The TM server logs all non-private 
remarks. 
1/2 1/2 
5 Lack of Confidentiality?  0/2 0/2 
6 Remarks tagged by username? TM supports the nameless 
technique. 
0/1 1/1 
7 Deanonymisation of anonymous remarks? A flaw in TM 
may allow people to deanonymise anonymous usernames 
(and remarks).
140
 
1/1 N/A 
8 Known Idiosyncrasies? 0/1 1/1 
9 Private communication supported? 1/1 1/1 
10 Meetings can be restricted? Yes, a common-access 
password can be set. Closed meeting? 
1/2 2/2 
11 Proximity?  1/2 1/2 
12 Users are not anonymous to some participants? 0/2 2/2 
    
 AAC1 Rating 5/20 9/19 
 AAC1 Percentage 25% 47% 
 Average Percentage 36% 
 
140
 See page 16 of Ch 2. 
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Conclusions of the range  analysis 
Table 5.11: Summary of the AAC1 range percentages 
Systems Average Minimum 
T2 31% 13% 
TM 36% 25% 
Oz 44% 25% 
IRC 47% 35% 
MERC 47% 36% 
EW2 50% 28% 
As the author rightly concluded, TM was previously the ‘best’ environment for 
conversational anonymity. That ‘title’ should now belong to T2. T2 scored the 
lowest AAC1 range percentage—suggesting that it protects anonymity better 
than TM, IRC, MERC, EW2, and Oz. T2 also scored the lowest AAC1 range 
minimum (ie 13%)—suggesting that it is able to provide the highest degree of 
anonymity. Both scores suggest that T2 is the superior environment. 
Chart 5.1 visualises the data in Table 5.11 along with the overall average and 
the standard deviation. 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
T2
TM
Oz
IRC
MERC
EW2
Average
-1 Standard
Deviation
+1 Standard
Deviation
-2 Standard
Deviation
 
Chart 5.1: Comparing the potential for loss of anonymity 
Only T2 and TM have a below-average potential for loss of anonymity. In other 
words, they were above-average environments for conversational anonymity. 
Except for T2, other environments laid within one standard deviation—
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perhaps suggesting that T2 is a distinctly different (or rather, distinctly 
‘better’) environment from the rest.
141
 
5.4 Close of the in-depth research phase 
The three goals of the in-depth research phase were to: 
1 create a better method of introducing authorship anonymity into 
online conversations than the nameless or the nondescript-avatar 
technique, 
2 create the ideal environment for conversational anonymity, and 
3 create a set of guidelines and standards for supporting conversational 
anonymity. 
Has the first goal been achieved? ‘Yes,’ because the tag technique is more ideal 
than the nameless technique. The tag technique does not hinder 
communication as the nameless technique does.  Furthermore, it does not 
change the style of conversing as the nondescript-avatar technique did. 
Has the second goal been achieved? T2 is a very ideal environment for 
conversational anonymity because anonymity is acknowledged, easily 
attained, protected, regulated, and allowed to co-exist with non-anonymity. 
The pseudo-scenario analysis and the AAC1 range analysis also showed that 
T2 is currently the best environment for conversational anonymity. The 
author believes that the second goal has been attained. Nevertheless, he 
hesitates to see T2 as the ultimate environment for conversational anonymity. 
Instead, he sees T2 as representing the minimum standard of support. 
Has the third goal been achieved? ‘No,’ not yet. 
A framework of guidelines and standards 
The provisions (ie the policies and techniques) that had transformed MERC 
into T2 were therefore generalised and turned into a set of recommendations 
(and requirements). This compilation, dubbed the Phantom Framework, is 
found in Appendix 1 (on page 112). 
 
141
 It is important that one does not think T2 has only been compared to TM, MERC, 
IRC, and EW2. Most conversation systems (on the Internet) are either based on or 
closely resemble these systems. 
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The Phantom Framework turns the outcomes of this research into a form that 
is convenient to disseminate, open to scrutiny, and independent of any 
specific method of implementation. This framework can now be used to raise 
the level of support (for conversational anonymity) of any conversation 
service to (and beyond) the benchmark set by T2. 
The third goal, which is also the primary goal of this research, has now been 
achieved. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion
6 Conclusions 
Anonymity has been seen as a natural by-product of text-based online 
communication. The absence of face-to-face contact and the use of typed 
messages are sufficient to create anonymity. It is why a certain degree of 
anonymity is possible on a text-based conversation system that does not even 
claim to support anonymity. 
This study has found that the naturally occurring anonymity is not ideal. A 
better ‘kind’ of anonymity has been found—one that is more practical and 
secure—one that has been deliberately created. Such a kind of anonymity was 
found in T2 and T1 (and to a lesser extent in Oz). Such a kind of anonymity 
can be recreated by the complete adoption of the Phantom Framework.
142
 
Apart from the Phantom Framework, this study has also created a body of 
knowledge. Concepts such as absolute-anonymity, profiled-anonymity, 
confined-anonymity, hidden-anonymity, protected-anonymity, conversational 
anonymity, identity anonymity, and authorship anonymity will now be 
available for others to use. The Anti-Anonymity Checklist 1 (AAC1) analyses 
and the PANIC notation should also be available. 
This work has also shown that anonymity does not need to be a hindrance to 
identity (ie non-anonymity), and vice-versa. Both can coexist and complement 
one another. The benefits of both can be attained at the same time. Support 
for the tag technique and password-protected usernames should enable a 
group of people to be identified, and yet converse anonymously. 
Although the goals of this research have been met, the author believes that 
there is room for further research. The author has responded to the problem 
of idiosyncrasies by supporting keyword screening and a de-capitalisation 
mechanism. The idea of a style scrambler capable of removing one’s 
idiosyncrasies or adding foreign idiosyncrasies was not implemented. Had 
Flinn and Maurer’s style scramblers been possible, the degree of a user’s 
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 See Appendix 1 (page 112). 
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anonymity would have been elevated to new heights. Implementing Flinn and 
Maurer’s style scramblers is an area for further research. Another possible 
area is to expand the Phantom Framework to support other online activities 
such as e-commerce
143
 and collaborative writing (or work).
144
 Further work is 
also needed before the Phantom Framework can be made acceptable to 
standards-setting bodies in particular, the International Standards 
Organisation. 
The conclusion or thesis of this research is simple—anonymity, if desired, 
should be deliberately supported. Should every online service support 
conversational anonymity? No, but at least one should. T1 was that service for 
a while. It has now been closed. Perhaps until T2 opens or until the Phantom 
Framework is adopted by one of the many conversation services on the 
Internet, people needing anonymity may have to face the kinds of difficulties 
they have been always had to face. 
 
143
 See Appendix 2 for a hint of what might be possible. 
144
 See Lee 94 for a hint of what might be possible. 
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Appendices
Appendices 
Appendix 1: The Phantom Framework 
The Phantom Framework does not contain of specifications but rather a 
combination of restrictions, demands, and examples. It specifies what the 
ideal environment for conversational anonymity is but does not specify how it 
should be created. The Phantom Framework is intended to help system 
designers and administrators transform an existing conversation service into a 
more adequate environment for users that require anonymity. 
Each clause is permanently referenced using a <section>/<clause> 
(<subclause>)-<release> scheme—eg [12/1(1)-1]. Alpha characters are used to 
relate certain clauses together—ie [12/1/(1a)-1] and [12/1/(1b)-1]. All future 
amendments will have to be introduced as additional clauses with a new 
release number. An existing clause cannot be modified after official release. 
The Phantom Framework 1 (PF-1) 
0/ Notes 
0/1(n)-n Release history—a record of versions (where n should become the release 
version), authors, dates, release channel, and comments. 
0/1(1)-1 Phantom Framework 1 (PF-1) by Andrew Lee 
Published on 7
th
 September 2000 at 
http://www.geocities.com/drew_drew.geo/phantom/ 
0/2a-1 The Phantom Framework (PF) clauses are consistently qualified by 
a scheme of reserved words. A clause qualified by ‘must’ means a 
mandatory requirement. 
0/2b-1 A clause qualified by ‘shall’ means a conditional requirement, 
where adherence is mandatory if the execution is possible or 
applicable. 
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0/2c-1 A clause qualified by ‘should’ means an adaptable requirement, 
where the terms or level of adherence can be changed. 
0/2d-1 A clause qualified by ‘may’ means a suggestion or discretionary 
requirement. 
0/3-1 To claim compliance to the Phantom Framework, the musts and 
shalls in sections 1–11 must be implemented or observed. 
0/4-1 A ‘service’ (as opposed to ‘services’) shall consist of the system 
(providing the services), services (ie the aid provided), policies (ie 
the terms, conditions, and codes of practice), and the 
administration (ie the people that maintain the service). 
0/5-1 A ‘system’ shall consist of programs and the standard procedures 
that revolve around the programs. 
0/6-1 The ‘user’ is a person using the service. A user may be equated to a 
customer. 
0/7-1 An ‘administrator’ means a member of the administration. It shall 
not imply any rank or responsibilities. 
0/8-1 A ‘superuser’ is a user who is given special authorities and 
privileges by the administration to provide services to other users. 
A superuser is a member of the administration but the reverse may 
not be true. 
0/9-1 The administration must have complete control over the system 
and data (or official records). The programs must be understood 
and modifiable. 
0/10-1 Every member of the administration must operate under a 
consistent code of practice. No administrator shall be exempted 
from the code of practice. 
0/11-1 The administration must be able to give and honour guarantees to 
a user. 
0/12-1 A ‘contribution’, ‘remark’, or ‘message’ shall imply a text-only 
content. 
0/13-1 A piece of ‘real-life user information’ shall mean a truth or fact 
about a person. A person’s full real name, date of birth, employer, 
telephone number, or e-mail address are examples of real-life user 
information. A user’s username may or may not be treated as a 
real-life user information. 
0/14-1 Real-life user information is gathered ‘indirectly’ when it is 
obtained without the explicit knowledge of the user. Potential 
sources may include a user’s personal and formal affiliations, 
public databases, the user’s computer or software (eg the operating 
system or Telnet client), or the network protocol. 
  
1/ The Limited Information Policy 
1/1-1 A service must be able to function without knowing its users’ real-
life identity. A service should function without requiring any piece 
of real-life user information. 
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1/2-1 Real-life user information shall not be gathered (whether directly 
or indirectly) until a user has rejected anonymity or violated his or 
her rights to anonymity (ie violated the contractual-anonymity 
understanding [5/1-1]). 
1/3-1 Any unavoidable need, possession, or use of a piece of real-life 
user information must be shown (ie proved) to be in the direct 
interest of the user or community (ie other users). Nevertheless, a 
justification shall not automatically imply an approval to gather, 
store, or use a piece of real-life user information. 
1/4-1 A user must be notified before (and not after) any indirect 
gathering [0/14-1] of real-life user information, even if the service 
is not seeking the user’s permission. 
  
2/ The Confidentiality Policy 
2/1-1 Users must be allowed to hide their real-life identity from other 
users. By default, every piece of real-life user information must be 
presumed confidential and guarded from the public (ie other 
users). The user shall decide what is not confidential. 
2/2-1 Justifications [1/3-1] and usage-access details (UAD) must be given 
to a user before a piece of real-life user information is stored (ie 
permanently recorded). The UAD must describe who will have 
access to what piece of user real-life user information explicitly. 
2/3-1 The use and disclosure of any real-life user information must be in 
accordance with the UAD [2/2-1]. 
2/4-1 Any record of a user’s real-life identity should be kept in an 
encrypted form and should be deleted when it has served its 
purpose. 
2/5-1 A user’s authorisation (ie consent) must not be implied or 
extended. A user who authorises a specific member of the 
administration does not automatically authorise the entire 
administration. 
2/6-1 The UAD must be comprehensive at the onset. The administration 
shall not modify the UAD without (formally) notifying a user a few 
days (not hours) in advance so that the user may be able to take 
any necessary action. 
2/7-1 The UAD must never be knowingly violated. 
2/8-1 An administrator who has access to any piece of real-life user 
information must be subjected to additional identification and 
authentication than the usual level imposed upon a user. 
Identification may proceed beyond password identification and 
require real-life names and e-mail addresses to be disclosed. 
Authentication may become more subjective and involve 
interviews to verify an administrator’s identity. 
  
3/ The Transparency Policy 
3/1-1 Users must know what information is kept about them. The 
administration must guarantee that every piece of real-life user 
information in possession has been disclosed. 
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3/2-1 Any information generated by the administration that is not 
considered a piece of real-life user information [0/13-1] (eg 
comments about a user’s ‘misbehaviour’) shall remain the property 
of the service and shall not have to be revealed to a user. 
  
4/ The Privacy Policy 
4/1-1 Activities of non-superusers (ie users) must never be secretly 
monitored (ie observed or recorded). Users must be aware of any 
monitoring in advance and while it occurs. 
4/2-1 Any unavoidable monitoring must be shown (ie proved) to be in 
the direct interest of the user or community. 
4/3-1 A group of users shall be able to hold a private meeting. No user 
(including a superuser) shall be able to join (ie intrude) the private 
meeting. Private lockable chambers (or channels) should be 
implemented. 
  
5/ The Contractual-Anonymity Policy 
5/1-1 An explicit (written) understanding must exist between the 
administration and the users whereby anonymity is guaranteed 
provided a user observes certain conditions. The contractual-
anonymity understanding (CAU) shall specify the conditions, 
guarantees, and repercussions. The repercussions may include 
efforts to determine a violator’s real-life identity. 
5/2-1 A person must be presented with the CAU before the person 
becomes a user (ie before the person uses the service). 
5/3-1 Anonymity may be granted to a user that has not explicitly agreed 
to the conditions in the CAU. The repercussions (outlined the CAU) 
may still be enforceable if the conditions are violated. 
5/4-1 A user must be shown (ie proven) to have explicitly violated the 
CAU before any repercussions are enforced. The service must not 
knowingly jeopardise the anonymity of any user while verifying a 
user’s compliance (to the CAU). In fact, a user should not be 
investigated unless there is due cause (ie evidence). 
5/5-1 A repercussion that is not described or implied in the CAU shall 
not be considered (or authorised) if it will jeopardise the 
anonymity of the violator. The service must not knowingly violate 
the CAU. 
5/6-1 The conditions and repercussions in the CAU should be 
proportional to the (benefits of the) provisions (in the CAU). 
Support for higher degrees of anonymity should attract more 
serious repercussions. 
5/7-1 Any guarantee (relating to anonymity) that a user cannot verify or 
the administration cannot prove shall be put in writing (in the 
CAU or elsewhere). 
5/7-1 The CAU must be comprehensive at the onset. The administration 
shall not modify the CAU without (formally) notifying the users a 
few days in advance. 
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6/ Anonymity-Compatible Operations 
 An anonymity-compatible method of operation does not endanger or 
reduce the anonymity of the users. 
6/1-1 A standard procedure or authorised practice must not violate the 
CAU [5/1-1]. 
6/2a-1 A standard procedure shall not burden an administrator or 
superuser with secrecy. A standard procedure that will expose an 
administrator or superuser to a piece of real-life user information 
should be automated. 
6/2b-1 The ban-by-username technique [12/9] should be implemented. 
6/3-1 Standard procedures that may jeopardise the anonymity of users 
must be identified and monitored. Any potential of jeopardy 
anonymity must be remove if monitoring were not possible. 
6/4-1 An updated list of the administrative team along with their ranks, 
responsibilities, and capabilities shall be available to the users. 
However, it is not necessary to reveal the real-life identity of an 
administrator. 
6/5-1 A superuser must be identified in a manner that cannot be forged 
by a non-superuser. A user must be able to verify that a particular 
user is indeed a superuser. A user should be able to list all the 
superusers on duty. 
6/6-1 The administration shall address a user by the user’s chosen 
username in any conversation or documentation. An anonymous 
alias shall be assigned to a person if one does not exist (or is not 
appropriate). 
  
7/ The User-Discretion Policy (Support for 
Identification) 
7/1-1 A user shall be allowed be non-anonymous (ie possess an 
identified username and make identified remarks). Some form of 
user identification and authentication (eg password-protected 
usernames) must be supported. A user shall be able to make 
remarks that are tagged by his or her username. 
7/2-1 Real-life user information shall not be used for the identification 
and authentication of a (typical) user. Identification and 
authentication shall not be an acceptable justification for 
requiring or gathering any piece of real-life user information. A 
correct password should be sufficient. 
7/3-1 Where there is a conflict between anonymity and identification, 
anonymity shall have precedence. Provisions for identification 
may be revoked to preserve anonymity. A Mirage [12/6] for 
example, forces everyone to be anonymous for there to be sufficient 
decoys for authorship anonymity [8/]. 
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8/ Support for Authorship Anonymity 
 Authorship Anonymity is created when a user is able to make a remark 
that cannot be traced to the user. 
8/1-1 The system shall support at least one authorship anonymity 
technique. The tag technique [12/1] should be implemented. 
8/2-1 The system must enable the source of a contribution to be 
concealed from users and the administration. The system must 
not provide other users or the administration a way to prove the 
source of a contribution (ie it must not technically be possible to 
deanonymise an anonymous contribution). 
8/3-1 An authorship anonymity technique uses a crowd to conceal the 
contributor and disperse any implications. The theoretical 
minimum should be the presence of four candidates including the 
actual contributor (or three decoys). A ‘candidate’ is a user who 
could have made the contribution technically. An authorship 
anonymity technique shall be disabled if the minimum is not 
satisfied. Each candidate should be a different person. A policy 
shall be imposed to prohibit multiple online presence (ie 
multiplaying). 
8/4-1 The system should provide users with the ability to reject (ie not 
receive) anonymous remarks. 
8/5-1 The system must provide the administration with the ability to 
disable all authorship anonymity techniques (hence, stop the 
creation of anonymous remarks). 
  
9/ Support for Identity Anonymity 
 Identity Anonymity is created when a user’s real-life identity (ie full real 
name) is not known or cannot be verified. 
9/1-1 The system shall support at least one identity anonymity 
technique. The alias on-the-fly technique [12/4] should be 
implemented. 
9/2-1 The system should not collect, force the disclosure, or publicise 
any information that is directly associated to a user’s real-life 
identity (eg a user’s e-mail address or IP address). 
9/3-1 The system should provide users with the ability to isolate 
themselves from anonymous users. 
9/4-1 The system must provide the administration with the ability to 
stop the creation (or use) of anonymous usernames. 
  
10/ Anonymity Guards 
 Anonymity guards help prevent avoidable loss of anonymity. 
10/1-1 A user must show a need for anonymity before an anonymity 
guard may interfere with the actions of the user. For example, the 
activation of the anonymous mode [12/5] or being in a Mirage 
[12/6] is sufficient evidence that a user requires anonymity. 
10/2-1 The contents of a user’s contribution (ie message) should not be 
changed without the user’s knowledge. Some form of explicit 
approval may be required before the system makes any changes. 
A p p e n d i c e s  
118 
 
  
11/ Awareness (Acknowledgement) 
& Education 
11/1-1 Support for (conversational) anonymity must be declared and 
shall be publicised. The keyword anonymity or anonymous shall 
be used. All endorsements and compliance to standards shall be 
declared (and elaborated) and shall be publicised. 
11/2-1 The administration must express in writing, all the asserted 
guarantees (ie assurances) and provisions for anonymity that a 
user may not know about or be able to verify. 
11/3-1 Users must be able to examine the administrative code of practice. 
In fact, users should be presented with this code before using the 
service. 
11/4-1 Users should be advised how to use the provisions and the risks (if 
any) associated to each provision. 
11/5-1 The mechanics behind every (anonymity) provision should be 
documented and made available to users. This may be important 
for user confidence and endorsement purposes. 
  
12/ Supplementary Clauses 
12/1 The Tag Technique 
12/1(1)-1 The tag-based communication commands (ie tag commands) shall 
resemble their untagged (ie non-anonymous) counterparts in form 
(ie syntax, feedback, and presentation) and function. However, 
usernames must be removed and replaced by numbers. 
12/1(1a)-1 An anonymous say command shall be implemented. Asay shall 
enable a user to speak anonymously at a gathering (ie to the 
people in the same room or channel as the user). 
 Syntax: asay <message> 
 Feedback (to the user): [<number> you] say '<message>'. 
 Presentation (ie output): [<number>] says '<message>'. 
12/1(1b)-1 Two anonymous tell commands shall be implemented. The first 
form of atell shall enable users to send private anonymous 
message to specific users. 
 Syntax: atell <user> <message> 
 Feedback: [<num> you] tell <user> '<message>'. 
 Presentation: [<num>] tells you '<message>'. 
The second form of atell shall enable users to reply a tagged 
remark anonymously and privately. Non-delivery of an atell 
<number> command shall not be reported to the user. 
 Syntax: atell <num> <message> 
 Feedback: [<num> you] tell [<num>] '<message>'. 
 Presentation: [<num>] tells [<num> you] '<message>'. 
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12/1(1c)-1 An anonymous shout command shall be implemented. Ashout 
shall enable users to make anonymous remarks to everyone 
online. 
 Syntax: ashout <message> 
 Feedback: [<num> you] shout '<message>'. 
 Presentation: [<num>] shouts '<message>'. 
12/1(1d)-1 An anonymous emote command shall be implemented. Aemote 
shall enable users to convey gestures anonymously at a gathering. 
 Syntax: aemote <activity> 
 Feedback: [<num> you] <activity>. 
 Presentation: [<num>] <activity>. 
12/1(2)-1 The tag shall be a number incremented from the last number 
used. The default range of numbers shall be 1 to 20. At the end of 
the sequence, the initial number shall be reused. If the duration 
between the assignment of the first number (ie 1) and the last 
number (ie 20) were less than one minute, the maximum (ie the 
range) should be automatically increased. If the duration between 
the assignment of the first and last number were more than a 
minute, the default range (ie 1–20) should be used. If a number 
were not reassigned after ten minutes, it should be cleared (ie it 
should not refer to any user). 
12/1(3)-1 Explicit evidence that connects a user, a tag, and a contribution 
must not be permanently stored or accessible to anyone including 
the administration—see [8/2-1]. 
12/1(4)-1 The anonymous mode [12/5], decoy-checker [12/2] and the 
capitalisation checker [12/3] shall be implemented as accessories 
to the tag technique. 
12/1(5)-1 The anonymous rooms [12/6] may be implemented as accessories 
to the tag technique. 
12/2 The Decoy Checker 
12/2(1)-1 The decoy checker mechanism shall disable all authorship 
anonymity techniques (such as the tag technique [12/1]) when 
there are fewer than four active participants in the meeting. 
12/2(2)-1 The decoy checker must discount inactive participants (ie users 
that could not have made any remark). It must rely on the 
information that the system makes available to the users when 
discounting candidates. For example, if the system were to report 
broken network connections then a disconnected user shall not be 
counted. 
12/3 The Capitalisation Checker 
12/3(1)-1 All capitalisation must be removed from an anonymous message. 
A user’s consent shall not be necessary for such intervention. 
12/4 The Alias on-the-fly Technique 
12/4(1)-1 The system shall allow a user to change usernames without 
alerting other users. 
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12/4(2)-1 The morph command shall be implemented. Users shall be asked 
to confirm their decision to change usernames. The usual login (ie 
identification) procedure must proceed before a user is given a 
new username. Certain welcome or introductory messages may be 
omitted to expedite the change. 
12/5 Anonymous Mode 
12/5(1)-1 When a user activates the anonymous mode, all his or her 
contributions (ie remarks) shall be anonymised using an 
authorship anonymity technique (such as the tag technique [12/1]). 
The decoy-checker mechanism [12/2] shall be activated when the 
anonymous mode is active. 
12/5(2)-1 The system shall stop a user from making any action that may be 
traced back to the user. For example, the system should stop the 
user from using social commands. 
12/5(3)-1 A user shall be able to activate or deactivate the anonymous mode 
at any time. 
12/6 Anonymous Rooms/Channels (Mirages) 
12/6(1)-1 An authorship anonymity technique shall be imposed on every 
person in a Mirage (including superusers). The tag technique [12/1] 
should be implemented. 
12/6(2)-1 The system shall not reveal the number of users in a Mirage. The 
decoy-checker mechanism [12/2] shall be activated in a Mirage but 
shall only prohibit the use of an authorship anonymity technique 
if the total number of candidate users on the system is fewer than 
the theoretical minimum of four. 
12/6(3)-1 The system must suppress any system message that may expose 
the presence of a particular user in a Mirage. For example, the 
system shall stop the use of social commands and shall enable 
users to enter and leave a Mirage without generating the usual 
entry or exit notifications. 
12/6(4)-1 The system must stop the execution of any command that may 
verify the presence of a particular user in a Mirage. For example, 
the system shall disable any command that reveals a local 
participant list (eg where and look) and any command that is 
applied to another local user (eg look <user>). 
12/6(5)-1 Users shall be able to transform their private chambers [4/3-1] 
into private-Mirages. The system must notify everyone in the 
chamber (or channel) when miraging and de-miraging occurs. 
12/6(6)-1 The elimination of global participant lists [12/7] may be 
implemented as an accessory to Mirages. 
12/7 The Elimination of Global Participant lists 
12/7(1)-1 All global participant lists shall be removed or replaced by 
statistics (eg a count of the number of users online). 
12/7(2)-1 Local participant lists shall not be removed (as this may inhibit 
private non-anonymous conversations). 
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12/8 The Word-blocker 
12/8(1)-1 The word-blocker shall alert the presence of any banned phrase or 
word from a message and await the user’s decision whether to 
allow the message to be communicated. 
12/8(2)-1 The list of banned words used by the word-blocker shall be 
considered sensitive and must only be accessible by the rightful 
user.  
12/8(3)-1 The word-blocker should be implemented on a front-end (ie a user-
side client software) and should be independent from the server 
(or service). 
12/9 The Ban-by-Username Technique 
12/9(1a)-1 An autoban <user> command shall enable a superuser to ban a 
particular IP address by specifying the user’s username. The 
system shall not reveal the user’s IP address to the superuser. The 
system shall determine the IP address of a user (from the 
temporarily login [12/10(2)-1] or problem-user [12/10(3)-1] logs) or 
determine the IP address from the network protocol and impose a 
ban of the IP address. 
12/9(1b)-1 Bans on IP addresses should be recorded in a banned-IP file. Each 
case should have a fixed expiry date. Upon expiry, the system 
should automatically remove the IP address ban. The banned-IP file 
does not need to be encrypted. 
12/9(2)-1 An unban <user> command shall enable a superuser to remove 
the fixed-period IP address ban on a particular user. 
12/10 Temporary IP address Logs 
12/10(1)-1 Every user’s IP address shall be logged by the system. This activity 
must be known to all users. The IP address will enable the service 
to impose a site ban or to contact a violator’s Internet Service 
Provider. All repercussions shall be outlined in the CAU [5/1-1]. 
12/10(2)-1 The login details shall be stored in encrypted form [2/4-1] in a 
temporary login log. Access to the temporary login logs shall be 
monitored, justified, and confined [6/3-1]. A getip <user> 
command would satisfy the three conditions. It would only return 
the IP address of a specific user. 
12/10(3)-1 An entry in the temporary login log shall have a fixed expiry 
period. The recommended period shall be twenty-four hours. An 
entry shall be deleted when it expires. A saveip <user> 
command shall allow the IP address of certain users to be retained 
(indefinitely) in a problem-user log. A deleteip <user> command 
should enable a user’s IP address to be deleted from the problem-
user log. The problem-user log does not need to be encrypted. 
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Appendix 2: Anonymity as a commercial 
service 
The following scenario shows how the anonymity provisions (in T2) could be 
used to provide a commercial service. 
‘Dr Kelly Brown’ wanted to interview people that were suffering from a very 
rare disease. She could not find any local patients to interview. She turned to 
the Internet. She found an anonymity provider on the Internet. She found the 
terms and fees acceptable. She registered and made a reservation. Her meeting 
details were recorded and approved. She was then issued a unique account 
number. The account number identified Dr Brown to the system. 
The system calculated the fee and prompted her about the payment method. 
She chose to pay using a cheque. She was given the necessary information (ie 
the payee, the billable amount in her local currency, and due date) and 
instructions. The service did not know or needed to know her real-life 
identity. The cheque could be written by anyone as long as her account 
number was quoted. 
Dr Brown mailed her cheque. A week later, Dr Brown logged on the web server 
(with her account number) to check if her payment had been received. Since it 
was, she was given further instructions. 
Once Dr Brown understood what was involved, she began making 
announcements in medical journals, Internet newsgroups, and notice boards 
at the local hospitals. She described who she was, what she wanted to do, the 
benefits of the interviews, the hows and whens, and guarantees anonymity. 
She specifically mentioned the use of an independent professional service to 
provide anonymity. 
Half an hour before the scheduled meeting, the system automatically created a 
virtual meeting room for Dr Brown. As instructed, Dr Brown arrived fifteen 
minutes before the meeting. She tried to use the username ‘Kelly’. 
Unfortunately, that username had already been reserved. She chose ‘Kel’ 
instead. Upon entry into the system, she was presented with a list of active 
meetings. She found the meeting with the title that she had specified (when 
she made her reservations). She was then brought into the appropriate 
meeting room. She then protected her username using her unique account 
number (as she had been instructed in advance). The system recognised the 
account number and now recognised ‘Kel’ as Dr Brown. The system assigned 
her special privileges because she was the host. Even if Dr Brown were to 
change her character’s password, the system would continue to recognise ‘Kel’ 
as Dr Brown (until ‘Kel’ was deleted). 
The system began billing Dr Brown once the scheduled meeting time arrived. 
There were no visitors in the first hour. Dr Brown had purchased five meeting 
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hours, and so four remained. In the second hour, one person arrived. Dr 
Brown began her interview immediately. More people began arriving. 
When the meeting was over, Dr Brown reminded everyone to reserve (ie 
password protect) their username for future meetings. Dr Brown had 
requested (and paid for) a facility to store the usernames of her guests. As 
long as her account was active, her guests would also be stored. Dr Brown had 
paid to keep her account active for a year. When all her guests had left, she 
closed the meeting. The remaining meeting time was credited to her account. 
Dr Brown’s guests were anonymous to her although she was not anonymous to 
them. She could have been anonymous if she had wanted to since the service 
would have protected her identity. She could have attained protected-
anonymity from the service. Even if Dr Brown could recognise her guests at 
later meetings, they would still be anonymous. They would experience 
profiled-anonymity unless they had identified themselves to Dr Brown. Even if 
they did, they should still be able to make anonymous remarks (if they knew 
about the tag commands). 
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